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Management review
The Finnish nuclear power plants caused no danger to the plant environment or employees 
in 2011. No events with safety implications to the safety of the environment or people took 
place at the plants. The collective radiation doses of employees were low and the radioac-
tive releases into the environment very small. Radioactive waste generated in operational 
processes at the nuclear power plants accumulated as anticipated. Its processing and final 
disposal in underground facilities took place in a controlled manner.
The number of events reported to STUK was lower than in previous years. The underly-
ing reasons for the events occurring during the year were mainly related to ageing of the 
plants. Ageing-induced faults were detected at both plants, among others in emergency 
diesel generators used for ensuring the power supply of safety systems in a situation where 
connection to other sources of electricity has been lost. Ageing-induced faults were also 
detected at the Olkiluoto NPP in the main valves of the reactor overpressure protection 
system. The detected faults have not prevented the operation of safety functions, but fol-
lowing the observations, STUK required both power companies to investigate and report 
on the sufficiency of condition monitoring, preventive maintenance and management of 
spare parts of the safety system equipment and structures. Furthermore, STUK inspected 
the spare parts management of plants, as well as their condition monitoring and licensee 
inspection activities during the annual maintenance outages. The inspections and operat-
ing experience show that the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants have to pay more attention to 
the monitoring and management of ageing of safety systems.
At Loviisa and Olkiluoto, modifications required for improving safety continued regarding 
plant systems, equipment and structures and operating practices. At Loviisa 1, the suc-
tion strainers of the low-pressure emergency cooling system and containment spraying 
system, required in accident situations, were improved by installing smaller-mesh strainer 
elements. The modification will secure the cooling of fuel by preventing loose insulation 
materials, for example, from entering the reactor core through the emergency cooling 
system in an accident situation. A similar modification was carried out at Loviisa 2 the 
year before. The Olkiluoto plant continued the modernisation project spanning many years, 
aimed at extending the service life of the plant and improving its availability. Most of the 
modifications implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2011 were now implemented at Olkiluoto 2. 
TVO also started the work for expanding the spent nuclear fuel storage in Olkiluoto. At the 
same time, the structures of the storage facility will be modified to comply with the current 
safety requirements.
Following the Fukushima accident, national safety assessments were initiated and im-
plemented at both pants. They involved assessing the safety of the plants and their safety 
margins against external threats, such as floods, earthquakes and extremely rare and 
severe weather conditions. The assessments also analysed emergency response activities in 
accident situations involving more than one plant unit, as well as cooling of the reactor and 
fuel pools in a situation where the plant has lost its power supplies or its normal residual 
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heat removal systems. The assessments led to the conclusion that safety of the plants can 
be further improved in many ways. The safety of plants was also assessed independently 
of the Fukushima accident. The probabilistic risk analysis of the Olkiluoto plant units was 
further extended by supplementing it with the risk caused by an oil spill accident occurring 
at sea. Furthermore, the frequencies of fires and initiating events included in the analysis 
were updated. Following the changes, the expected core damage frequency of the plant 
increased by about 30%.
No essential changes affecting safety were made to the power companies’ organisations. 
The organisations of both power companies have operated in a systematic and develop-
ment-oriented way. STUK is of the opinion that both power companies should continue 
their development work. The Loviisa plant must ensure that information on the operations 
is collected and utilised for further development of operations and that the implementation 
of actions is systematically followed up. Sufficient resources must be allocated for develop-
ment work. Teollisuuden Voima Oy must continue the development of its modification work 
process, taking into account the several simultaneous plant modification projects foreseen 
for the plant units currently in operation. Both power companies must invest resources in 
the evaluation, management and control of suppliers.
The problem areas in the Olkiluoto 3 project have not changed. The most important un-
settled design issues still concern I&C design, for which the plant supplier and TVO have 
not been able to demonstrate how the independence of different I&C systems has been 
ensured. Demonstration of the qualification of I&C equipment platforms for plant use will 
still require a lot of efforts from all parties concerned. In order to assess the supply chain 
management, STUK investigated the activities of the organisations related to the design 
and manufacture of emergency diesel generators. The investigation revealed deficiencies in 
the selection, instruction, guidance and control of subcontractors. The installation work of 
emergency diesel generators in Olkiluoto was suspended for about one year, during which 
time the conformity of design and manufacture of auxiliary equipment for the EDGs was 
investigated. Deficiencies were also discovered towards the end of the year in the manufac-
ture of containment penetration pipes. The guidance and control of subcontractors partici-
pating in the design and manufacture of plant equipment still require constant monitoring 
and vigilance of TVO and the plant supplier. Although TVO and the plant supplier have 
continued the assessment of safety culture at the site and the creation of an atmosphere 
emphasising safety, ensuring and maintaining the highest priority for safety and qual-
ity will require continuous actions and exemplary conduct of the managements of project 
organisations.
STUK continued its work in preparation of the possible construction licence stages regard-
ing the new NPP projects. As part of its preparations, STUK compiled experience from 
the oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 project, and this experience was discussed with the power 
companies, Posiva and the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety. STUK assessed the 
sections of TVO’s and Fennovoima’s tender documentation concerning safety requirements 
and provided the power companies with feedback regarding the comprehensiveness and 
unambiguity of the requirements. STUK studied Fennovoima’s site related design basis 
criteria. Following the choice made regarding Fennovoima’s plant site, STUK organised, at 
the invitation of the Municipality of Pyhäjoki, a briefing event and press conference for the 
inhabitants of Pyhäjoki and the media.
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STUK’s work input in the regulatory oversight of each of the operating nuclear power 
plants was equivalent to approximately 12 person-years. The working hours spent on regu-
latory oversight remained at the previous year’s level. These objectives of oversight were 
attained. In all, 34 person-years were used for overseeing the design, component manufac-
turing and construction of the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which is about the same amount as in 2010. 
The amount of work will certainly not reduce during 2012–2013 when plenty of installa-
tion work will be performed and the operating licence application for the plant is reviewed. 
During the year, STUK issued its statement regarding the renewal of operating licence for 
the research reactor in Otaniemi and regarding the continuation of its operation.
As part of the continual improvement of safety and preparation for new NPP projects, 
STUK continued the work for revising its own YVL Guides and also participated in the 
preparatory work for reforming the Nuclear Energy Act. The reform will entail harmonis-
ing the requirements, as far as possible, with the national regulations of EU countries and 
the requirements of the IAEA. STUK had intended to complete the YVL Guides by the end 
of 2011. However, this was not achieved, partly because of the additional work caused by 
the Fukushima accident.
The storage of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel or the transfers of fuel did not en-
counter any problems at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto plants. Thanks to appropriate planning 
of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less nuclear waste than NPPs on average. At 
the Loviisa plant, STUK oversaw the commissioning of the liquid waste solidification plant 
that had among other things been delayed by the upgrade of ventilation systems, deemed 
necessary following an event in 2010. However, the delay in commissioning did not affect 
the safety of nuclear waste management at the Loviisa power plant. At the Olkiluoto plant, 
STUK oversaw the expansion work for expanding the spent fuel storage. The work contin-
ued throughout the year. The length of the storage building will be extended, and addition-
al pools will be constructed there to also accommodate the fuel coming from the Olkiluoto 
3 plant unit. At the same time, the storage facility will be protected against the crash of a 
large airplane.
Posiva Oy (Posiva) continued the construction of the underground research facility related 
to the final disposal of spent fuel under the oversight of STUK. The regulatory oversight 
was organised in the same manner as for the construction of a nuclear facility because the 
construction work will actually produce the first phase of the repository. The access tunnels 
and shafts leading to the research facility will become part of the repository, provided that 
the project progresses as planned. STUK issued its assessment of the planned contents 
of the construction licence application for the repository and also assessed the analyses 
related to the long-term safety of final disposal and the factors related to the reliability of 
technical release barriers. Careful preparations are necessary because a similar project has 
never been implemented elsewhere in the world. STUK was supported in its safety assess-
ments by an international group of experts from different fields of science and technology.
STUK began producing a safety assessment of the amendment application regarding the 
operating licence of the low- and medium-level waste repository (VLJ repository) that has 
been in operation in Olkiluoto since 1993. The amendment concerns in particular the final 
disposal of low- and medium-level waste coming from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. The inten-
tion is also to solve at the same time the question of final disposal of radioactive waste from 
government-owned operations, stored temporarily in Olkiluoto. Small amounts of such 
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waste has been accumulating from hospitals and industry for decades. A small part of this 
waste will have to be disposed of elsewhere due to its high activity. The possibility of plac-
ing them in Posiva’s future repository is investigated as one alternative.
The implementation of nuclear safeguards based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty func-
tioned without problems in Finland, and no cause for remarks was found in the inspec-
tions carried out by the IAEA and the European Commission. Development of the nuclear 
safeguards regarding spent nuclear fuel continued in cooperation with the IAEA and the 
European Commission.
The new four-year periods of the national nuclear research programmes (the SAFIR 
programme regarding the safety of nuclear facilities and the KYT programme regarding 
the safety of final disposal of nuclear waste) began. The purpose of the programmes is to 
develop, with a long-term perspective, high-class competence for ensuring the safe use of 
Finnish nuclear power. STUK has a major role in determining and guiding the contents of 
these programmes.
STUK participated actively in international nuclear safety cooperation. In particular, 
STUK participated in the harmonisation work of international nuclear safety requirements 
in the working groups of the International Atomic Energy Association, European safety 
authorities and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.
STUK-B 147
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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear energy which 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once a year to 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to Section 121 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Environment, the Finnish 
Environment Institute, and the regional environmental authorities of the localities in 
which a nuclear facility is located.
The regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2011 included the design, construction and 
operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear materials. 
The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as nuclear non-
proliferation, concern two STUK departments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear 
Waste and Material Regulation.
The first parts of the report explain the basics of nuclear safety regulation included as part 
of STUK’s responsibilities, as well as the objectives of the operations, and briefly introduce 
the objects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and implementation of 
legislation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as well as the progress 
of STUK’s YVL Guide revision work.
The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains an overall safety assess-
ment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the nuclear 
facilities currently in operation, the chapter describes plant operation, events during 
operation, annual maintenance and observations made during regulatory activities. Data 
and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on ensuring 
the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and components. 
Summaries are included for the development of the plants and their safety, and nuclear 
waste management. The report also includes a description of the oversight of the opera-
tions and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational experience feed-
back activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation safety of nuclear 
facilities is examined using employees’ individual doses, collective doses, and the results of 
emission and environmental radiation monitoring. For the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently 
under construction, the report includes descriptions of the regulation of design, construc-
tion, manufacturing, installation and commissioning preparations, as well as regulation 
of the operations of the licensee and the organisations participating in the construction 
project. At the end of the chapter on the regulation of nuclear facilities, there is a summary 
of assessments initiated following the Fukushima accident, new plant projects and regula-
tion of the research reactor.
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The chapter concerning the regulation of the final disposal project for spent nuclear fuel de-
scribes the preparations for the final disposal project and the related regulatory activities. 
In addition, the oversight of the design and construction of the research facilities (Onkalo) 
under construction in Olkiluoto, as well as the assessment and oversight of the research, 
development and design work being carried out to specify further the safety case for final 
disposal are included in the report.
The section concerning nuclear non-proliferation describes the nuclear non-proliferation 
control for Finnish nuclear facilities and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, as well as 
measures required by the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, it 
describes the control of the transport of nuclear materials and the oversight of the nuclear 
test ban.
The chapter describing the oversight of security arrangements in the use of nuclear energy 
discusses oversight of the security arrangements in nuclear power plants and other plants, 
institutions and functions included within the scope of STUK’s regulatory oversight. The 
chapter also discusses the national and international cooperation for developing the secu-
rity arrangements and associated regulations.
In addition to actual safety regulation, the report describes safety research, regulatory 
indicators and regulation development, as well as emergency preparedness, communication 
and STUK’s participation in international nuclear safety cooperation.
Appendix 1 presents a detailed study of the safety performance of the nuclear power plants 
by means of an indicator system, Appendix 2 includes a summary of employees’ doses at 
the nuclear power plants, and Appendix 3 describes exceptional operational events at the 
nuclear power plants.
STUK-B 147
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory control by STUK is based 
on the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory control 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of physical protection and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards for nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation.
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facilities; from strategy to implementation.
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STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety.
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licences under the Nuclear Energy Act, con-
trols compliance with the licence conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and controls 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public.
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory 
activities is to ensure the safety of nuclear 
14
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facilities, so that plant operation does not cause 
radiation hazards that could endanger the safety of 
workers or the population in the vicinity or cause 
other harm to the environment or property. The 
most important objective is to prevent a reactor 
accident that would cause a release of radioactive 
substances, or the threat of a release. Another ob-
jective is to maintain public confidence in regula-
tory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with their requirements.
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory acti-
vities that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements.
Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives.
STUK ensures, by means of inspections and cont-
rols, that the operational preconditions and ope-
rations of the licensee and its subcontractors and 
the systems, structures and components of nuclear 
facilities are in compliance with regulatory requi-
rements. STUK’s operations are guided by annual 
follow-up plans, presenting the key items and acti-
vities for inspection and review. STUK carries out 
inspections of plans for nuclear facilities and other 
documents that the licensee is obliged to request 
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutually-
redundant functional and structural levels. This 
approach is called the “defence in depth” principle. 
Safety-ensuring functions may be divided into pre-
ventive, protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent 
any deviations from the plant’s normal opera-
tional state. Accordingly, high quality standards 
apply to component design, manufacture, installa-
tion and maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into an accident.
If the first or second level functions fail to stop 
the progress of an accident, its consequences must 
be mitigated. In such a case, the main thing is to 
ensure the integrity of reactor containment and the 
operation of its associated systems.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe use 
of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed 
by the Government and functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of office is three years. The 
Advisory Commission was appointed on 1 October 
2009, and its term of office ends on 30 September 
2012.
During 2011, the Chairman of the Commission 
was key account manager Seppo Vuori (VTT, 
Technical Research Centre of Finland) and the 
Vice-Chairman was Professor Riitta Kyrki-
Rajamäki (Lappeenranta University of Techn-
ology). The members are vice president Rauno 
Rinta maa (VTT), country manager Timo Okkonen 
(Inspecta Oy), senior researcher Ilona Lindholm 
(VTT), senior inspector Miliza Malmelin (Ministry 
of the Environment) and Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Antero 
Tam minen. Professor Jukka Laaksonen, Director 
General of STUK, was a permanent expert to the 
Com mission.
The commission has two committees, the 
Reactor Safety Committee and the Nuclear Waste 
Safety Committee. Foreign and Finnish experts 
have been invited to join the committees. English is 
the working language in the committees, and more 
extensive questions of principle will be brought 
to them for preparation. Nuclear industry ex-
perts from France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and the USA have been 
invited to join the committees. The committees con-
vene a couple of times a year. The members of the 
actual commission also participate in the work of 
the committees.
STUK-B 147
15
STUK to do. The compliance of activities with the 
plans is verified through inspections carried out 
at the plant site or at subcontractors’ premises. In 
addition to these inspections and reviews, STUK 
has separate inspection programmes for periodic 
inspections of operating plants and inspections 
during construction. STUK also employs resident 
inspectors at the plants, who supervise and wit-
ness the construction, operation and condition of 
the plant and the operations of the organisation 
on a daily basis and report their observations. An 
overall safety assessment is conducted annually on 
each nuclear facility, dealing with the attainment 
of radiation protection objectives, the development 
of defence in depth, and the operation of organisa-
tions constructing or operating nuclear facilities 
and providing services to them.
STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facilities starting from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, inter-
mediate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal 
facility require a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. The safety assessment will state, in particu-
lar, whether any issues have been discovered that 
would indicate that the necessary prerequisites for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in com-
pliance with the Nuclear Energy Act do not exist. 
In connection with the application for the decision-
in-principle, the applicant also presents a report on 
the environmental impact assessment. When an 
application for a construction or operating licence 
for a nuclear facility has been submitted to the 
Government, STUK issues a statement on it and 
includes its safety assessment. 
STUK regulates the different nuclear 
facility design and construction stages
The principles and detailed approach of STUK’s in-
spection activities are described in the YVL Guides 
issued by STUK. Guide YVL 1.1 describes the 
monitoring and inspection procedures at a general 
level, while the detailed procedures are described 
in other YVL Guides. The purpose of monitoring 
and inspection activities regarding plant projects is 
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act prescribes that the users 
of nuclear energy must have a liability insurance 
policy, or other financial guarantee, for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
have prepared for damage from a nuclear accident 
as prescribed by law by taking out an insurance 
policy for this purpose, mainly with the Nordic 
Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of an accident, the funds available for 
compensation come from three sources: the license 
holder, the country of location of the facility and 
the international liability community. In 2011, 
a total of 300,000,000 SDR was available for 
compensation from these sources. SDR refers to 
Special Drawing Right, an international reserve 
asset defined by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), whose value is based on a basket of key 
international currencies. In 2011, the value of the 
SDR was about EUR 1.15. As a result of interna-
tional negotiations completed in 2004 concerning 
the renewal of the Paris/Brussels nuclear liability 
agreements, funds available for compensation will 
be more than tripled compared with the current 
situation. However, the entry into force of these in-
ternational agreements has been repeatedly post-
poned. Consequently, the decision has been taken 
in Finland to legislate nationally regarding a 
higher amount of insurance and impose an un-
limited liability on licensees. The amendment to 
the legislation entered into force at the beginning 
of 2012. 
In Finland, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority is responsible for ascertaining the con-
tents and conditions of the licensee’s insurance ar-
rangements. The Financial Supervisory Authority 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the trans-
port of nuclear materials. STUK ascertains that 
all nuclear material transport has had liabil-
ity insurance either approved by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority or by the authorities of 
the sending state in accordance with the Paris 
Convention.
16
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to allow STUK to verify that the prerequisites for 
operations of a high standard exist, that the plans 
are acceptable before the implementation begins 
and that the implementation is compliant with 
regulations before the operating licence is granted. 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee 
must ensure safety. Through its monitoring, STUK 
ensures that the licensee meets its responsibilities. 
STUK monitors and inspects the implementation 
of the plant and the organisations participating in 
its implementation and operation. STUK does not 
monitor and inspect every detail; instead, the moni-
toring and inspections are targeted on the basis of 
the safety implications of each subject. To this end, 
the plant is divided into systems, structures and 
equipment, which are further classified according to 
their importance to plant safety. The safety classifi-
cation of the plant is reviewed by STUK at the stage 
of applying for the construction licence. STUK in-
spects and monitors the design and manufacture of 
the equipment and structures that are most critical 
from the point of view of safety. Inspection organisa-
tions approved by STUK have been trusted with the 
inspection of equipment and structures with lesser 
safety implications. STUK oversees the operations 
of these inspection organisations.
In plant projects, STUK ensures with its moni-
toring and inspections, the bulk of which are 
scheduled to take place in advance, that the power 
company planning to build the plant and the plant 
supplier responsible for its implementation, and its 
main sub-contractor, have the necessary capabili-
ties for a high-quality implementation. 
During the construction licence stage, the plant 
design work and quality assurance of implemen-
tation are evaluated in order to make sure that 
the plant can be implemented in compliance with 
high quality standards and Finnish safety re-
quirements. During construction, inspections and 
monitoring are deployed in order to ensure that the 
plant is implemented in compliance with the prin-
ciples approved at the construction licence stage. 
The inspections are based on detailed documenta-
tion delivered to STUK and onsite inspections at 
the suppliers’ premises. Before the manufacture of 
equipment and structures may commence, STUK 
inspects both the respective detailed plans and the 
capabilities of the manufacturing organisations to 
produce high-quality results. During manufacture 
and building, STUK carries out inspections in 
order to verify that the equipment and structures 
are manufactured in compliance with the plans 
approved by STUK. Regarding the installation of 
equipment and structures, STUK carries out in-
spections in order to verify that the installations 
are made in compliance with the approved plans 
and that the requirements set out for installations 
are fulfilled. Approval by STUK after inspection is 
a prerequisite for trial operation of the equipment. 
After that, STUK inspects the results of the trial 
operation before the actual commissioning.
Before operating the plant, STUK must be pro-
vided with documentation proving that the plant 
was designed and implemented in compliance with 
Finnish safety requirements. In addition, STUK 
has to be provided with evidence verifying that 
the prerequisites exist for safe operation of the 
plant. These include personnel that have been 
trained and verified to be competent, the instruc-
tions required for operating the plant, safety and 
preparedness arrangements, maintenance sched-
ule and staff, as well as radiation protection staff. 
Having verified that the implementation is safe 
and the organisation has the required capabilities, 
STUK prepares the safety assessment and report 
required for the operating licence. Obtaining the 
operating licence is a prerequisite for loading the 
reactor with fuel. 
Comprehensive safety assessment 
is a prerequisite for extending 
the operating licence
In Finland, operating licences are granted for a fi-
xed term, typically 10 to 20 years. A comprehensive 
safety assessment is required to renew the ope-
rating licence. If the operating licence is granted 
for a period exceeding 10 years, an interim safety 
assessment is carried out during the licence peri-
od. The scope of the interim assessment is similar 
to that carried out in conjunction with renewing 
the operating licence. During the assessments, the 
state of the plant is investigated, paying particular 
attention to the effects of ageing on the plant and 
its equipment and structures. In addition, the ca-
pabilities of the operating personnel for continued 
safe operation of the plant are assessed. 
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Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment.
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operations of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety of 
nuclear power plants by carrying out inspections 
on plant sites and at component manufacturers’ 
premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory YVL Guides, 
deterministic safety analyses are analyses of 
transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear po-
wer plants. The licensees update these analyses in 
connection with the renewal of operating licences, 
periodic safety reviews and any significant modifi-
cations carried out at the plant. 
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions. The licensees employ 
PRA for the maintenance and continuous impro-
vement of the technical safety of nuclear facilities.
STUK reviews the deterministic safety analyses 
and probabilistic risk analyses related to construc-
tion and operating licences and the operation of a 
nuclear power plant. When required, STUK has 
its own independent comparison analyses made in 
order to verify the reliability of results. 
STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
Various modifications are carried out at nuclear 
facilities to improve safety, replace aged systems 
or components, facilitate plant operation or main-
tenance, or improve the efficiency of energy gene-
ration. STUK inspects the plans for extensive or 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on site or at manufacturers’ premises. 
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents that describe 
the plant’s operation and structure – such as the 
Operating Limits and Conditions, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the operating and mainte-
nance procedures – have changed. STUK oversees 
the document revisions and generally follows the 
updating of plant documentation after the modifi-
cations.
Operability of the plant is overseen during 
operation and annual maintenance
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down in 
the operational limits and conditions, and over-
seeing annual maintenance outages, plant main-
tenance and ageing management, fire safety, ra-
diation safety, physical protection and emergency 
preparedness.
Operational limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC)
of nuclear facilities lay down the detailed tech-
nical and administrative requirements and re-
strictions concerning the plant and its various 
systems, equipment and structures. The licensee 
is responsible for keeping the operational limits 
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reports, annual experience operational feedback 
reports and safeguard reports to STUK.
Internal processing and reporting is also required 
for events or near-misses not subject to a special 
or operational transient report. Reports on such 
events are submitted to STUK for information if 
the event is or may be relevant to nuclear or ra-
diation safety or STUK’s communication activities.
Annual maintenance
Work that cannot be done during plant operation is 
carried out during annual maintenance of nuclear 
power plants. These include refuelling, preventive 
equipment maintenance, periodic inspections and 
tests, as well as failure repairs. These actions ensu-
re the preconditions for operating the power plant 
safely during the following operating cycles. 
STUK is responsible for controlling and ensu-
and conditions up-to-date and ensuring compli-
ance with them. STUK controls compliance with 
the plants’ operational conditions and limits by 
witnessing operations on site. Special attention is 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the operational limits and conditions.
When annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
with the operational limits and conditions prior to 
start-up. Any changes to and planned deviations 
from the operational limits and conditions must 
be submitted to STUK for approval in advance. In 
addition, the licensee is responsible for reporting to 
STUK without delay all situations deviating from 
the requirements under the operational limits and 
conditions. In the report, the power company pre-
sents its corrective action for approval by STUK. 
STUK oversees the implementation of corrective 
action. 
Oversight of operation, incidents 
during operation and reporting 
the operation to STUK
STUK oversees the safe operation of plants 
through regular inspections and reports submitted 
by the power companies. In addition, STUK’s local 
inspectors working on plant sites oversee the ope-
ration on a daily basis. The local inspectors assess 
faults and oversee their repairs, as well as tests 
of safety-critical equipment. The inspections of 
the periodic inspection programme focus on major 
faults, incidents and progress made in corrective 
actions, as well as on operating procedures. The 
inspections are based on the regular reports sub-
mitted by power companies and inspections and 
walkdown inspections conducted on site.
The power companies are obliged to report any 
operational transients and any matters that may 
compromise safety. STUK assesses the safety imp-
lications of the incidents and the power company’s 
ability to detect safety deficiencies, take action and 
carry out corrective actions.
The licensees submit event reports to STUK on 
operational events at nuclear facilities, comprising 
special reports, operational transient reports and 
scram reports. In addition to event reports, the fa-
cilities submit daily reports, quarterly reports, an-
nual reports, outage reports, annual environmental 
safety reports, monthly individual radiation dose 
The majority of radioactive substances cre-
ated during the operation of a nuclear re-
actor are contained in the nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, radioactive substances are contained in the 
reactor cooling system, as well as in the related 
purification and waste systems. The liquid and 
atmospheric effluents from the plant are purified 
and delayed so that their radiation impact on the 
environment is very low compared with the im-
pact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The emissions are carefully measured 
to ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits.
Radioactive emissions from a nuclear 
power plant into the air and sea are veri-
fied through comprehensive radiation monitoring. 
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
power plant comprises radiation measurements 
and determination of radioactive substances, con-
ducted to analyse the radioactive substances ex-
isting in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plant and to the na-
tional radiation-monitoring network.
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ring that the nuclear power plant is safe during the 
annual maintenance and future operating cycles, 
and that the annual maintenance does not cause a 
radiation hazard to the workers, the population or 
the environment. STUK ensures this by reviewing 
the documents required by the regulations, such as 
outage plans and modification documentation, and 
by performing on-site inspections during annual 
maintenance. 
Plant maintenance and ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the ageing 
management of operating nuclear facilities, STUK 
controls the plants’ ageing management strategy 
and its implementation ensures the maintenance 
of sufficient safety margins for safety-significant 
systems, components and structures throughout 
their lifetime. The organisation of the licensee’s 
operations, the prerequisites for the organisation 
to carry out the necessary actions, and the conditi-
on of components and structures important to safe-
ty are subject to inspection and review. Regulatory 
control and inspections ensure that the power com-
panies have the lifetime management programmes 
in place that enable them to detect potential prob-
lems in time. In addition, corrective action must be 
carried out in a way that ensures the integrity and 
operability of safety-significant components and 
structures so that safety functions can be activated 
at any time.
STUK monitors ageing management through 
the inspections of the periodic inspection program-
me and inspections related to modifications and 
annual maintenance. The key issue in operation 
licence renewal and periodic safety assessments is 
the management of plant ageing.
Every year, the power companies provide STUK 
with reports on the ageing of electrical and I&C 
equipment, mechanical structures and equipment, 
as well as buildings. These reports describe the 
most salient ageing phenomena to be monitored, 
observations related to the ageing process and 
actions required for extending the service life of 
equipment and structures.
The licensee must carry out periodic inspec-
tions of safety-critical equipment and structures 
(such as the reactor pressure vessel and reactor 
coolant system). STUK approves the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections and monitors 
the inspections and their results on site. The final 
result reports will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval after the annual maintenance. 
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by 
inspecting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation 
measurements, radiation protection procedures, 
radiation conditions and radiation protection ar-
rangements for work processes at each facility. The 
dosimeters used for measuring the occupational ra-
diation doses undergo annual tests carried out by 
STUK. The test comprises irradiating a sample of 
dosimeters at STUK’s measurement standard lab-
oratory and reading the doses at the power plant. 
In addition, STUK oversees the meteorological dis-
persion measurements of radioactive substances, 
release measurements and environmental radia-
tion monitoring, and also reviews the relevant re-
sult reports.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the readiness of the organi-
sations operating nuclear power plants to act in 
abnormal situations. The inspection focuses on 
training in emergency response organisation, ar-
rangement of rooms, securing the connections used 
for the transfer of meteorological measurement 
data during an emergency situation and radia-
tion monitoring of the surrounding environment, 
as well as the development of internal alarm proce-
dures at the power plant. Emergency exercises test 
the operation of the emergency response organisa-
tion, the functionality of the emergency response 
guidelines and the usability of the alert areas in 
practice, which are developed on the basis of the 
feedback received for the exercises. STUK moni-
tors the actions of power companies during these 
emergency drills.
Monitoring the operation of organisations is 
part of the process of ensuring plant safety
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and training 
of the staff of nuclear facilities and operational 
experience feedback activities. The aim is to ensure 
that the organisations of the power company as a 
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whole and its key suppliers operate in a manner 
that ensures the safety of the plant at all levels 
and in connection with safety-related actions.
Training and qualifications of personnel
STUK monitors the training and qualifications of 
personnel through inspections included in the peri-
odic inspection programme, by assessing the suit-
ability and approving the appointment of certain 
key personnel and by assessing the ability of the 
power company to ensure safety in conjunction 
with incidents and annual maintenance opera-
tions. The key persons whose appointment must be 
approved by STUK are the director in charge of 
the construction and safe operation of the nuclear 
facility, the operators working in the plant control 
rooms and the persons in charge of materials re-
lated to preparedness, safety and nuclear technol-
ogy. In addition, STUK’s approval is required for 
personnel carrying out certain integrity checks on 
materials. In case events reveal flaws in the op-
eration of the organisation, number of personnel 
or their competence, STUK will require the power 
company to take rectifying action as required.
Operational experience feedback
According to Government Decision VNA 733/2008, 
the advancement of science and technology and 
operating experience must be taken into account 
for the further enhancement of the safety of 
nuclear power plants. This principle is not limited 
to operational experience from Finnish nuclear po-
wer plants, but feedback from abroad must also 
be analysed systematically, and action must be ta-
ken to improve safety as necessary. STUK controls 
and ensures that the power companies’ operational 
experience feedback activities effectively prevent 
the reoccurrence of problematic events. STUK pays 
particular attention to the power companies’ abi-
lity to detect and identify the causes of the events 
and to remedy the underlying operational weak-
nesses. In addition, STUK analyses Finnish and 
foreign operational experience data and, as neces-
sary, lays down requirements to enhance safety.
STUK controls the operational experience feed-
back activities by reviewing the event reports sub-
mitted by the licensee and the annual summary of 
operational feedback activities. During inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme, the 
operational experience feedback activities of the 
plant and utilisation of international experience 
are monitored.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as plan-
ned during an event or when it is estimated that the 
event will lead to significant modifications to the 
plant’s technical layout or procedures. A STUK in-
vestigation team is also set up if the licensee has not 
adequately clarified the root causes of an event. 
Pressure equipment critical to nuclear 
safety is monitored by STUK
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. Pressure 
equipment in other safety classes is inspected by 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations autho-
rised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities, and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
Regulatory oversight of nuclear non-
proliferation is a basic requirement 
for using nuclear energy
Oversight of nuclear non-proliferation ensures that 
nuclear materials and other nuclear commodities 
remain in peaceful use in compliance with the rel-
evant licences and notifications, and that nuclear 
facilities and the related technologies are only uti-
lised for peaceful purposes. Another objective of 
the oversight of non-proliferation is to ensure that 
appropriate security arrangements are in place for 
nuclear items.
The operator is responsible for managing the 
nuclear items in its possession, accounting for 
them and reporting on plant sites and its activities 
relating to the nuclear fuel cycle to STUK and sub-
mitting their reports on nuclear materials to the 
European Commission. STUK maintains a nation-
al control system the purpose of which is to carry 
out the safeguards for the use of nuclear energy 
that are necessary for the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. In compliance with the Safeguards 
Agreement and its additional protocol, STUK for-
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wards data on activities relating to the nuclear 
fuel cycle in Finland to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). STUK verifies the correct-
ness of the notifications, accounting and reporting 
through on-site inspections and participates in 
all inspections carried out by the IAEA and the 
European Commission. 
The National Data Centre (NDC), which is 
based on the CTBT, contributed to the work of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in 
establishing a cost-effective NDC organisation that 
is functional from the Finnish perspective.
Oversight of nuclear waste management 
extends from planning to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste manage-
ment is to ensure that nuclear waste is processed, 
stored and disposed of safely. The control of nuclear 
waste processed at plant sites is part of the regulatory 
control of operating plants mentioned above. STUK 
oversees the nuclear waste management of nuclear 
power plants through document reviews and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. In ad-
dition, STUK approves the clearing of waste from con-
trol and reviews plants’ nuclear waste management 
and decommissioning plans, on the basis of which the 
licensees’ nuclear waste management fees are deter-
mined. 
The final disposal project for spent fuel requires 
special attention. STUK inspects and reviews 
Posiva Oy’s plans and research work for project im-
plementation and is overseeing the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also being used to test suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The plan is to 
later convert the research tunnel into an entrance 
for the repository.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 890/860 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted about 1,600 (net) PWR,
 17.2.2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the  
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo
Posiva Oy is constructing an 
underground research facility 
(Onkalo) in Olkiluoto, where 
bedrock volumes suitable for 
final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock research 
at the planned final disposal 
depth is a requirement for 
granting a construction 
licence for the final disposal 
facility. Posiva has designed 
Onkalo to function as one of 
the entrance routes to the 
planned final disposal facil-
ity, so STUK is applying 
the same regulatory proce-
dures to the construction of 
Onkalo as those of a nuclear facility. 
The underground research facility consists of a 
drive tunnel, three shafts and a research gallery 
quarried to a depth of 437 m. Posiva started con-
structing Onkalo in 2004. By the end of 2011, the 
excavation of the drive tunnel had reached a depth 
of 455 m, and the length of the tunnel was 4913 m. 
In addition, intake air and personnel shafts had 
been quarried using raise boring techniques to a 
depth of 290 m and exhaust air shaft to a depth of 
437 m.
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
•	 TRIGA	Mark	II	research	reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
•	 Fuel	of	the	core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA	reactors	have	a	unique	fuel	type;	 
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
Figure 2. Plan of the underground rock characterisation facility (Onkalo) and 
status of the construction on 12 March 2012 (Posiva Oy).
FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The reac-
tor is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maxi-
mum thermal power is 250 kW. It began operations 
in March 1962, and its current operating licence 
will expire at the end of 2011. The reactor is used 
for the fabrication of radioactive tracers, activa-
tion analysis, student training and Boron Neutron 
Capture Therapy (BNCT) treatment of tumours, as 
well as the development of therapeutic methods.
Ventilation shaft
–437 m
Personnel shaft
–290 m
(Intake	ventilation)
–290 mLength of the drive tunnel
4987 m
Depth of the tunnels
454 m
SITUATION 12 March 2012
24
STUK-B 147
3 Development of regulations
Changes in upper-level regulations
An amendment to the Nuclear Power Act entered 
into force in 2011. STUK participated in its pre-
paratory work in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. Among other things, 
the amendment took into account the changes to 
be made pursuant to the Nuclear Safety Directive 
as well as the changes derived from international 
recommendations concerning the development of 
security arrangements. STUK issued its statement 
of opinion regarding the amendment to the Nuclear 
Liability Act confirming the considerably higher 
limits for the licensees’ compensation liabilities that 
were scheduled to enter into force at the beginning 
of 2012. The preparations for certain new amend-
ments to nuclear energy legislation also began dur-
ing the year. The most significant of these concerns 
the more extensive use of testing and inspection in-
stitutes that will release STUK’s resources for tasks 
more important to safety.
Reform work of the YVL Guides continued
In 2011, STUK continued its project of many years 
for reforming the structure of YVL Guides. The 
purpose of the reform is to ensure the compre-
hensiveness and up-to-dateness of the Guides. The 
original target was to complete the new Guides 
during 2011, but this was not achieved. The main 
factors postponing the schedule were the larger-
than-expected effort required for the project, the 
work carried out simultaneously due to the post-
ponement of the Olkiluoto 3 project as well as the 
Fukushima accident that required STUK’s expert 
to put in a considerable number of hours.
The current set containing over 70 separate 
YVL Guides will be replaced by approximately 
40 new Guides. In addition to the comprehensive 
and demanding nature of the contents, attention 
will be paid in the reform work to a uniform and 
user-friendly manner in which the Guides are pre-
sented. Six final Guide drafts were completed in 
2011, and a statement of opinion was sought from 
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety for five 
Guide drafts. By the end of 2011, the preparatory 
work for all new Guides had began in the working 
groups appointed for the work.
Use of the Guide extranet 
now well established
Use of the Guide extranet (https://ohjeisto.stuk.fi) 
launched in 2010 increased during 2011, and the 
service established its position as an unofficial com-
munication channel for the statements of opinion 
issued by the licensees on the YVL Guide drafts. A 
possibility for commenting on the drafts in English 
was added to the service.
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B  Plant and system design 
B.1  Design of the safety systems of a nuclear facility 
B.2  Classification of systems, structures and 
equipment of a nuclear facility 
B.3  Safety assessment a NPP 
B.4  Nuclear fuel and reactor 
B.5  Reactor coolant circuit of a NPP 
B.6  Containment of a NPP 
B.7  Preparing for the internal and external 
threats to a nuclear facility 
B.8  Fire protection of a nuclear facility
Structure of the new YVL guides
A  Safety management of a nuclear facility 
A.1  Regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy 
A.2  Siting of a nuclear facility 
A.3  Management systems of a nuclear facility 
A.4  Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
A.5  Construction of a NPP 
A.6  Operation and accident management of a NPP 
A.7  Risk management of a NPP 
A.8  Ageing management of a nuclear facility 
A.9  Reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility 
A.10  Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility 
A.11  Security arrangements of a nuclear facility
E  Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
  
E.1  Inspection, testing and certifying organisations 
E.2  Manufacture and use of nuclear fuel 
E.3  Pressure vessels and pipings of a nuclear facility 
E.4  Verification of strength of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility 
E.5  In-service inspections of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility 
E.6  Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility 
E.7  Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.8  Valve units of a nuclear facility 
E.9  Pump units of a nuclear facility 
E.10  Emergency power supply of a nuclear facility 
E.11  Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
D  Nuclear materials and waste 
D.1  Regulatory control of nuclear non-proliferation 
D.2  Transport of nuclear materials and waste 
D.3  Handling and storage of nuclear fuel 
D.4  Handling of low- and intermediate-level waste and 
decommissioning of a nuclear facility 
D.5  Final disposal of nuclear waste 
D.6  Production of uranium and torium
C  Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment 
C.1  Structural radiation safety and radiation monitoring 
of a nuclear facility 
C.2  Radiation protection and dose control of the personnel 
of a nuclear facility 
C.3  Control and measuring of radioactive releases 
to the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.4  Radiological control of the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.5  Emergency preparedness arrangements of a NPP
 
Figure 4. The structure of the new YVL guides by the end of 2011.
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4 Regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities and its results in 2011
occurred at the plant. Two events occurred at the 
plant during which the plant was non-compliant 
with the Operating Limits and Conditions. One 
event at the plant was classified as an opera-
tional transient, resulting in a turbine trip. The 
events had no impact on the safety of employees 
or the plant surroundings. System and equipment 
failures had a minor safety implication for the 
plant. Annual maintenances were implemented as 
planned in terms of nuclear and radiation safety. 
An important observation, made through interna-
tional operational feedback, related to a suspected 
fault in the connecting rod bearings of emergency 
diesels. Consequently, the connecting rod bearings 
of one emergency diesel engine at Loviisa 1 were 
replaced. The problems related to spare bearings 
were later found to apply to several EDGs in differ-
ent countries, and STUK has reported the observa-
tions internationally.
During the year, the power company imple-
mented several modifications for improving plant 
safety. At Loviisa 1, the suction strainers of the 
low-pressure emergency cooling system and con-
tainment spraying system (intended for use in 
accident situations) were improved by installing 
smaller mesh strainer elements for preventing, 
among other things, the thermal insulation materi-
als from entering the reactor core in accident situ-
ations via the emergency cooling system. A similar 
modification was carried out at Loviisa 2 in 2010. 
The modifications succeeded well. In 2007, STUK 
issued its statement to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (currently the Ministry of Economy and 
the Employment) regarding the renewal of the 
Loviisa NPP’s operating licence and the plant’s 
periodic safety review. The actions for improving 
plant safety in compliance with the action plan 
produced by Fortum Power and Heat Oy at that 
time have mainly progressed according to plans.
Implementation of the second phase of the 
4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment 
of the Loviisa NPP
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power plant 
and assessed its organisation and personnel’s com-
petence in different areas by means of reviewing 
materials provided by the license holder, carrying 
out inspections in line with the periodic inspec-
tion programme and by overseeing operations at 
the plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, 
STUK can state that plant operations did not cause 
any radiation hazard to the employees, population 
or the environment. The occupational radiation dos-
es and radioactive releases into the environment 
were low and below the prescribed limits. The li-
censee has operated the Loviisa power plant in a 
safe manner and in compliance with YVL Guides. 
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa power plant 
complies with the requirements. The processing, 
storage and final disposal of low- and intermediate-
level waste (so-called plant operating waste) at the 
power plant were carried out as planned.
According to the tests and inspections car-
ried out, the condition of the containment and 
the primary circuit, which prevent the release of 
radioactive material into the environment, are in 
compliance with requirements. No fuel leaks were 
observed at the Loviisa power plant in 2011.
STUK approved the licensee’s application for 
increasing the average value fuel burn-up in fuel 
assemblies to 57 MWd/kgU. In 2011, STUK carried 
out a special inspection concerning ageing manage-
ment where the sufficiency of spare parts and the 
functionality of spare parts management at the 
plant units were assessed. The inspection found 
that the licensee is aware of the challenges related 
to the availability of spare parts and has initiated 
in 2011 a task to determine spare parts needs.
Plant operation has been systematic and safe. 
No exceptional events with safety implications 
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I&C upgrade (LARA) at the Loviisa plant was 
postponed until 2014 for Loviisa 1 and until 2016 
for Loviisa 2. The systems to be upgraded in the 
second phase include the reactor plant I&C sys-
tems most important to safety as well as the I&C 
systems of the main safety functions, such as that 
of emergency power supply. Postponement of the 
I&C upgrade requires the licensee to take action 
in order to ensure the sufficiency of maintenance 
operations on the existing I&C systems and equip-
ment as well as the availability of spare parts.
In the main, Fortum Power and Heat Oy and its 
Loviisa power plant organisation have operated in a 
systematic and development-oriented way to ensure 
the safety of the plant. The observations made by 
STUK in the course of its oversight indicate that 
the organisation produces an abundance of informa-
tion regarding its operations, but this information 
is not fully utilised for developing the management 
system and for improving operations. The work for 
improving the operational processes of the organisa-
tion must be continued in order to ensure the safe 
operation of the plant, particularly with regard to 
developing the management system, ensuring the 
quality of procurement operations and develop-
ing the safety culture assessment methods. The 
programme for developing project management at 
the Loviisa power plant has been successfully com-
pleted, but there is further scope for improvement 
in the quality management of project activities. 
STUK paid attention to the procedures in the power 
company’s assessment and development activities 
and in the associated allocation of resources. STUK 
required the Loviisa power plant to ensure that the 
procedures are appropriate and comply with the 
requirements. STUK will assess the situation in 
the course of its oversight in 2012. STUK has found 
scope for improvement in the follow-up procedures 
of the Loviisa power plant regarding the implemen-
tation and success of corrective actions decided fol-
lowing plant’s own operational events.
4.1.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with the Operating 
Limits and Conditions
The Loviisa power plant has kept the power plant’s 
Operating Limits and Conditions (OLC) up to date. 
STUK has assessed the OLC and their up-to-date-
ness in connection with inspecting the modifica-
tions and analyses carried out at the plant as well 
as in connection with on-site oversight.
During 2011, Fortum submitted to STUK for 
approval a proposed amendment to the Operating 
Limits and Conditions regarding a decrease in the 
limits for noble gas releases from Loviisa  1 and 
Loviisa  2. The need for the amendment was cre-
ated by the fact that the doses resulting from the 
releases are currently estimated using a different 
calculation model and different weather data from 
those used at the time the release limits were origi-
nally calculated. STUK found the proposed amend-
ment to be acceptable.
In 2011, the power company applied for permis-
sions from STUK for four planned deviations from 
the Operating Limits and Conditions. Two of the 
applications were related to fault repairs, one to 
tests on the new emergency diesel generator and 
one to the periodic inspection of a chemical tank. 
Table 1. Events	at	the	Loviisa	plant	units	subject	to	special	reports	or	a	root	cause	analysis	and/or	classified	INES	
Level	1	or	higher.	All	events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).
Event Non-compliances 
with the OLC
Special report and/
or root cause report
INES 
rating
Omission of primary coolant hydrogen concentration measurements • • 0
Initiation of annual maintenance of an emergency diesel generator at during 
power operation
• • 0
Figure 5. INES	classified	events	at	the	Loviisa	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
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STUK approved the applications because the as-
sessments carried out indicated that deviations 
had no significant implications for the safety of the 
plant or the environment.
In 2011, two events occurred at the plant dur-
ing which the plant was non-compliant with the 
Operating Limits and Conditions. One of the devia-
tions was related to maintenance work carried out 
on an emergency diesel generator where a tempo-
rary power supply for the DC switchgear of the die-
sel generator was connected from the switchgear of 
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 94.7%, while that of 
Loviisa 2 was 94.8%. Among other things, the load 
factor is affected by the duration of the unit’s annual 
maintenance outage. Both plant units had short main-
tenance outages, approximately 17 days for Loviisa 1 
and approximately 20 days for Loviisa 2. The load fac-
tor is also affected by the losses in gross energy output 
due to operational transients and component malfunc-
tions. The losses in gross energy output were 0.8% at 
Loviisa 1 and 0.07% at Loviisa 2.
A turbine trip occurred at Loviisa 1 in con-
nection with a planned ramp-down carried out for 
maintenance operations. The erroneous controls of 
certain pieces of equipment, caused by a malfunction 
of a turbine control component that occurred during 
the change of power, had the result that the steam 
pressure downstream of the high-pressure turbine 
increased to the limit value, which triggers the turbine 
trip. In the event, the plant’s I&C and other systems 
and equipment operated as planned, and the event did 
not affect the safety of the plant or its surroundings.
Loviisa 1 was shut down to repair a leaking 
flange seal in the steam generator. In February, a 
steam leak was observed inside the containment. The 
steam leak was a minor one, and the steam contained 
no radioactivity as it came from the secondary circuit 
containing pure water. The leak did not put the safety 
of people or the surrounding environment at risk. In 
order to repair the leak, the plant had to be shut down 
and cooled down to a repair outage.
The connecting rod bearings of an emergency 
diesel engine had to be replaced in January 2011 
due to a suspected fault. In January, the Loviisa 
power plant learned through unofficial channels that 
the emergency diesels used in France had suffered se-
rious connecting rod bearing failures. On the basis of 
this information and negotiations with the equipment 
manufacturer, the Loviisa power plant established 
that one emergency diesel at Loviisa 1 uses the same 
bearing type. These connection rod bearings had been 
installed in 2009 in connection with a complete over-
haul. The power plant replaced the bearings without 
delay during the following week. In order to carry out 
the replacement work, an external power connection 
was made to replace the emergency diesel generator 
isolated for the replacement work. No defect could be 
found in the removed bearing in preliminary inspec-
tions, although there were some signs of excess wear.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.Figure 7. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa plant in 2011.
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another diesel generator and the battery array and 
rectifier of the diesel generator’s control system 
were also disconnected for maintenance operations 
in breach of the OLC. In the second event, the con-
tinuous measurement of primary circuit hydrogen 
concentration was out of order, and the 24-hour 
time limit set in the OLC for hydrogen concentra-
tion measurements using a portable analyser was 
exceeded. The events are described in more detail 
in Appendix 3.
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 1 
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 1 was a short main-
tenance outage. The maintenance outage began on 21 
August 2011 and ended on 7 September 2011 when 
one of the plant’s two generators was synchronised 
with the national grid. The annual maintenance out-
age lasted for approximately 17 days, almost one day 
less than planned.
The main operations during the annual mainte-
nance outage were refuelling, dismantling and re-as-
sembly of the reactor as well as inspections and main-
tenance of equipment and structures. The operations 
important for safety included maintenance of the 
unit’s four emergency diesel generators, replacement of 
the motors of three reactor coolant pumps to re-wound 
spare motors and dye penetration testing of the seal-
ing grooves in the reactor pressure vessel flange face. 
The inspection indicated that the surface quality of 
the face conformed with the requirements.
A defect had already been detected in the pump 
motor of the plant's high-pressure emergency cooling 
system during the 2010 annual maintenance. Closer 
investigation revealed that the defect was a serious 
one. The power company decided to inspect all motors 
of similar type at the plant. All inspected motors were 
found to be in operating condition.
Alarms caused by the double seal of the primary 
collector had been observed in six steam generators of 
the reactor circuit during the previous operating cycle. 
Consequently, the collector covers were opened and the 
seals replaced with new ones with a denser texture.
The pump inlet strainers of the emergency cooling 
system located in the steam generator room of the con-
tainment were fitted with fine-mesh metal screens. The 
purpose of this modification was to prevent the fibres 
and other materials originating from the insulation 
materials of equipment and pipes from entering the 
reactor core. A similar modification was carried out 
at Loviisa 2 during the 2010 annual maintenance 
outage.
As part of the plant’s ageing management, the 
power company continued the operation of replacing 
the 6kV switches of systems important for safety, initi-
ated during the 2010 annual maintenance. The sched-
uled switch replacements were carried out during the 
annual maintenance outage, and the replacement 
project was completed. 
The annual maintenance included periodic inspec-
tions of pressure vessels and pipelines in accordance 
with the inspection schedule. When overseeing the 
annual maintenance, STUK found that some pressure 
vessel inspections that were scheduled to be conducted 
during power operation had not been carried out. The 
power company submitted an application for postpon-
ing the delayed inspections, and STUK approved the 
application. Following the event, STUK required the 
power company to develop its inspections monitoring 
system.
It was observed in connection with the annual 
maintenance that there were problems in communi-
cations between Fingrid, the company monitoring 
and maintaining the national electric grid, and the 
power company, as well as in the way information 
supplied by Fingrid was processed in the plant’s dif-
ferent organisational units. An example of the break 
in communications was an event during the annual 
maintenance outage in which Fingrid was carrying 
out operations at the plant’s 400kV switchyard and 
the operating shift of the Loviisa plant was not aware 
of it. In its inspection during the annual maintenance 
outage, STUK demanded that the flow and manage-
ment of information between Fingrid and the power 
company must be developed in order to ensure that 
similar events are not repeated.
Operation and operational events
Operation of the Loviisa plant has been systematic 
and safe. No events with significant nuclear or ra-
diation safety implications took place in plant op-
eration. The one event classified as an operational 
transient at Loviisa 1 was a turbine trip. A leaking 
seal in the steam generator flange was a significant 
operational event at Loviisa 1. The plant unit was 
consequently shut down for a short repair outage. 
In addition, the exceptional events included the 
maintenance operations and investigations carried 
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the power company to assess the up-to-dateness 
of documentation in the main control room and 
to delete or update any outdated documents. 
Furthermore, some training bulletins included in 
the control room documents lacked some signa-
tures which are required to indicate that the 
control room personnel are familiar with their 
contents.
Annual maintenance outages
Annual maintenance outages at the Loviisa plant 
were carried out safely, and the power company 
completed all maintenance work to its planned 
extent. During the annual maintenance outages, 
the power company paid particular attention to fire 
safety, tidiness and orderliness as well as to stor-
age at the plant facilities. The oversight of annual 
maintenance outages by STUK comprised STUK’s 
oversight and inspection functions set out in the 
YVL Guides, inspections complying with the pe-
riodic inspection programme and the activities of 
the oversight team composed for the annual main-
tenance.
During the annual maintenance outages, 
out due to the connecting rod bearing faults in the 
emergency diesel generators, as well as the spare 
part problems regarding the pump motors of the 
high-pressure safety injection system.
In 2011, the risks caused by the component 
malfunctions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
5.3% and 8.6% of the expected value of the an-
nual accident risk calculated using the plant’s risk 
model for Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, respectively. The 
results are in line with long-term averages.
In 2011, two of STUK’s resident inspectors 
worked at the Loviisa power plant. They were re-
sponsible for overseeing the plant operation, activi-
ties of the organisation and the overall situation 
at the plant. The inspection programme included 
one inspection regarding the oversight of opera-
tion during the power operation of plant units. The 
other inspection regarding the oversight of opera-
tion was related to the power company’s activities 
for ensuring the safe and planned implementation 
of annual maintenance outages.
Following the observations made during the 
inspection of the plant’s operation, STUK required 
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 2 
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 2 was a short mainte-
nance outage. The maintenance outage lasted for ap-
proximately 19 days, more than two days longer than 
planned. At the end of the outage, the power company 
had to carry out additional repairs due to equipment 
failures, and these delayed the start-up of the plant 
unit.
During the annual maintenance outage, the power 
company refuelled the reactor and carried out sched-
uled inspections, repairs and modifications. The in-
spections included periodic inspections of pressure 
vessels and pipelines. The operations important for 
safety included replacement of the 6kV electrical 
system switches and the periodic maintenance of one 
of the emergency diesel generators, which involved re-
placing the engine with a completely overhauled unit.
In the modernisation project regarding the plant’s 
I&C systems, modifications were carried out in con-
junction with the annual maintenance, the most 
important one being the installation of new level 
measurement pipelines for two steam generators. The 
pipelines will be connected to the process and commis-
sioned at a later stage in the project.
The power company has replaced the gas turbine 
plant in the plant area with a diesel power plant dur-
ing 2011. The power supply tests for Loviisa 2 were 
conducted in connection with the annual maintenance 
as part of the pilot operation programme of the diesel 
power plant.
During the annual maintenance outage, the power 
company carried out a measurement programme with 
the intention of verifying the functioning of the plant’s 
internal earthing system. The purpose of the earthing 
system is to prevent the creation of harmful potential 
differences between the different components of the 
I&C system in case of an earth fault. The measure-
ments were the first stage in the investigation aimed 
at assessing the potential differences caused by thun-
derstorms.
The replacement of cooling units in one emergency 
diesel generator room was planned for the annual 
maintenance outage. Of the three cooling units in the 
room, only two could be replaced due to certain de-
sign inconsistencies found during the operations. The 
third cooling unit will be replaced in the 2012 annual 
maintenance.
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STUK carried out an inspection of operation ac-
tivities, which primarily focussed on the activities 
of the power company’s operating and mainte-
nance organisations and its quality assurance unit. 
Following the observations made in the course 
of oversight and inspections, STUK required the 
Loviisa power plant to develop further the flow of 
information between Fingrid, the company respon-
sible for the monitoring and maintenance of the 
national electric grid, and the Loviisa power plant. 
Furthermore, the power plant must complete the 
instructions for kick-off meetings and implement 
the related induction training.
STUK composed a dedicated team for oversee-
ing the annual maintenance outages. The team 
consisted of experts in different fields of technology 
as well as of resident inspectors from the depart-
ment of nuclear reactor regulation. Following the 
oversight, it was found that the annual mainte-
nance activities of the power plant had, in the 
main, been well organised and that the power 
company had clear objectives for developing them 
further. The oversight team made observations 
of varying degrees of importance, mainly related 
to the activities of the Loviisa NPP organisation 
and to irregularities in certain documents. STUK 
paid attention to the cleaning methods and equip-
ment in work locations where employees could 
be exposed to significant amounts of radiation. 
Following the observations, STUK required the 
power company to improve further the cleaning 
methods in use.
STUK used a total of 234 man-days on on-site 
oversight during the annual maintenance outages; 
these days were made up of equipment and system 
inspections and oversight work in different areas 
of expertise. In addition, two resident inspectors 
worked regularly on site.
4.1.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Because the plant’s safety functions are secured 
with multiple parallel systems and equipment and 
in some cases also with systems and equipment 
that have different operating principles, the indi-
vidual failures observed in the plant’s equipment 
have not prevented the activation of safety func-
tions in any situations.
In 2010, the power company made modifica-
tions to the operation of the pressure emergency 
water tanks of the low-pressure emergency cooling 
system on the basis of updated safety analyses (see 
the 2010 Annual Report). The problem has been 
the potentially poor leak tightness of the tank’s 
original Russian-made isolation balls as there 
was a risk that they would release nitrogen into 
the cooling circuit when the system was required 
to operate. In 2011, the power company commis-
sioned the Lappeenranta University of Technology 
to conduct a series of tests on new isolation balls 
from another manufacturer, where the results 
were compared with analyses and tests carried out 
in 2010 on the old balls. The results indicated that 
the new isolation balls of a different structure had 
clearly better leak-tightness than the original ones 
in a situation where the system is required to oper-
ate. Fortum intends to replace old balls with new 
ones starting from the 2012 annual maintenance. 
STUK will assess the power company’s modifica-
tion proposal in early 2012.
4.1.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK monitored the integrity of structures and 
equipment on the basis of the periodic inspection 
programmes and repairs and modifications carried 
out. No significant deviations were observed in the 
monitoring and inspections of the primary circuit 
or other equipment and structures important to 
safety.
Fortum carried out periodic inspections of pres-
sure equipment and pipeline condition inspections 
as part of the plant units’ ageing management 
programs in connection with annual maintenance 
outages and during operation. No observations 
restricting the use of pressure equipment were 
reported following the inspections. However, STUK 
observed that some periodic inspections of pres-
sure equipment had not been carried out by the 
due dates, and they had to be carried out later 
than planned. Following the observation, STUK 
required the Loviisa power plant to develop its 
inspections monitoring system and its inspection 
activities so that the set deadlines are kept.
In 2011, STUK carried out a special inspec-
tion related to ageing management where the 
sufficiency of spare parts and the functionality of 
spare parts management at the plant units were 
assessed. The inspection found that the licensee is 
aware of the challenges related to the availability 
of spare parts and has initiated in 2011 a task to 
determine spare parts needs. STUK will continue 
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to follow the power company’s spare parts manage-
ment in 2012.
The operating licence of the reactor pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 1 is valid until the end of annual 
maintenance outage in 2012. In 2011, Fortum sub-
mitted to STUK a comprehensive set of thermal-
hydraulic analyses regarding the loads exerted on 
the pressure vessel. STUK will assess the analyses 
during 2012 in connection with the review of the 
new operating licence application for the pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 1.
Primary circuit
The power company monitors the condition of the 
primary circuit, among other things, through pe-
riodic inspections. In addition, the power compa-
ny records the loads exerted and STUK inspects 
the records in connection with its inspection pro-
gramme concerning operation activities. Leak 
monitoring allows detecting, with a high probabil-
ity, a crack in a pressure equipment wall before it 
results in a rupture. Good water chemistry in both 
the primary and secondary circuits is particularly 
important for the integrity of steam generator heat 
transfer tubes. The primary circuits of both Loviisa 
plant units are still in good condition. The valid-
ity of the operating licence of the reactor pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 2 was extended in 2010 until the 
end of validity of the plant unit’s current operating 
licence. The safety of the reactor will in the future 
be assessed in connection with the plant’s periodic 
safety review in 2016 and 2024. Similarly, STUK 
will assess the renewal of the reactor pressure ves-
sel operating licence for Loviisa 1 in 2012.
Fuel
In the annual maintenance, a so-called dummy as-
sembly of a new type, equipped with mixing spac-
ers and containing no uranium, was put in the 
place of one protective element in the outer circle 
of the Loviisa 1 plant unit’s reactor. It is mainly 
intended for verifying the mechanical durability 
of mixing spacers in reactor conditions. The pur-
pose of mixing spacers is to improve the mixing of 
coolant inside the assembly, thus improving heat 
transfer from the fuel assemblies. The intention 
is to install 12 test assemblies fitted with the new 
type mixing spacers in the reactor of Loviisa 1 in 
2012.
One of the conditions for increasing the highest 
permissible burn-up of fuel assemblies, approved 
in 2011, was that the amount of fission gases re-
leased inside the fuel rod remains small. During 
winter 2010, Fortum carried out measurements on 
a new type assembly that had been irradiated for 
four cycles, and the measurements were repeated 
in March 2011. The measurements indicated that 
this type of assembly releases very little fission 
gases, which is in line with the earlier measure-
ment results obtained from first-generation as-
semblies.
Jammed spring packs of the reactor 
pressure vessel protection elements
The fuel elements closest to the reactor pressure 
vessel wall had to be replaced with protective el-
ements at both plant units of the Loviisa power 
plant in order to slow down the radiation embrit-
tlement process of the wall. Each protective ele-
ment contains six springs, designed to prevent the 
protective assemblies from rising up when drawn 
by the flow of primary coolant. Radiation, tem-
perature and tension cause the springs to relax so 
that the force exerted by them decreases. To avoid 
replacing the complete protective elements every 
eight years or so, the power company has ordered 
protective elements with replaceable springs.
During the annual maintenance outages of 
2010, jammed spring pins were observed in the 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
STUK approved, pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, one manufacturer of nuclear pressure ves-
sels for the Loviisa plants on application by the 
Loviisa power plant of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy. In addition, STUK approved, on application 
by the Loviisa power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy and pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, 
three testing organisations to carry out tests re-
lated to the manufacture of mechanical equipment 
and structures plus one inspection organisation 
to review the construction plans of mechanical 
components and structures and to carry out their 
structural and commissioning inspections. Testing 
operators from one testing organisation were ap-
proved for carrying out periodic tests of mechani-
cal equipment and structures pursuant to YVL 3.8.
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protective elements in the outer circles of the re-
actors of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. Consequently, 
the spring packs of all protective elements were 
inspected during the 2011 annual maintenance 
outages before fuel transfers. Two protective ele-
ments were replaced with eight-year-old protective 
elements that still had a sufficient spring force. 
Fortum has initiated investigations into the rea-
sons for the jamming.
Reactor coolant pump seal
The purpose of the shaft seal of the reactor coolant 
pump is to prevent the primary circuit water from 
escaping into the room space. The shaft is sealed 
with two successive sealing systems, the so-called 
hydraulic and mechanical seals. The mechanical 
seal contains antimony as the packing material. 
Some antimony enters the sealing water by dis-
solving and abrasion, and it is activated when it 
ends up in the primary circuit when carried there 
by sealing water circulation. According to a sur-
vey carried out by Fortum, more than half of the 
radiation dose rate caused by the primary circuit 
comes from antimony. For this reason, Fortum has 
planned that it will replace the material of the 
mechanical seals of the reactor coolant pumps with 
another graphite-based material where resin is 
used as the packing material instead of antimony. 
The seal construction itself remains the same, but 
the new material will not be activated. During 
the annual maintenance outage of 2011, Fortum 
replaced the mechanical seal on the first reactor 
coolant pump at Loviisa 2. However, an installa-
tion error was detected in the hydraulic seal of 
the primary circuit during ramp-up. This resulted 
in the mechanical seal being damaged, and the 
old antimony-impregnated seal was re-installed. 
Fortum intends to test the use of a resin-impreg-
nated mechanical seal in one of Loviisa’s reactor 
coolant pumps in the 2012 annual maintenance.
Inspection of the material of 
valve bonnet stud bolts 
A broken valve bonnet stud bolt was discovered 
during the 2010 annual maintenance outage at 
Loviisa 2. The bolt had broken because the manu-
facturer had used the wrong material and incorrect 
heat treatment. Following the discovery, Fortum 
inspected in 2011 the stud bolts of 58 valves at 
Loviisa 1 and 40 valves at Loviisa 2 using a mate-
rial analyser. The above deviations were detected 
in a total of five bolts, which were replaced. The 
inspections will continue during the 2012 annual 
maintenance.
Periodic inspection programmes
In 2011, Loviisa  1 and Loviisa  2 had short 
refuelling outages, which means that the scope of 
periodic inspections was also limited. No signifi-
cant faults with nuclear safety implications were 
observed in the inspections.
The dimensions of the indication earlier de-
tected in one weld joint of the reactor pressure ves-
sel cover head were measured using an improved 
ultrasonic inspection technique. The technique has 
been developed after the 2010 annual maintenance 
outage with the aim of being able to measure the 
dimensions of the fault more accurately. The size 
of the fault was determined to be larger than the 
2010 results indicated, and it was found to start 
at the interface between the cladding and the base 
material. The power company submitted the up-
dated strength calculations to STUK for approval. 
STUK has approved the indication. According to 
Fortum, the indication will be next inspected using 
the improved technique in 2014.
The deterministic periodic inspection pro-
gramme of Loviisa  2 pipelines has been replaced 
by a risk-informed in-service inspection pro-
gramme for the next 10-year inspection period of 
2011–2020. At Loviisa 1, the change was already 
implemented for the 10-year inspection period 
of 2008–2017. Following the introduction of the 
risk-informed periodic inspection programme, new 
inspection subjects were added to the programme 
and subjected to basic inspections.
Delayed periodic inspections of 
registered pressure equipment
STUK observed in connection with the pressure 
equipment inspections made during the annual 
maintenance outage at Loviisa 1 that inspections 
of registered pressure equipment required to be 
carried out during power operation had been omit-
ted and were several months overdue. STUK re-
quired Fortum to immediately investigate the root 
cause of the event and to assess the procedures 
related to the administration of pressure equip-
ment inspections. In order to prevent similar occur-
rences, the Loviisa power plant must develop the 
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system for monitoring the inspections of registered 
pressure equipment and the actual inspections so 
that they are carried out by the set deadlines.
Ageing management
Measurements of loads inducing fatigue to pipe 
material have been carried out at the Loviisa 
power plant in the system designed for blowing 
out secondary circuit impurities accumulating in 
the steam generator. STUK required the power 
company to verify further these observations by 
non-destructive tests on the subject pipeline sec-
tions. STUK also paid attention to the possibility of 
strains caused by fluctuating flow conditions when 
assessing the replacement of pressurizer spraying 
lines at the Loviisa power plant, and required that 
a report be submitted on the strain measurements 
carried out in connection with the replacement. In 
addition, the inspection revealed that the Loviisa 
power plant has not recorded the interrupted heat-
ups of the primary circuit from the cold shutdown 
state to operating state as primary circuit load-
ing situations. STUK required the power company 
to assess if the interrupted heat-ups might have 
caused significant additional strains on the pri-
mary circuit.
The Loviisa plant has had several development 
projects improving ageing management: the loca-
tions of faults in steam generator tubes and the 
spots where deposits from the secondary circuit 
will accumulate can now be visualised three-di-
mensionally, and their causal links can be shown. 
The material studies on parts decommissioned 
from the Greifswald plant were utilised for analys-
ing the ageing mechanisms and realistic accident 
loads of inner parts of the reactor pressure vessel. 
Furthermore, the power company has studied age-
ing of cables, reactor support cage screws, diesel 
generators and concrete structures, and investi-
gated the possibilities for increasing the pH of the 
secondary circuit. In deviation from the other main 
components of the primary circuit, no inner parts 
of the reactor pressure vessels are included in the 
most critical group of the ageing management pro-
gramme of the Loviisa power plant, but the power 
company has allocated resources for studies con-
cerning them.
The main focus of the ageing management 
programme at the Loviisa power plant is on the 
main components that are difficult to replace and 
determine the service life of the plant. When main-
taining other components important to safety, the 
safety implications are taken into account through 
criticality classification based on the Operating 
Limits and Conditions. STUK required a further 
analysis to be carried out to establish whether the 
said method is sufficient for managing the ageing 
of these components. The power company must 
also analyse if the ageing management-related 
allocations of responsibility and resources at the 
Loviisa power plant are sufficient for all compo-
nents important to safety.
In relation to ageing management, the periodic 
inspections of registered pressure equipment were 
carried out according to plans during the annual 
maintenance outages at both plant units. A total 
of 10 inspections were carried out at Loviisa 1; of 
these, two inspections were in STUK’s inspection 
domain. A total of 17 inspections were carried 
out at Loviisa 2; of these, six inspections were in 
STUK’s inspection domain. In addition, periodic 
inspections were carried out for 16 pieces of reg-
istered pressure equipment at both plant units. 
These pieces of pressure equipment are in the 
licensee’s inspection domain. No observations re-
stricting the use of pressure equipment were made 
during the inspections.
Condition monitoring
The condition monitoring inspections of pipelines 
at the Loviisa NPP were performed according to 
plans at both plant units, and no observations re-
quiring repairs or restricting their use were made. 
No significant deviations were observed when 
monitoring the condition of the spent fuel storage 
and the fuel pools. The power company monitored 
the condition and leak tightness of the contain-
ment without observing any significant deviations. 
The monitoring of leak tightness requirements of 
NPP containments is discussed in greater detail in 
Section A.III.3 of Appendix 1.
On the basis of the analyses made following the 
Fukushima accident, STUK required Fortum to 
update the safety assessments of spent fuel stor-
ages and fuel pools with a view to earthquake situ-
ations. Fortum has announced that it will update 
its assessment after the supplementary analyses 
are completed on 30 April 2012.
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Spare parts management at 
the Loviisa power plant
In 2011, STUK inspected the sufficiency of spare 
parts for systems and equipment important to 
safety and the functionality of spare parts manage-
ment at the Loviisa power plant. The inspection fo-
cussed in particular on the spare parts inventory of 
systems and equipment important to safety as well 
as on the procedures used at the power plant for 
monitoring the spare parts needs and for procuring 
spare parts. The inspection found that the licensee 
is aware of the challenges related to the availabil-
ity of spare parts and initiated in 2011 an investi-
gation regarding spare parts requirements. STUK 
deems the investigation and its completion impor-
tant. Furthermore, STUK found that the overall 
responsibilities, procedures and instructions re-
garding spare parts management must be further 
specified so that the spare parts requirements of 
systems and equipment important to safety are 
foreseen and that the procurement procedures en-
sure the timely availability of spare parts. Matters 
requiring immediate corrective actions were also 
observed in the storage conditions of spare parts 
for systems and equipment important to safety, 
such as further specification of procedures related 
to the ageing and maintenance of the stored spare 
parts as well as verification of the usefulness of 
aged items in the store or their removal from the 
store. The licensee must submit to STUK an ac-
count of the immediate corrective actions by the 
beginning of March 2012 and draw up, during the 
spring 2012, a development plan for spare parts 
management for the period 2012–2016. STUK con-
siders a long-term development plan necessary in 
order to ensure the availability of spare parts for 
the systems and equipment important to safety 
throughout the entire planned service life of the 
plant unit.
Spare part problems regarding 
the pump motors of the high-
pressure safety injection system
The spare part problems regarding the pump mo-
tors of the high-pressure safety injection system 
surfaced in 2010 when a spare motor was installed 
in place of a faulty motor. The replacement motor 
installed in the component location was the last 
spare motor in store for the safety injection system 
at the Loviisa power plant. Consequently, the pow-
er plant has initiated the process for procuring new 
motors. STUK has required the power company to 
submit a plan and time schedule for replacing the 
motors because the faults occurring in the pump 
motors of the high-pressure safety injection sys-
tem indicate that the original Soviet-made motors 
should be replaced.
Management of EDG spare parts
In conjunction with its inspections and regula-
tory activities, STUK has paid attention to the 
poor spare parts situation of the emergency diesel 
generators at the Loviisa power plant and to the 
procurement and availability of critical parts. The 
goal must be to secure the long-term availability 
of good quality spare parts for the EDGs. In order 
to improve the situation, Fortum has concluded 
a framework agreement with the motor supplier 
for the spare parts required for basic maintenance 
and for other separately specified critical mechani-
cal spares. The power company has also ordered 
more spare parts with long delivery times to be 
kept in store for the annual maintenance outages. 
Furthermore, Fortum intends to audit the spare 
parts suppliers among the motor supplier’s sub-
contractors with whom quality problems have been 
encountered. STUK will assess the sufficiency of 
these actions in early 2012.
4.1.5 Development of the plant and its safety
In 2007, STUK issued its statement to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (currently the Ministry of 
Economy and the Employment) regarding the re-
newal of Loviisa NPP’s operating licence and the 
plant’s periodic safety review. Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy presented, in connection with the periodic 
safety assessment, an action plan for developing 
the plant’s safety. It includes decreasing the risk of 
accidents and releases through various actions and 
supplementing the Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 
The actions have, in the main, progressed in line 
with the action plan. However, the intention is 
to implement certain actions aimed at improving 
safety in connection with the I&C upgrade of the 
Loviisa power plant. The intention is to reduce the 
risk associated with lifting heavy loads by modifi-
cations implemented in connection with modernis-
ing the fuel transfer machine. They will allow us-
ing lifting routes more beneficial to plant safety. 
Since the above projects have been delayed from 
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their original schedule, the implementation of as-
sociated safety improvements has likewise been 
postponed.
The YVL Guides issued by STUK require that 
it must be possible after an accident to bring the 
reactor to a state that allows removing the fuel 
from it. In connection with renewing its operating 
licence, the Loviisa power plant announced that 
it is making investigations in order to meet this 
requirement and, in 2011, it submitted a report of 
the investigations carried out. The report presents, 
in a comprehensive manner, the procedures and 
systems that will be required for emptying the re-
actor of fuel in case of a primary circuit leak. The 
Loviisa power plant has produced the preliminary 
plans and reports that can be used as the basis for 
producing a detailed action plan when required.
Increasing the burn-up of fuel
STUK has earlier approved irradiating the nuclear 
fuel at the Loviisa power plant to a fuel assembly 
burn-up value of 45  MWd/kgU. In 2010, Fortum 
applied for permission to increase the fuel assem-
bly burn-up value to 57  MWd/kgU for fuel of a 
new type, so-called second-generation fuel. This is 
a new fuel type to which burnable poison (Gd2O3) 
has been added to six fuel rods. The poison reduces 
the need to compensate for the reactivity by active 
boron control. Fortum submitted comprehensive 
empirical and computational material in support of 
its application for increasing the burn-up value. On 
the basis of the material, STUK assessed that the 
new fuel will meet STUK’s requirements regarding 
the normal operation of the reactor and accident 
situations up to the burn-up value applied for.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, the PRA calculations use regularly up-
dated information of the occurrences of initiating 
events and the unavailability of equipment togeth-
er with a logical model of the plant’s systems and 
their interdependencies.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated by the licensee for the Loviisa 
plant units was 4.3 × 10-5 in 2011. The value has 
decreased by about 17% from the previous year. 
Several minor plant modifications and the im-
provements to the PRA model have contributed to 
the reduction of the risk. The PRA modifications 
carried out in 2011 concerned, among other things, 
the modelling of replaced sump screen meshes in 
the recirculation lines of emergency cooling water, 
new procedures for recovering the 400 kV main 
transformer in cold shutdown states, replacement 
of the old gas turbines in Hästholmen with a new 
diesel emergency power plant and replacement of 
the EDG relays. For the backup system for residual 
heat removal, the introduction of own operating 
experience data and further specified assessment 
of human errors reduced the estimated unavail-
ability of the system. In addition, the assessed 
seismic risk has decreased when the analysis has 
been updated and the susceptibility of components 
to seismic damage has been re-assessed using up-
to-date computational methods.
The accident risk at the Loviisa power plant 
and its changes are discussed in closer detail in 
Section A.II.4 of Appendix 1 entitled “Accident risk 
of nuclear power plants”.
I&C upgrade at the Loviisa power plant 
LARA, the I&C upgrade project at the Loviisa pow-
er plant, was initiated in 2005. The original inten-
tion was to carry out the upgrade in four phases, 
but according to the current plan, all safety-clas-
sified modifications will be implemented during 
phase 2 of the implementation and phases 3 and 4, 
involving modernisation of the EYT-classified I&C, 
are to be combined. The LARA project will modern-
ise almost the entire I&C system of the plant to a 
digital equipment platform. At the same time, the 
plant’s control room will be modernised.
No installation work took place in the I&C 
modernisation project at the Loviisa power plant 
in 2011. Warranty repairs and updates were made 
to earlier installed I&C systems during the annual 
maintenance outages. The most significant items 
of preparatory work related to phase 2 of the I&C 
upgrade included the preliminary installations of 
measurement pipelines for the reactor protection 
system at both plant units, as well as the earthing 
measurements conducted at Loviisa 2.
In 2011, the power company submitted to STUK 
for review requirement specifications and system 
descriptions as well as quality and qualification 
plans associated with phase 2 of the I&C upgrade. 
Their review will continue in early 2012.
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The project implementation schedule has now 
been further specified so that the installations of 
phase 2 will be made in 2014 for Loviisa 1. In de-
viation from the earlier schedule, the whole I&C 
upgrade of Loviisa  1 will be completed in 2015 
before the installations at Loviisa 2 begin in 2016 
and 2017.
Modernisation of refuelling machines
Fortum is in the process of modernising the refu-
elling machines at the Loviisa power plant. The 
modernisation project will include a basic upgrade 
of the electrical and I&C systems of the refuelling 
machine, now based on 1970s technology, as well 
as a possible increase in the height of the machine. 
The latter can be implemented either by modernis-
ing the existing machine or by replacing it. The 
main reason for increasing the height of the bridge 
is that it would allow installing permanent safety 
rails at the fuel pools. Provisions also exist for ex-
tending the rails of the refuelling machine. This 
would allow re-routing the heavy load lifts in the 
reactor hall, thus reducing the risk of core damage 
caused by falling loads. Fortum submitted a con-
ceptual modernisation plan for the refuelling ma-
chine to STUK in June 2010. STUK reviewed the 
conceptual design plan and required additions to 
be made to it with respect to, among other things, 
quality management, systems classification and 
the I&C qualification plan. STUK approved the 
conceptual design plan with remarks in November 
2011. Fortum submitted an updated I&C qualifica-
tion plan to STUK at the end of the year.
4.1.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
STUK reviewed, in accordance with the inspection 
programme, the low- and intermediate-level waste 
management and final disposal of waste materi-
als at the Loviisa power plant. The inspection of 
low- and intermediate-level waste management fo-
cused on the situation of the project for developing 
the handling of low- and intermediate-level waste, 
the arrangements at the liquid waste solidifica-
tion facility, waste accounting, organisation and 
instructions. Following the inspection observations, 
STUK required the Loviisa power plant to assess 
the rusting and corrosion mechanism of low-level 
waste barrels placed in the VLJ repository, as well 
as the impacts that the deteriorating condition of 
the barrels will have on nuclear waste manage-
ment and its safety.
In October, STUK carried out an inspection of fi-
nal disposal facilities for waste at the Loviisa pow-
er plant. It covered the maintenance procedures at 
the plant site, the repairs and modifications car-
ried out and the results of inspections performed 
by the power company. The latter also included the 
results of groundwater chemistry measurements 
taken from the bedrock of the disposal facility, 
as well as the hydrological and rock-mechanical 
monitoring measurements. No requirements were 
imposed following the inspections.
The processing, storage and final disposal of 
low- and intermediate-level waste (so-called op-
erating waste) at the Loviisa power plant were 
carried out as planned. The volume and activity 
Quantities of spent fuel and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
The volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site 
at the Loviisa power plant at the end of 2011 
was 4,339 assemblies* (522 tU), an increase of 
192 assemblies (23 tU). The volume of low- and 
intermediate-level waste finally disposed of was 
1,774 m³. The total increase of volume from 2010 
is 93 m³. Approximately 50% of the waste has been 
finally disposed of.
* The assembly figures do not include the as-
semblies in the reactors. The average weight of 
spent fuel assemblies at the Loviisa power plant 
is 120.3 kgU.
One event occurred in 2011 in intermediate- 
and low-level waste management. It was de-
tected at the Loviisa power plant in early 2011 that 
the seepage water collection system of the low-level 
waste repository contained small amounts of ra-
dioactive tritium. Radioactivity had escaped into 
the system when the drain pipe for water dropping 
from the ceiling had become blocked and water 
had run on some waste barrels. The event had no 
impact on the safety of personnel or the environ-
ment. Following the event, Fortum replaced the 
drain pipes of the seepage water collection funnels 
on the ceiling of the repository. The activity of seep-
age water and condensation water in the ventila-
tion system is closely monitored.
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of low- and intermediate-level waste in relation to 
generated electrical power remained relatively low 
compared with most other countries. Contributing 
factors include the high quality requirements for 
nuclear waste management and nuclear fuel, the 
planning of maintenance and repair operations, 
decontamination, component and process modi-
fications, as well as waste monitoring and sort-
ing, which enable some of the waste with a very 
low radioactive substance content to be cleared 
from control. In 2011, quantities of maintenance 
waste below the activity limits and scrap metal 
were cleared from control at the power plant, with 
STUK’s approval. In addition, the power plant em-
ploys efficient procedures for reducing the volume 
of waste subject to final disposal.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. 
The solidification facility processes the radioactive 
evaporation residues generated at the power plant 
and the radioactive ion exchange resins from the 
purification filters. Prior to commissioning the so-
lidification facility, a test programme will be car-
ried out and approved to ensure that the solidifica-
tion facility systems function as planned. The tests 
are to ensure, among other things, the functioning 
of the I&C system, the correctness and adequacy of 
the information transmitted by the process mea-
surement devices, and waste package activity de-
termination. STUK approved in 2008 the results 
of the pre-operational tests carried out using ra-
dioactive evaporation residues. Trial operation on 
the resin waste began in May 2009, but there have 
been delays due to various reasons, including the 
unreliable operation of the dosing tank level mea-
surement.
In order to continue the commissioning of its 
liquid waste solidification facility, Fortum has de-
signed improvements to the plant’s process sys-
tems and instructions. The possibility of liquid 
waste spreading to the ventilation system from 
the degassing lines will be prevented by changes 
in process technology. Improvements will also be 
made to the tank level measurements.
The HARVALA sub-project of the LOKIT project, 
intended for increasing the resin storage capacity, 
has advanced in the liquid waste storage facility. 
In the sub-project, the storage capacity of inter-
mediate-level resin will be expanded by modifying 
one low-level ion exchange resin storage tank to be 
suitable for intermediate-level resin. The radiation 
protection structures surrounding the tank will 
be reinforced, level measurements will be added 
and pipeline connections built. TVO submitted the 
conceptual design plan for the project to STUK for 
approval in late 2011.
Expansion of the repository for low- 
and intermediate-level waste
An expansion of the repository for low- and inter-
mediate-level waste was initiated at the Loviisa 
power plant in 2010. The expansion will comprise 
Maintenance Waste Facility 3 and a connecting 
tunnel. The excavation work for the facilities was 
completed in the early spring of 2011, after which 
the construction work continued with equipment 
installations inside the facilities until the end of 
2011. The new facility will be used for the sorting 
and temporary storage of maintenance waste.
According to the statement issued by the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy, the expansion 
could be implemented subject to STUK’s approval 
and oversight. Maintenance Waste Facility 3 will be 
commissioned during the first quarter of 2012. The 
commissioning will require an operating licence is-
sued by STUK and a commissioning inspection.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, Fortum provided the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy with 
the revised and supplemented waste management 
scheme and information on the costs and prices 
of nuclear waste management measures at the 
end of June. The update of the waste management 
scheme includes an index adjustment to the cost 
and price information as well as an estimate of the 
amount of nuclear waste at the end of 2011.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statement, STUK pointed out the incorrect es-
timate of the amount of spent fuel in the waste 
maintenance scheme of 2010, which Fortum will 
correct for the next waste maintenance scheme 
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in 2013. In 2011, Fortum’s liabilities amounted to 
EUR 968.3 million.
4.1.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
The oversight of STUK did not reveal any significant 
deficiencies in the organisational operation of the 
Loviisa power plant in 2011. STUK continued the 
work for assessing the functionality of the manage-
ment system at the Loviisa power plant and verified 
the compliance with the requirements of YVL Guide 
1.4 that entered into force in 2008. Particular atten-
tion was paid to the power plant’s procurement op-
erations. STUK found that there were still deficien-
cies in the way the requirements on operations were 
applied and therefore required the Loviisa power 
plant to reduce the ambiguity in its procedures for 
procurement and supplier control as well as in the 
way auditing activities are reported. STUK also 
oversaw the development of the management sys-
tem at the Loviisa power plant into a process-like 
system. The development work of the management 
system process at the Loviisa power plant is carried 
out by a working group. STUK will continue to as-
sess the progress of this work in 2012. The project 
management development project was successfully 
completed at the Loviisa power plant, but there is 
still a need to develop further the quality manage-
ment of project activities so that the need to ensure 
compliance with the nuclear safety requirements is 
taken into account in the activities throughout the 
entire life span of the projects.
The observations made by STUK in the course 
of its oversight indicate that the organisation pro-
duces an abundance of information regarding its 
operations, but this information is not necessarily 
utilised for developing the management system 
and for improving operations. STUK is of the opin-
ion that the high-quality and timely fulfilment 
of the requirements regarding the management 
systems of nuclear facilities requires the manage-
ment and entire organisation of the Loviisa power 
plant to be strongly committed. On the basis of the 
above, STUK requires the power plant to specify 
further certain matters, including the procedures 
for self-assessment and the associated assessment 
of safety culture.
STUK approved the updated description of 
the quality management system of the licensee, 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy. In its approval deci-
sion, STUK imposed the requirement that the 
licensee must supplement its quality management 
system with a management review compliant with 
YVL Guide 1.4. STUK assessed the procedures of 
the Loviisa power plant for processing the possible 
impacts of changes in the licensee’s quality man-
agement system on the operations of the Loviisa 
power plant and found them to be deficient in 
parts. Consequently, the licensee was required to 
prepare an assessment of the manner in which the 
guiding documents are updated and the associated 
issues are assessed, as well as of the ways in which 
the sufficiently extensive processing and flow of 
information are ensured. The power company pro-
vided STUK with an assessment presenting the ac-
tions for ensuring that there is no conflict between 
the operations, procedures or other documents of 
the licensee and the power plant.
STUK found the human resources assessing the 
operation of the Loviisa power plant and running 
the related development processes to be somewhat 
scant and required the power plant to assess and 
describe its HR planning procedures so that the 
needs of development activities are also sufficient-
ly taken into account in resource planning.
STUK approved, on the basis of an application 
and an interview, one new deputy to the responsi-
ble director in compliance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act. Following this approval, the responsible direc-
tor of the power plant now has three deputies.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are conversant 
with all salient matters related to plant operation 
and safety. In 2011, STUK granted 25 licences to 
shift managers and operators on application by the 
power company and following a successful oral ex-
amination. STUK granted a trainee licence to four 
trainees in the basic operator training programme. 
The licence entitles the holder to supervised practi-
cal training in the main control room.
All participants passed their examinations in 
2011. The new operators achieved good results in 
the examination, which indicates that the basic 
training programme is effective. The operators 
renewing their licences also achieved good results 
in the examination, which indicates that the power 
company’s refresher and supplementary training 
is effective.
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4.1.8 Fire safety
During 2011, STUK oversaw fire safety at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant and nuclear facilities 
with inspections complying with the periodic in-
spection programme, visits made by fire safety ex-
perts during the annual maintenance outages and 
inspections rounds, in the course of the continuous 
presence of resident inspectors.
In the fire safety inspection made as part of the 
periodic inspection programme, STUK required 
the power plant to reduce the fire load during an-
nual maintenance outages by reducing the use of 
wooden scaffolding planks. Fortum decided to stop 
using scaffolding planks inside the plant, and this 
practice began with the annual maintenance out-
ages. Wooden scaffolding planks may only be used 
without the permission of the safety organisation 
in very limited locations according to advance in-
structions. Such locations include the spaces inside 
tanks and pressure vessels. Wooden scaffolding 
planks may only be used in rooms in exceptional 
cases when permitted by the safety organisation.
No significant deviations from the plant’s pro-
cedures regarding the management of flammable 
materials during hot work or maintenance work 
were observed.
The plant’s fire alarm and extinguishing sys-
tems had been managed in keeping with the con-
dition monitoring programme. Demonstration of 
earthquake resistance was previously not required 
for the fire extinguishing systems, but following 
the analyses made after the Fukushima accident, 
STUK required Fortum to investigate the earth-
quake resistance of the fire extinguishing systems. 
The investigations will be completed during 2012.
The monitoring of fire safety at the NPPs is also 
discussed in section A.II.5 of Appendix 1, “Number 
of fire alarms”.
4.1.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
on the basis of reports, inspection visits and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. 
During the year, there were no events classified as 
INES 1 or higher.
Three root cause analyses were performed at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2011. Their subjects 
were the problems related to ventilation and cool-
ing systems, management of component isolations 
and the modification process. The related events 
and observations are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3. The root cause analyses also con-
sidered several events with similar features of 
underlying factors. The analysis tool used was the 
AcciMap method, which the power company has 
used for seven root cause analyses since 2008.
The different steps of the root cause analyses 
brought up various observations concerning the 
technical solutions of systems or the operations 
of the organisation that can be deemed to be of 
particular importance. The analyses have been 
used as the basis for developing the procedures 
for nuclear fuel handling, risk assessment of work 
operations and the technical planning of projects. 
Factors leading to the events were identified in 
several areas, such as instructions, competence, 
observance of instructions or established practices, 
flow of information and lack of systems or tools 
supporting isolation management. The proposed 
actions related, among other things, to kick-off 
meeting practices, isolations carried out during 
daytime, qualification requirements regarding pro-
cess chemistry and to recording observations.
The Loviisa power plant provided STUK with 
special reports regarding the omission of the hydro-
gen analysis required in the Operating Limits and 
Conditions and regarding the initiation of main-
tenance operations on the DC systems of a diesel 
generator while still in power operation. The events 
are described in closer detail in Appendix 3. STUK 
was provided with 12 event reports. A total of 52 un-
expected operation-related events were recorded at 
the Loviisa power plant. The most significant events 
were processed at the Loviisa power plant, and the 
reports were completed on time. The reports related, 
for example, to water and other leaks, component 
isolation problems, modification works, component 
failures and methods of operation.
The follow-up procedures regarding the imple-
mentation and success of corrective actions decided 
following operational events at the Loviisa power 
plant are currently insufficient. The areas in need 
of improvement include the setting of priorities 
regarding action decisions and the timely imple-
mentation of actions. The Loviisa power plant has 
participated in the corporation-led development 
of a new follow-up system for observations, opera-
tional events and risk management. Organisation 
of the operating experience feedback activities as a 
separate group was being planned during the year. 
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The Loviisa power plant also intends to expand the 
group of people dealing with operating experience 
feedback.
The procedures for utilising international op-
erating experience feedback function well at the 
Loviisa power plant. Foreign event reports are 
comprehensively analysed, and the corrective ac-
tions decided on their basis are justified and trace-
able. Fortum itself conducts pre-screening of the 
reports coming from various sources, mainly via 
WANO and the IRS system maintained by IAEA/
NEA. The selection criterion for events to be taken 
to the International operating experience team 
is their safety significance for the Loviisa power 
plant. The operating experience feedback activi-
ties and the monitoring of their impact could be 
further enhanced and improved using a uniform 
operating experience feedback database covering 
the company’s internal and external operating ex-
perience. The fire that occurred in connection with 
the containment leak tightness test performed in 
connection with the 2011 maintenance outage of 
Ringhals 2, and the protective plastic sheet that 
burned, releasing a lot of corrosive chlorides, was 
also identified as an issue to be investigated at 
Loviisa. Fortum investigated the amount of plastic 
materials in the reactor hall in order to assess the 
fire load and risk. During the cleaning operations 
following the fire, a possible operational risk was 
discovered in the containment spraying system at 
Ringhals, caused by foreign material found in the 
pipelines. The foreign material possibly consisted 
of plugs and welding debris dating back to the 
modification work carried out in 1988, and it had 
not been detected in the periodic tests performed 
using air. No similar blockage of the containment 
spraying system has been identified as a problem 
at Loviisa.
The IRS reports dealing with the connecting rod 
bearing problems of EDGs in Germany and France 
had significant information for Finnish plants 
because the Loviisa power plant has emergency 
diesel generators of a similar size. The investiga-
tions performed by the power company revealed 
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Figure 9. Annual radiation doses to the critical groups since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. Over the recent years, the doses to the critical groups have remained below one percent of the set limit, 
0.1 milliSv.
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Figure 8. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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that bearings of the subject type, proven to be sus-
ceptible to damage, had been installed in one of the 
EDGs at the Loviisa power plant in the summer 
2009. The bearings were changed back to the origi-
nal type in January 2011. It transpired during the 
basic overhaul of another EDG at Loviisa in the 
summer 2011 that the situation in spare bearings 
for the EDGs is worrying and an extensive problem 
because the supplier does not yet have a new, ap-
proved replacement bearing, and the old type bear-
ings are no longer available. Fortum commissioned 
VTT to investigate the reasons behind the bearing 
damage. STUK reported the bearing problems in-
ternationally.
Following the results of the root cause analysis, 
STUK supplemented its report submitted in 2010 
to the operating experience database maintained 
by the IAEA regarding an event at the Loviisa 
power plant where radioactive resin escaped into 
the ventilation channel from the mixing tank of a 
liquid waste solidification plant in trial operation.
4.1.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
as part of the periodic inspection programme at the 
Loviisa power plant, focusing on radiation meas-
urements in particular. The scope of the inspec-
tion included the environmental radiation moni-
toring programme and the instruments intended 
for measuring radiation at the plant. Following 
the inspection, STUK requested a report regard-
ing the impact of the dosimeter box and ambient 
conditions of the dosimeters kept in the plant sur-
roundings on their response and wanted to know 
the person appointed responsible for the radia-
tion measurements. STUK also required the power 
company to include the equipment used for col-
lecting atmospheric samples from the environment 
within the scope of the periodic maintenance pro-
gramme and to send the testing instructions of 
the three new radiation measuring instruments to 
STUK for information.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occu-
pational radiation doses underwent annual tests. 
The tests comprise irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s radiation metrology laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. The test 
results were acceptable, although it was found 
that the test results for surface doses were system-
atically conservative. Closer investigation revealed 
that the surface doses reported to the dose register 
in 2011 were relatively higher in relation to deep 
doses when compared to previous years. As a cor-
rective action, the Loviisa power plant intends to 
make technical and administrative changes to the 
radiation dose determination algorithms in 2012.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protec-
tion inspections during the annual maintenance 
outages. In the inspections, STUK assessed the 
radiation protection personnel’s operations and re-
sources as well as the training provided for person-
nel. At the same time, the activities of employees 
in radiation work were assessed. It was concluded 
that radiation protection at the plant units func-
tions well throughout. In the inspections, it was 
found that the cleaning methods and equipment of 
the power plant in work locations where employees 
could be exposed to significant amounts of radia-
tion should be developed. At the same time, it was 
noted that the cleaning operations have too few 
human resources for implementing the work ef-
ficiently, avoiding radiation doses. Follow-up of this 
issue will continue in 2012.
Table 2. Radioactive nuclides originating from the Loviisa NPP, found in the environmental samples.
Types of samples containing radionuclides originating from the NPP. Figures in the table indicate the number of samples of a certain sample type 
in which each radionuclide was detected. Several different nuclides may be found in the same sample.
Type of sample / radionuclide H-3 Mn-54 Co-58 Fe-59 Co-60 Zr-95 Ag-110m Te-123m Sb-124 Sb-125 Total
Air – 1 – 1 2 – – – – – 4
Fallout – – – – 3 – 1 – – – 4
Seawater 5 – – – – – – – – – 5
Aquatic plants – 6 6 – 9 2 9 1 5 1 39
Seabed fauna (Saduria Entomon) – – – – – – 1 – – – 1
Sedimenting materials – – – – 4 – 3 – – – 7
Total 5 7 6 1 18 2 14 1 5 1 60
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In early September 2011, an error was detected 
at the Loviisa power plant in the way in which 
radioactive emissions were determined. The pow-
er plant had introduced a new gamma activity 
measurement system on 11 June 2010, to be used, 
among other things, for determining the aerosols 
and iodine isotopes in the emissions released into 
the atmosphere. Due to an error discovered in the 
method used by the new measurement system to 
calculate the sampling air flow, the figures report-
ed to STUK for gamma-active emissions into the 
atmosphere had been incorrect during the period 
11 June 2010 to 2 September 2011. Having dis-
covered the error, the licensee reported the matter 
to STUK. STUK required the Loviisa power plant 
to supply new, corrected figures for the incorrectly 
reported emissions.
The event is described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
The Loviisa power plant intends to reduce the 
releases of antimony (Sb-122 and Sb-124) to the 
primary circuit and to reduce the activity of the 
primary circuit and the resulting radiation expo-
sure. The power company intends to change the 
material of seals in the reactor coolant pumps to 
an antimony-free alternative (see Section 4.1.4, 
Reactor coolant pump seal).
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 0.43 
manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.29 manSv at Loviisa 1. 
According to the YVL Guide issued by STUK, the 
threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose aver-
aged over two successive years is 2.5 manSv per 
gigawatt of net electrical power. This means a col-
lective dose value of 1.22 manSv per Loviisa plant 
unit. This limit value was not exceeded at either 
plant unit.
The total time used for annual maintenance 
outages in Loviisa was short, and there were few 
operations of significance for radiation protection, 
which resulted in the total collective dose being 
the lowest ever in the history of the Loviisa NPP. 
The collective occupational radiation doses of em-
ployees at the Loviisa NPP were smaller than the 
average doses of employees working in pressurized 
water reactors in the OECD countries.
The occupational radiation doses of NPP work-
ers mostly accumulated in work carried out during 
annual maintenance outages. The collective occu-
pational radiation dose caused by work carried out 
during the annual maintenance outages was 0.40 
manSv at Loviisa 1, and 0.25 manSv at Loviisa 2. 
The highest individual radiation dose accumulated 
amounted to 4.9 mSv at Loviisa 1, and to 6.1 mSv 
at Loviisa 2. The highest individual dose incurred 
during the annual maintenance outages of both 
plant units was 7.4 mSv. The highest individual 
dose incurred during the year was 7.9 mSv.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants in 2011 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
STUK inspected the operation of the weather 
measurement system and environmental radiation 
monitoring network at the Loviisa power plant 
site. The instruments of the weather measurement 
system were found to be operable. The environ-
mental radiation monitoring network had operated 
well apart from a few isolated disturbances. Due 
to the ageing of both of these systems, the power 
plant initiated in 2011 the planning work for up-
grading the weather measurement system and the 
environmental radiation monitoring network.
The radioactive releases into the environment 
from the Loviisa nuclear power plant were well 
below the authorised annual limits in 2011. The 
releases of radioactive noble gases into the air 
were approximately 6 TBq (as Kr-85-equivalent 
activity), which is approximately 0.03% of the 
authorised limit. The releases of radioactive noble 
gases were dominated by argon-41, i.e. the activa-
tion product of argon-40 present in the air space 
between the reactor pressure vessel and the main 
concrete shield. The releases of radioactive iodine 
isotopes into the air were about 1 MBq (as I-131- 
equivalent activity), i.e. approximately 0.0004% of 
the authorised limit. The emissions through the 
vent stack also included radioactive particulate 
matter amounting to 0.1 GBq, tritium amounting 
to 0.2 TBq and carbon-14 amounting to approxi-
mately 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea was 15 TBq, less than 10% of the 
release limit. The total activity of other nuclides 
released into the sea was about 0.2 GBq, which is 
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0.02% of the plant location-specific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.05 μSv per annum, i.e. less than 0.1% of 
the set limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). The 
average person living in Finland receives the 
equivalent radiation dose from natural and spatial 
radiation sources in about 20 minutes.
A total of 300 samples were collected and anal-
ysed from the terrestrial and marine environment 
surrounding the Loviisa power plant during 2011. 
External background radiation measurement and 
the whole body counting of people in the sur-
roundings were also carried out regularly. Very 
small amounts of radioactive substances originat-
ing from the nuclear power plant were observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts were so small that they are insignificant 
in terms of the radiation exposure of the environ-
ment or people.
4.1.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
response organisations of nuclear power plants to 
act in abnormal situations. No situations requir-
ing emergency response actions occurred at the 
Loviisa power plant in 2011.
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa power 
plant complies with the main requirements. The 
emergency response organisation of the power 
plant consists of the organisation of the Loviisa 
power plant and of Fortum’s technical support 
organisation in Keilaniemi. Both locations were 
included within the scope of periodic inspections in 
October 2011. The matters inspected included pre-
paredness training, exercises, facilities and equip-
ment, environmental radiation measurements and 
weather measurements at the plant site. The func-
tions of the emergency information system were 
revised; the system is used to transfer the key in-
formation on events at the plant to the emergency 
response centres at STUK and Keilaniemi.
An unannounced emergency exercise was or-
ganised at the Loviisa power plant in May 2011. 
The exercise took place outside normal work-
ing hours, and the results indicated that the 
plant’s emergency response organisation can be 
summoned quickly enough. The emergency re-
sponse organisation of the power plant, STUK, 
the Regional Emergency Response Centre, the 
Eastern Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services and 
the Eastern Uusimaa Police Department partici-
pated in the exercise. A personnel evacuation drill 
was organised at the power plant in December. In 
fire-fighting exercises, the fire brigade of the power 
plant works in close cooperation with the Eastern 
Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services.
The assessments carried out following the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident did not 
yet affect the emergency response arrangements at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2011.
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4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto power 
plant and assessed its organisation and personnel’s 
competence in different areas by means of review-
ing materials provided by the license holder, carry-
ing out inspections in line with the periodic inspec-
tion programme and by overseeing operations at 
the plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, 
STUK can state that plant operation did not cause 
a radiation hazard to the employees, population or 
the environment. Occupational radiation doses and 
radioactive releases into the environment were 
low and clearly below the prescribed limits. The 
licensee has operated the Olkiluoto power plant 
in a safe manner and in compliance with the YVL 
Guides. Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto 
power plant is in compliance with requirements. 
The processing, storage and final disposal of low- 
and intermediate-level waste (so-called plant op-
erating waste) at the power plant were carried out 
as planned.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the containment and the pri-
mary circuit, which prevent the release of radioac-
tive material into the environment, are in compli-
ance with requirements. A small fuel leak was de-
tected at Olkiluoto 2 in 2010. It was located during 
annual maintenance in 2011, and the leaking fuel 
assembly was removed from the reactor. In August 
2011, a new fuel leak was detected at Olkiluoto 
2. The monitoring measurements indicate that it 
has remained small. The detected leakages are 
insignificant for the radiation safety of the environ-
ment, because the radioactivity is contained in the 
primary circuit and inside the containment.
STUK approved the licensee’s application for 
increasing the average value fuel burn-up in fuel 
assemblies to 50 MWd/kgU. In 2011, STUK carried 
out a special inspection concerning ageing manage-
ment where the sufficiency of spare parts and the 
functionality of spare parts management at the 
plant units were assessed. The licensee was found 
to have taken corrective actions regarding spare 
parts management. At the end of November, STUK 
received the report of these actions, which it had 
requested following the inspection.
Plant operation has been systematic and in com-
pliance with the Operating Limits and Conditions 
(OLC) and guidelines. One event affecting safety 
was reported at the plant, rated as class 1 on the 
international INES scale. In the event, damage 
was discovered in the inner parts of the valves in 
the systems required for overpressure protection 
of and residual heat removal from the primary 
circuits of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, which is 
why TVO replaced all damaged parts. A root cause 
analysis was also performed on the event. In 2010, 
STUK pointed out that there had been too few root 
cause analyses. Two were performed in 2011. They 
have concentrated on investigating the technical 
causes while the investigations on the activities 
of the organisation have scope for improvement. 
System and equipment failures had a minor safety 
implication for the plant. A significant observation 
received through international operating experi-
ence activities was related to a fire occurring in the 
containment of a Swedish NPP and the blockages 
discovered in the containment spraying system in 
that connection. Following the event, TVO decided 
to update its instructions for containment leak 
tightness tests and to extend the scope of tests and 
inspections on the spraying system.
The annual maintenance outages of plant units 
were implemented as planned in terms of nuclear 
and radiation safety. In 2010, STUK required TVO 
to develop its planning processes for annual main-
tenance and modification works. The situation 
regarding documentation to be submitted to STUK 
improved slightly in 2011. STUK will continue the 
assessment of corrective actions proposed by TVO 
in 2012.
During the year, several modifications were 
implemented for improving plant safety. The plant 
is in the middle of a modernisation project span-
ning many years, aimed at extending the service 
life of the plant and improving its availability. The 
modifications carried out at Olkiluoto 1 in 2010 
were also implemented at Olkiluoto 2 in 2011. 
They included the replacement of inner isolation 
valves in the main steam system, replacement of 
low voltage distribution switchgears in one sub-
system, replacement of the low-pressure turbine, 
modernisation of the main seawater pumps as 
well as replacement of the generator and its cool-
ing water system. TVO is also in the process of 
expanding the spent fuel storage at Olkiluoto. At 
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the same time, the structures of the storage facility 
will be modified to comply with the current safety 
requirements. In 2011, TVO provided STUK with 
the conceptual design plans for the construction of 
an emergency control room and for replacing the 
diesel generators. In 2009, STUK approved the 
periodic safety review regarding Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
and TVO’s action plan for developing plant safety. 
The agreed actions have mainly progressed in line 
with the plans.
TVO’s organisation has acted in a system-
atic and development-oriented way to improve 
the plant’s safety. In 2011, the modification work 
process was a subject of STUK’s special oversight. 
TVO has developed its project management pro-
cedures, but management of the project portfolio 
still needs further attention. In its inspections 
performed as part of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, STUK pointed out several areas in need 
of development, and TVO is still in the process of 
improving the description of the modification work 
process. The modification work instructions will 
be developed in particular with respect to quality 
management and procurement.
4.2.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Operating Limits and Conditions
STUK is responsible for verifying that TVO keeps 
the Operating Limits and Conditions (OLC) up 
to date and does not deviate from them without 
STUK’s permission. TVO looks after the up-to-
dateness of the OLC of the Olkiluoto plant among 
other things by assessing the need to update them 
in regular reviews and during the planning stages 
of modifications. In its inspections, STUK discov-
ered individual points for improvement regarding 
the up-to-dateness of the OLC and the update pro-
cedures: the main control room did not have avail-
able the latest OLC updates regarding the spent 
fuel storage, and a few updates related to periodic 
tests had been made without STUK’s approval. In 
2011, TVO did not report any events during which 
the plant would not have been in a state compliant 
with the Operating Limits and Conditions.
STUK oversaw the observance of requirements 
and limits set out in the OLC in the course of its 
oversight of the licensee’s activities at the plant 
site. Deficiencies were observed in keeping the fire 
doors shut during annual maintenance outages. 
The employees wedge self-closing fire doors open 
for easier passage. STUK requested TVO to look 
into the matter because, in case of fire, the doors 
left ajar may allow fire to spread from one compart-
ment to the next. In its account on the matter, TVO 
presented the scheduled corrective actions with 
which it seeks to influence the matter from dif-
ferent angles, such as from that of the employees’ 
attitudes and actions, control of the doors and as-
sessment of the need to lock them.
During the year, TVO submitted to STUK for ap-
proval 10 amendment proposals for the Operating 
Limits and Conditions. The amendments were 
mainly due to modifications carried out at the 
plant, such as replacement of the inner isolation 
valves of the main steam lines at Olkiluoto 2 and 
upgrade of the plant’s radiation measurement 
systems. In these cases, the operating and test-
ing requirements of new equipment were differ-
ent from those of the decommissioned equipment. 
STUK approved nine amendment proposals as 
they were and asked for further justification for 
the amendments in one case before approving 
them. One amendment proposal was only partly 
approved by STUK. That amendment concerned 
taking into account the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, to 
be commissioned, in the release limits of radioac-
tive substances. STUK wanted to keep some of 
the items as they were so that more lenient action 
limits than the current ones could not be applied in 
any situation.
TVO applied for permission from STUK for sev-
en planned deviations from the Operating Limits 
and Conditions (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). Five 
of the applications were related to modifications 
and two to periodic tests. For example, the volt-
age had to be cut off from the power supply cables 
of the start-up transformers of Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 when the perimeter fence of the plant 
area was being refurbished and excavations were 
necessary at the location of the cables. This had to 
be done for occupational safety. STUK approved 
the applications but imposed restrictions in a few 
of its decisions concerning, for example, the valid-
ity of the permission and activities during the 
deviation. STUK also approved two applications 
for extending the validity period of two earlier 
approved deviations from OLC, when TVO was un-
able to start the work within the planned schedule.
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Operation and operational events
No events leading to a reactor trip occurred at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. In addition to 
the annual maintenance outages, TVO shut plant 
units down for repairs to a so-called maintenance 
outage on three occasions: damaged inner parts in 
the valves of the systems required for overpressure 
protection of and residual heat removal from the 
primary circuit were replaced at both plant units, 
and the motor of one reactor coolant pump was re-
placed at Olkiluoto 1 due to a bearing fault. Other 
significant events included faults in the diesel gen-
erators forming part of the emergency power sys-
tems. The events are described in Appendix 3.
STUK oversaw the operation on a daily basis 
at the plant site, by inspecting the regular re-
ports on operating activities as well as the event 
reports, and by making two inspections as part 
of the periodic inspection programme. One of the 
most significant observations regarding operation 
was to do with the activities of operating person-
nel during the annual maintenance outages. There 
have been several events in recent years where the 
operators have reacted slowly to the alarms com-
ing to the control room during annual maintenance 
outages. Similarly, there have been several events 
related to component isolation during the annual 
maintenance outages. TVO has identified the indi-
vidual events, analysed them and determined the 
corrective actions. The events have, for example, 
resulted in the pumps in safety systems starting 
unnecessarily as well as in radioactive systems 
being released inside the plant. Due to the recur-
ring nature and common features of these events, 
Figure 12. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant in 2011.
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Figure 11. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 10. INES	classified	events	at	the	Olkiluoto	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
STUK required TVO to analyse the events as one 
entity and determine the corrective actions and 
report the results to STUK in a root cause report 
and during an inspection to be conducted in the 
spring 2012.
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Operation and operational events
The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 94.8%, while that 
of Olkiluoto 2 was 90.9%. The annual maintenance 
outages have a major effect on the load factors. The 
outage at Olkiluoto 1 lasted for nine days, while that 
of Olkiluoto 2 lasted for 29 days. The losses in gross 
energy output due to operational transients and com-
ponent malfunctions were 1.9% at Olkiluoto 1 and 
1.4% at Olkiluoto 2.
The emergency diesel generator at Olki-
luoto  1 did not operate according to specifica-
tions when the switch-over and re-switching automa-
tion of the 660 V emergency power supply was tested. 
During the test, the generator switch of the diesel gen-
erator opened. The opening was caused by overvoltage 
resulting from the incorrect operation of the generator 
exciter. Due to the fault, the generator would not have 
operated according to specifications in a real situation 
where it would have been required.
Damage, such as cracks and coating flaws, was 
discovered in the inner parts of the valves in the 
systems required for overpressure protection 
of and residual heat removal from the primary 
circuits of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in inspections 
carried out during the annual maintenance outages. 
The damage had not affected the operation of the 
valves; they had operated correctly in regular tests. 
Nevertheless, STUK found, on the basis of the reports 
produced by TVO regarding the faults discovered, 
that the original pistons and pilot cylinders of the 
valves were approaching the end of their life span. 
TVO had replaced all damaged parts with new ones 
by the autumn 2011.
It was discovered in conjunction with mainte-
nance performed at the equipment manufacturer’s 
premises that an earth fault occurs at a certain 
voltage level in a diesel generator forming part 
of the emergency power systems of Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2. A similar fault had been discovered dur-
ing the maintenance of another diesel generator a 
year earlier. A fault like this can be latent for a long 
time without affecting the operability of the generator, 
but it can also rapidly escalate and damage the core 
winding and cause a risk of fire. Following the event, 
TVO has increased condition monitoring measure-
ments and the frequency of maintenance operations 
on the diesel generators.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
In 2011, the risks caused by component mal-
functions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
13.1% and 5.4% of the expected value of the an-
nual accident risk calculated using the plant’s risk 
model for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, respectively. 
The result was in line with those of previous years.
Annual maintenance outages
Annual maintenance ensures the preconditions for 
operating the power plant safely during the fol-
lowing operating cycles. STUK oversees that the 
annual maintenance does not cause radiation haz-
ards to the employees, the population or the envi-
ronment and that the plant is safe. This is done by 
Table 3. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units subject to special reports or a root cause analysis and/or classified 
INES	Level	1	or	higher.	All	events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).
Event
Non-compliances 
with the OLC
Special report and/
or root cause report
INES 
rating
Incorrect operation of the emergency diesel generator at Olkiluoto 1 • 0
Defects in the internal parts of the valves of the system required for 
overpressure protection of and residual heat removal from the primary circuit  
at Olkiluoto 2 and Olkiluoto 1
• 1
Short between core windings discovered in the maintenance of a diesel 
generator
• 0
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inspecting the outage plans and modification work 
documentations and by carrying out site inspec-
tions during the annual maintenance.
STUK has found that TVO is capable of plan-
ning and implementing annual maintenance out-
ages in a safe manner. However, STUK identified 
scope for development in spare parts management, 
planning and resource allocation of modifications 
implemented during the annual maintenance as 
well as in decision-making related to analysing 
events. Following its inspection performed before 
the annual maintenance, STUK required TVO 
to produce a report of spare parts maintenance 
regarding systems and components important to 
safety and submit it to STUK by the end of 
November 2011. The shortage of spare parts en-
countered during the annual maintenance outages 
further emphasised the importance and topicality 
of the issue. The observations made during the 
2010 annual maintenance indicated that there 
is scope for improvement in the way TVO plans 
modifications and allocates resources for them. 
Following the 2010 annual maintenance, STUK re-
quired TVO to investigate the underlying problems 
that have led to delays in planning and to the defi-
ciencies in the contents of documents submitted to 
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 2 
The annual maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 took 
place between 10 May and 8 June 2011 and lasted 
over three days longer than planned. The delay was 
caused in particular by investigations and repairs 
of the damage observed in the pistons and control 
cylinders of the valves in the system required for over-
pressure protection of and residual heat removal from 
the primary circuit.
Almost 25 per cent of the nuclear fuel in the reac-
tor was replaced with fresh fuel during the annual 
maintenance outage. A fuel leak was detected at the 
plant unit soon after the start-up following the 2010 
annual maintenance outage. TVO monitored the mag-
nitude of the leak and its development by regular 
measurements during the operating cycle. During this 
annual maintenance outage, the leaking fuel assem-
bly was identified and removed from the reactor.
Some major modifications were carried out dur-
ing the annual maintenance outage. They included 
the replacement of the inner isolation valves of the 
main steam pipes (see the description in Section 
4.2.5), the replacement of a low-voltage mechanism in 
one subsystem (see the description in Section 4.2.5), 
the modernisation of the main seawater pumps, the 
replacement of pipes in the seawater system, the re-
placement of low-pressure turbines, the replacement 
of the generator and the replacement of the generator’s 
cooling system. In addition to the modifications, nu-
merous inspections, maintenance operations, repairs 
and tests of systems, equipment and structures were 
carried out.
TVO tested the operation of the new generator and 
its voltage regulator on 11 and 13 June after the an-
nual maintenance. An operational transient occurred 
during both tests resulting in the plant dropping off 
the national grid. The first transient was caused by 
an incorrect setting of the voltage regulator. The latter 
transient was due to an error in planning the tests. 
The voltage regulator setting was corrected before 
ramping up the reactor power. The events did not put 
the plant or its surrounding environment at risk. The 
events did not cause any disturbance to power supply 
to the plant’s systems.
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 1
Olkiluoto 1 had a refuelling outage from 1 to 10 
May 2011. The outage lasted two days longer than 
planned due to the time taken to repair the faults 
discovered in the diesel generator and in the outer 
isolation valve of one of the main steam pipes.
Twenty-five per cent of the fuel in the reactor 
was replaced with fresh fuel. In other respects, the 
work carried out mainly consisted of inspections, 
maintenance, repairs and tests of systems, equip-
ment and structures, such as fuel inspections and 
leak tests on the two hundred or so containment 
isolation valves.
During the outage, a fuel rack in the reactor 
hall fuel pool tilted slightly when spent fuel was 
moved to one side of the rack. The structure of the 
rack is such that a lop-sided load like this changes 
the centre of gravity, and the rack may tilt. The 
matter had not been taken into account when pro-
ducing the transfer plan and when carrying out 
the actual transfers. TVO will develop its proce-
dures and instructions so that a similar event can 
be prevented. The event did not put the integrity of 
fuel at risk.
50
STUK-B 147 4.2 OlkiluOtO NPP uNits 1 aNd 2
STUK. The account submitted by TVO presented 
the corrective actions to be taken before the 2011 
annual maintenance related, among other things, 
to the development of pre-planning and instruc-
tions. STUK will monitor the effectiveness of the 
corrective actions.
STUK used a total of 282 man-days on on-site 
oversight during the annual maintenance outages; 
these days were made up oversight work on dif-
ferent areas of expertise, such as equipment and 
system inspections at the plant site, and inspec-
tion rounds. In addition, two resident inspectors 
worked regularly on site, primarily responsible for 
overseeing the Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 plant 
units.
4.2.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Because the plant’s safety functions are secured 
with multiple parallel systems and equipment and, 
in some cases, also with systems and equipment 
that have different operating principles, the indi-
vidual failures observed in the plant’s equipment 
have not prevented the activation of safety func-
tions in any situations. The safety of the plant was 
comprehensively assessed in the periodic safety re-
view of 2009, after which TVO has further supple-
mented the transient and accident analyses per-
formed for ensuring the safety functions – for ex-
ample, with respect to an extension of a postulated 
accident in 2009 and with respect to loss-of-coolant 
accidents in 2010.
4.2.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK monitored the integrity of structures and 
equipment on the basis of the periodic inspection 
programmes and repairs and modifications carried 
out. No observations restricting the use of pres-
sure equipment or pipelines were made during the 
periodic inspections. The crack detected in 2003 in 
the nozzle weld of the reactor feedwater system of 
Olkiluoto  2 has not propagated. The leaking fuel 
rod detected at Olkiluoto 2 after the 2010 outage 
was replaced during the 2011 outage. Another leak 
was detected in the spring 2011; it must be located 
and the leaking fuel assembly replaced during the 
2012 outage at the latest.
Faults were detected during the annual main-
tenance outages of both plant units in the pistons 
and hard-chrome plating of cylinders of the valves 
required for over-pressure protection of the prima-
ry circuit and for residual heat removal from the 
reactor. Consequently, STUK required the power 
company to replace all valves. Due to the limited 
availability of spare parts, the valve replacement 
operation caused an additional outage at both 
plant units in June and August 2011. Furthermore, 
signs of fatigue were detected in the exhaust mani-
folds of the EDGs of both plant units. However, the 
damage report produced by TVO indicates that the 
fatigue will not directly affect the operation of the 
diesel generators and does not therefore prevent 
the generation of emergency power. During 2011, 
STUK paid particular attention to ageing manage-
Maintenance outages 
Olkiluoto 1 had a maintenance outage on 26–29 
June 2011 for the purpose of inspecting the in-
ner parts of the valves in the systems required 
for over-pressure protection of and residual heat 
removal from the primary circuit and for replac-
ing any damaged parts (Section 4.2.4). The inspec-
tions were carried out following the observations 
made during the annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2. 
Olkiluoto 2 had a maintenance outage on 
18–21 August 2011 for the purpose of replacing the 
inner parts of the valves in the systems required 
for over-pressure protection of and residual heat 
removal from the primary circuit. The damage was 
discovered during the annual maintenance outage 
in June–July, but TVO did not have enough spare 
parts available at that time for replacing all neces-
sary parts (Section 4.2.4).
Olkiluoto 1 had a maintenance outage on 
26–29 August 2011 for the purpose of replacing 
one main circulation pump motor. The pump’s 
vibration readings had been increasing during 
the operating cycle. When the motor was inspected 
after removing it from its location, the reason for 
the vibration was found to be larger-than-normal 
wear on the bearing. The bearing material of the 
subject pump had been replaced during the 2010 
annual maintenance outage, and the intention had 
been to open up the pump for inspection during the 
2012 outage. The other main circulation pumps 
at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 have bearings of 
the original type. During the outage, one pump in 
the cooling system of the shut-down reactor was 
replaced because its vibration level had increased.
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ment of the plant units and to the availability of 
spare parts. In the spring 2011, STUK inspected 
the sufficiency of spare parts inventory for the 
most critical equipment and the functionality of 
spare parts procurement. The licensee was found 
to have taken corrective actions regarding spare 
parts management. At the end of November, STUK 
received the report of these actions, which it had 
requested following the inspection. STUK will con-
tinue to monitor closely the functionality of spare 
parts procurement during 2012.
Fuel
During the annual maintenance outages, TVO 
carried out visual inspections and measurement 
checks of the fuel as part of the periodic inspection 
programme. The purpose of these inspections is to 
investigate the behaviour of the last delivered fuel 
assemblies and their flow channels. An indication 
of a fuel leak had been observed at Olkiluoto  2 
in the spring 2010. The leaking assembly was re-
moved from the reactor during the annual mainte-
nance. The initial visual inspection of the assembly 
indicated that the damage may have been caused 
by a foreign object. More specific results will be ob-
tained from an inspection to be performed during 
the operating cycle.
Fuel leaks at Olkiluoto 2
A fuel leak was detected at the plant unit imme-
diately after the 2010 annual maintenance out-
age. The leak remained very small the whole time. 
The maximum iodine-131 concentration measured 
in the coolant during 2011 was about one thou-
sandth of the limit value specified in the Operating 
Limits and Conditions for operational restrictions. 
The highest activity concentration was measured 
during a reduction of power. Under reduced pow-
er, the gaseous fission products contained inside 
the fuel cladding, such as the iodine-131 isotope, 
are readily released to the reactor coolant. During 
power operation, the activity concentration usu-
ally stabilises at the level that prevailed before the 
reduction of power. The leaking fuel assembly was 
identified and removed from the reactor during the 
2011 annual maintenance.
A new fuel leak was detected in the reactor of 
Olkiluoto 2 in early August 2011. The leak has re-
mained small throughout the reported period. The 
maximum value of iodine-131 activity concentra-
tion in the reactor water was about 0.2%, or two 
thousandths, of the limit value set in the Operating 
Limits and Conditions. The highest activity con-
centration was measured during a reduction of 
power. The licensee will monitor the situation re-
garding the fuel leak both by continuous activity 
measurements and by laboratory measurements. 
The leaking fuel assembly will be removed from 
the reactor during the 2012 annual maintenance 
outage at the latest.
Primary circuit
The power company will monitor the condition of 
the primary circuit, among other things, by peri-
odic inspections. The exerted loads are recorded, and 
STUK inspects these records in connection with the 
periodic inspection programme. Leak monitoring al-
lows detecting, with a high probability, a crack in a 
pressure equipment wall before it results in a rup-
ture. The primary circuit is still in good condition. 
The risk of stress-induced corrosion of stainless 
steel requires constant monitoring in boiling water 
reactors. Stress corrosion is caused by the com-
bined effects of stresses, sensitisation caused by 
the carbon contained in the steel and unfavourable 
water chemistry. Oxygen is formed in the water of 
boiling water reactors, which is why it is so impor-
tant to keep the concentrations of other impurities 
extremely small. Over the years, the pipelines at 
Olkiluoto have been gradually replaced with pipes 
made of stainless steel with lower carbon content.
Periodic inspection programmes
The inner parts of the reactor pressure vessel of 
Olkiluoto  1 were subjected to a visual video in-
spection during the 2011 refuelling outage. The 
Olkiluoto 1 faults being monitored have remained 
unchanged, and the inspections did not reveal any 
new faults with important safety implications. 
Periodic inspections were also performed on the 
reactor pressure vessel of Olkiluoto 2 using volu-
metric inspection methods.
There is a crack in a nozzle weld in the reactor 
feedwater system of Olkiluoto  2, which has been 
monitored during 2003–2009. The inspection made 
in 2011 indicated that the crack has remained un-
changed. The testing organisation has developed 
its inspection techniques in order to verify the 
height of the fault. The current, qualified meas-
uring technique has been optimised up to a fault 
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height of 10 mm, but its accuracy quickly weakens 
with faults higher than that. The dimensioning of 
the crack have been further specified by making 
laboratory tests using fault geometries similar to 
that of the subject concerned. However, the tech-
niques used in these tests have not been qualified 
in compliance with the national practice. The new 
probe type used in the tests gave 15.3 mm for the 
height of the fault. The testing organisation in-
tends to use both the qualified procedure and the 
above new probe type in future annual mainte-
nance outages so that the height of the fault can be 
determined more accurately.
The periodic inspections of registered pres-
sure equipment were implemented during the 
annual maintenance outages according to plans 
for both plant units. At Olkiluoto  1, eight pieces 
of pressure equipment were inspected, all of them 
in the domain of TVO’s inspection organisation. 
At Olkiluoto  2, a total of 44 registered pieces 
of pressure equipment were inspected. Of these, 
18 were in STUK’s inspection domain and the 
remaining 26 in the domain of TVO’s inspection 
organisation. In addition, periodic inspections were 
carried out for 18 pieces of pressure equipment 
during the operation of plant units. No observa-
tions restricting the use of pressure equipment 
were made during the inspections.
Ageing management
The inspections carried out by STUK indicated 
that TVO had carried out the internal audits re-
quired for the service life management process and 
added in the organisational manual the previously 
missing descriptions of teams participating in age-
ing management. The internal auditing activities 
were found to function well, and the power com-
pany has initiated the corrective actions based on 
the audit findings.
TVO has also initiated improvement measures 
required by STUK so that more comprehensive 
documentation can be collected on the implemen-
tation of work carried out in component mainte-
nance. Utilisation of the IT systems will be im-
proved by user training. Furthermore, the list of 
items in the IT systems will be extended. This will 
benefit the monitoring of effectiveness and devel-
opment of maintenance programmes, as well as the 
traceability of spare parts, materials and working 
methods that have proved incorrect.
The technical justification for structural so-
lutions to be implemented at Olkiluoto  3 has 
given STUK cause to request an account of the 
possibility of thermal embrittlement in the dissim-
ilar material joint of the primary feedwater fitting 
at Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2. According to the 
report received by the power company from VTT, 
such a risk is not to be expected. TVO has contin-
ued its investigations regarding the accelerating 
effect of actual process conditions on the fatigue 
of the most important pipelines. With the help of 
these investigations and the supporting extensive 
development work regarding strength calculations, 
TVO intends to provide STUK with totally new 
fatigue analyses on these pipelines to serve as the 
basis for extending the service life of Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto  2. In addition, the power company 
has investigated the technical prerequisites for in-
creasing the output power. To this end, it conducted 
a trial programme in connection with the 2011 an-
nual maintenance in which the vibrations in the 
main steam pipeline under increased flow of steam 
were measured.
In spite of the research, development and mod-
ernisation projects, a growing trend can be seen in 
the failure frequency of safety-related components. 
The fault in the exhaust pipe of a diesel generator 
occurred unexpectedly in 2011 and was repeated 
in other units. Cracks and coating damage were 
discovered in the main valve of the system re-
quired for over-pressure protection of the primary 
circuit and residual heat removal from the reactor 
in inspections carried out in 2011. In its inspec-
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
A total of 24 nuclear pressure equipment manu-
facturers were approved for the Olkiluoto plant 
(plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). STUK approved 
five testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures, plus two inspection organisations to 
review the construction plans of mechanical com-
ponents and structures and to carry out their 
structural and commissioning inspections. Testing 
operators from three different testing organisa-
tions were approved for carrying out periodic tests 
of mechanical equipment and structures pursuant 
to YVL 3.8.
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tions, STUK called attention to the fact that the 
potential ageing phenomena are not sufficiently 
taken into account in the maintenance operations 
included within the scope of the equipment-specific 
responsibility system. The component classifica-
tion used for the maintenance of equipment and 
structures does not particularly emphasise ageing 
or itemise the parts of even the most important 
equipment to allow their localised ageing phenom-
ena to be taken into account.
Metal ageing phenomena in the valve 
pistons of the system required for over-
pressure protection of the primary 
circuit and for residual heat removal
The purpose of the system required for over-pres-
sure protection of the primary circuit and for resid-
ual heat removal is to restrict the pressure in the 
reactor by letting out steam generated in the reac-
tor to the reactor containment building in cases 
where the normal route of the steam to the turbine 
plant is not available. TVO detected cracks in the 
valve piston of the said system in a visual inspec-
tion performed on 24 May 2011 during the annual 
maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2. Following the 
observation, all 12 valves were disassembled and 
inspected.
The damage was analysed in investigations 
carried out by TVO and VTT. Stress corrosion and 
fatigue cracks were found in the welded piston 
coatings of several valves. In addition, parts of the 
chrome coating of the pilot cylinders had come off 
due to corrosion. The power company assessed that 
there was no immediate risk of the valves failing 
and becoming inoperative. Due to the extent of 
the discovered cracks and damage, STUK found 
that the components were due for replacement and 
required that this be done. Furthermore, STUK 
required TVO to inspect the valves of Olkiluoto 1, 
at that time in operation, during the maintenance 
outage in June. The rest of the valve parts suf-
fering from ageing phenomena were replaced in 
August during an additional maintenance outage 
at Olkiluoto 2.
Cracks in the exhaust manifold of 
an emergency diesel generator
A leak was detected in the exhaust manifold of an 
emergency diesel generator at Olkiluoto 2 while 
the EDG was being tested. The exhaust manifold 
was disassembled and one of its parts was found to 
have cracks. Another broken part was discovered 
during a trial run after replacing the parts. The 
exhaust manifold parts are original and date back 
to the 1970s.
Because of the faults, TVO inspected all EDG 
engines and found similar faults in most of them. 
Following the trial runs and inspections, STUK re-
quired TVO to establish the root cause of the faults 
and the possibility of a common cause failure. 
Furthermore, STUK required TVO to establish the 
possible impact of loose parts on the availability of 
the engines and to have a damage report produced. 
In the damage report produced by TVO, the failure 
mechanism was found to be a fatigue crack that 
does not directly affect the operation of the diesel 
generator and, as a result, does not prevent the 
generation of emergency power.
Because of the event, TVO will inspect and 
repair the exhaust manifolds of all EDGs in the 
maintenance operations to be carried out in the 
autumn 2011 and the spring 2012.
Condition monitoring
The condition and leak tightness of the contain-
ment at the Olkiluoto NPP is monitored through 
periodic inspections. No significant deviations have 
been observed in them. The monitoring of leak 
tightness requirements of the containments at the 
Olkiluoto power plant is discussed in greater detail 
in Section A.III.3 of Appendix 1.
The condition of pipelines was inspected at 
both Olkiluoto plant units according to plans. At 
Olkiluoto 1, it was found that the erosion corrosion 
had not advanced in the spots being monitored. At 
Olkiluoto  2, several points in the pipelines were 
measured, for which no earlier results were avail-
able. Measurement results falling short of the 
approval limit were obtained from three of these 
pipelines. The weld of one valve was also found to 
be incomplete. Consequently, the power company 
made more detailed strength calculations, which 
indicated that the pipe wall thicknesses and the 
weld are still sufficient in spite of the measure-
ment results.
No significant deviations were observed when 
monitoring the condition of the spent nuclear fuel 
storage and the fuel pools. The expansion of the 
spent nuclear fuel storage at the Olkiluoto plant is 
discussed in Section 4.2.6.
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Spare parts management at the 
Olkiluoto power plant
In the spring 2011, STUK inspected the sufficiency 
of spare parts for systems and equipment impor-
tant to safety and the functionality of spare parts 
management at the Olkiluoto power plant. The 
inspection focussed in particular on the spare parts 
inventory of systems and equipment important to 
safety as well as on the procedures used at the 
power plant for monitoring the spare parts needs 
and for procuring the spare parts.
The responsibilities and systematic procedures 
have been defined at the Olkiluoto power plant for 
monitoring the changes in the spare part invento-
ry of systems and components important to safety. 
However, the observations made by STUK in its 
inspections indicate that these responsibilities 
and procedures need to be further defined so that 
they cover the monitoring and management of the 
spare parts requirements of all systems and com-
ponents important to safety. It was also found that 
the licensee had taken action to ensure also the 
future availability of individual spare parts that 
are difficult to replace and are important to safety, 
such as electronic cards. In addition to further de-
fining the responsibilities and procedures, STUK 
required that any products non-compliant with 
the requirements are removed from the goods 
reception area and that the storage practices are 
further specified so that the products accepted 
in the store do not become mixed with products 
that have not yet been inspected. In August 2011, 
STUK established jointly with the management 
of the power company that the corrective actions 
had been appropriately implemented at the goods 
reception area.
4.2.5 Development of the plant and its safety
Development actions based on 
the periodic safety review
In 2009, STUK approved the periodic safety review 
regarding Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and TVO’s action plan 
for developing plant safety. Among other things, 
the power company is assessing and developing 
the application of the diversity principle at the 
plant, the Operating Limits and Conditions and 
the emergency operating procedures.
Development of the Operating 
Limits and Conditions
In its development plan for the Operating Limits 
and Conditions (OLC), TVO stated that it will im-
prove the justification of requirements and reduce 
their ambiguity as required. In 2011, TVO had 
internal discussions regarding the needs to amend 
the OLC and produced amendment proposals. 
TVO will submit the first amendment proposals to 
STUK for approval at the beginning of 2012.
Further development of emergency 
operating procedures
Following the periodic safety review, STUK re-
quired TVO to draw up strategic and justification 
documents for the containment isolation proce-
dures and to assess the need to re-validate the 
procedures. Furthermore, TVO has to assess the 
development needs of its entire set of emergency 
operating procedures (EOPs).
The procedures development has progressed 
as planned. The isolation procedures have now 
developed to be operator-specific, and justifica-
tion documents have been produced for them. 
The procedures have been re-validated. STUK has 
monitored the work in follow-up meetings organ-
ised approximately once a year and by studying 
the submitted procedures and their justification 
memorandums and validation materials. STUK 
has not had any objections to the procedures or 
their validation. STUK considers compilation of 
information of old analysis carried out by Asea and 
observations made along the plant’s operating his-
tory in the justification material as a good practice.
During 2011, TVO assessed the need to develop 
other EOPs and drafted on that basis a continu-
ation plan for the development work. STUK has 
required that the generic procedures for emer-
gencies and all related instructions, as well as all 
strategy/justification documents pertaining to the 
procedures to be followed during outages and the 
validation of the procedures, are completed by the 
end of 2012.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, the PRA calculations use regularly up-
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dated information of the occurrences of initiating 
events and the unavailability of equipment togeth-
er with a logical model of the plant’s systems and 
their interdependencies.
In 2011, the annual probability of a severe re-
actor accident calculated by the licensee for the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units was 1.33 × 10-5. The 
increase of approximately 30% from 2010 is caused 
by supplementing the model with the risks caused 
by an oil spill in the sea, as well as by an update 
of initiating event frequencies of fires and internal 
transients.
The accident risk at the Olkiluoto power plant 
and its changes are discussed in greater detail in 
Section A.II.4 of Appendix 1 entitled “Accident risk 
of nuclear power plant”.
Increasing the burn-up of fuel
In 2010, Teollisuuden Voima applied for permission 
to increase the average discharge burn-up value 
of fuel to 50 MWd/kgU for the fuel types in use at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. When these fuel types 
were first introduced, 45 MWd/kgU has been ap-
proved for their average discharge burn-up value. 
The behaviour of fuel assemblies has been studied 
by irradiating test assemblies up to a burn-up val-
ue of 50–53 MWd/kgU. In support of its application 
for increasing the burn-up, TVO presented a report 
with which it justified the acceptability of the pro-
posed increase of discharge burn-up. On the basis 
of the material submitted, STUK assessed that 
the said fuel types will meet STUK’s requirements 
regarding normal operation of the reactor and for 
accident situations up to the burn-up value applied 
for, and approved the application as submitted.
Construction of an emergency 
control room at Olkiluoto
Pursuant to a Government Decree, a nuclear power 
plant shall have an emergency control room inde-
pendent of the main control room, and the neces-
sary local control systems for shutting down and 
cooling the nuclear reactor, and for removing re-
sidual heat from the nuclear reactor and spent fuel 
stored at the plant in a situation where operations 
in the main control room are not possible.
TVO is in the process of constructing emergency 
control rooms for the Olkiluoto units currently in 
operation in compliance with the requirements set 
out in STUK’s implementation decision regarding 
YVL Guide 5.5 and in the periodic safety review 
of Olkiluoto. The project is currently in its pre-
planning phase, and STUK reviewed the concep-
tual design plan of the emergency control rooms 
in 2011. STUK required TVO to asses, in a more 
comprehensive manner, the consequences of a loss 
of main control room as well as the sufficiency and 
comprehensiveness of the measurement data and 
controls to be brought to the emergency control 
room.
Replacement of diesel generators
TVO has investigated the possibilities for replacing 
all current emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of 
Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 with their auxiliary 
systems to correspond with the changed need for 
power, taking also into account any increases in 
the need for power due to possible future plant 
modifications as well as the lessons learnt from 
the Fukushima accident in relation to securing the 
power supply. The nuclear safety requirements dic-
tate that a power margin of at least 10% is avail-
able in all load conditions. Furthermore, both main 
components of the EDGs (the diesel engine and the 
generator) are old models, whose development and 
manufacture has been discontinued, and the avail-
ability of spare parts and the supplier’s technical 
support are declining.
The purpose of the emergency diesel generators 
and their associated auxiliary systems is to sup-
ply electrical power to the 660 V emergency power 
system in case of loss of supply from the 6.6 kV 
main bar. Both plants have four subsystems, and 
each subsystem has its own standby diesel genera-
tor. Replacement of the diesel generators will also 
mean that the main switchgear in the 660 V emer-
gency power network has to be replaced; this will 
be done as part of the replacement of low-voltage 
switchgear as a modification project separate from 
the replacement of the EDGs.
The intention is to implement the EDG replace-
ment project during the normal operation of the 
plant units as far as possible. According to the 
plan, the new EDGs will be installed and commis-
sioned during power operation so that one new 
EDG is installed to both plant units during one 
power operation cycle. For this purpose, a ninth 
EDG unit has to be constructed to replace any one 
of the current EDGs of Olkiluoto 1 or Olkiluoto 2. 
In the future, the ninth EDG can be connected to 
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replace an EDG undergoing periodic maintenance 
at Olkiluoto  1 or Olkiluoto  2, or it can replace a 
failed EDG. A new building will be constructed for 
the ninth EDG, while the replacement EDGs will 
be installed at the same premises where the cur-
rent units are located.
In late autumn 2011, TVO submitted a con-
ceptual design plan regarding the replacement of 
EDGs to STUK for approval. According to the pre-
liminary schedule, the EDGs will be installed and 
commissioned during 2014–2018.
Replacement of the inner isolation valves 
of the main steam pipe at Olkiluoto 2
The inner containment isolation valves were re-
placed in the main steam lines of Olkiluoto  2 
during the 2011 annual maintenance. The corre-
sponding valves of Olkiluoto 1 were replaced dur-
ing the 2010 annual maintenance. The purpose of 
the valves is to prevent the loss of coolant and the 
release of radioactive emissions outside the con-
tainment. The valves also serve as a back-up for 
the outer containment isolation valves.
One reason for replacing the valves was the fact 
that the old valves had a tendency to close when 
the flow of steam increased. In a situation where 
one valve closes, the flow of steam through the oth-
er valves increases, which may also cause them to 
close. The almost simultaneous closure of all steam 
line isolation valves will result in a larger increase 
in pressure and a larger load on the reactor pres-
sure vessel and steam pipes than the closure of a 
single valve.
The new valves are of gate valve type, operating 
with media (steam) and the pressurizing principle. 
This valve type does not carry a similar risk of 
autonomous closure due to the increasing flow of 
steam.
STUK reviewed and assessed the valve design 
documentation before manufacture, oversaw the 
appropriateness of manufacture and the factory 
tests at the manufacturer’s site, and also oversaw 
the installation and trial operation at the plant. 
The trial operation of the valves took place in 
June 2011 in compliance with the trial operation 
programme. The leak tightness tests, actuation 
tests in cold and hot states, as well as tests using 
a steam flow corresponding to 60% power of the 
plant were completed successfully.
Low-voltage switchgear replacement project
TVO has initiated a project (the SIMO project) for 
replacing the switchgears of the low-voltage distri-
bution systems at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The 
primary reason for replacing the switchgears is the 
increase in maintenance costs due to the ageing of 
original equipment, as well as the need to moder-
nise the switchgear to correspond to the current re-
quirements regarding plant and personnel safety. 
The replacement mainly concerns the switchgears 
and associated transformers of electrical systems 
important to safety. TVO has already replaced the 
medium-voltage switchgear (6.6 kV) in 2005 and 
2006. The voltages in the low-voltage networks of 
the units vary from 24 V DC to 660 V AC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the I&C systems and components 
of the units.
TVO made the first switchgear installations of 
the project in the 2010 annual maintenance. They 
concerned an electrical system less important to 
safety. During the 2011 annual maintenance out-
age of Olkiluoto 2, TVO implemented the first 
switchgear replacement to systems important to 
safety so that the low-voltage switchgear in one of 
the plant’s four subsystems was replaced with the 
associated transformers. TVO intends to continue 
the project at Olkiluoto 1 during the 2012 annual 
maintenance outage by replacing the switchgear of 
two subsystems.
4.2.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
In November, STUK conducted an inspection of nu-
clear waste management at the Olkiluoto NPP, fo-
cussing in particular on waste accounting and the 
foreseen waste management facilities and systems 
of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction. 
Following the inspection, STUK required TVO to 
update the mass limit set for the amount of waste 
cleared from control and received at its own land-
fill site. The waste volumes have increased as the 
plant has aged, and, in the future, Olkiluoto 3 will 
further increase the amount of waste. However, the 
activity limits important for nuclear and radiation 
safety have been appropriate, and the activity val-
ues of waste are well below the set limits.
The treatment, storage and final disposal of 
low- and intermediate-level waste (“operating 
waste”) at the Olkiluoto power plant were carried 
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out as planned and no significant events in terms 
of plant or environmental safety were evident. The 
volume and activity of low- and intermediate-level 
waste in relation to generated electrical power 
remained relatively low compared with most other 
countries. Contributing factors include the high 
quality requirements for nuclear waste manage-
ment and nuclear fuel, the planning of main-
tenance and repair operations, decontamination, 
component and process modifications, as well as 
waste monitoring and sorting, which enable some 
of the waste with a very low radioactive substance 
content to be cleared from control. In 2011, main-
tenance waste below the activity limits taken to 
the local landfill for burial, waste oil was delivered 
to Ekokem Oy, and scrap metal delivered for reuse 
were cleared from control with STUK’s approval. 
In addition, the power plant employs efficient pro-
cedures for reducing the volume of waste subject to 
final disposal.
On 21 September 2011, TVO submitted an ap-
plication to the Government for an amendment, 
referred to in section 25 of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
to the current licence conditions of the low- and 
intermediate-level waste repository (VLJ reposi-
tory) so that the nuclear waste from Olkiluoto 3 
and the radioactive waste in the possession of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority can be 
finally disposed of there. The licence conditions 
have also been revised with respect to nuclear ma-
terials. STUK will prepare its statement regarding 
the application for the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy during the spring and attach to 
it its safety assessment and the statement of the 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.
Expansion of the spent fuel storage
TVO is also in the process of expanding the 
spent fuel storage (the so-called KPA storage) at 
Olkiluoto by three additional pools, and the storage 
structures will also be modified at the same time 
to comply with the current safety requirements. 
The current KPA storage capacity in Olkiluoto will 
be sufficient until 2014, and the expansion will in-
crease the capacity for the spent fuel coming from 
the Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 and 3. TVO submit-
ted the documentation regarding expansion of the 
storage to STUK for approval at the end of 2009.
The extension of the storage is designed to fulfil 
the current safety requirements, the most signifi-
cant of which are its ability to withstand the crash 
of a large airliner and its seismic resistance. At the 
same time, the structures of the existing part of 
the storage will be modified with a view to the cur-
rent requirements. In conjunction with assessing 
the safety of the expansion, STUK inspected the 
needs to update the earlier design basis and safety 
analyses, the resources and operational methods of 
TVO’s project organisation, the structural design 
basis of the storage, as well as the methods with 
which TVO will ensure the safety of the storage in 
operation. Following its inspections, STUK found 
that the storage expansion meets the safety re-
quirements. During the construction work, STUK 
will inspect, among other things, the design basis 
with regard to aircraft crash resistance and the 
plans regarding annexation of the expansion to the 
storage currently in use.
The work carried out during 2011 at the KPA 
storage construction site included the construc-
tion of walls for the new pools and an upgrade of 
the wall structures of the existing building. STUK 
has reviewed the plans for the systems that will 
change with the expansion. The design and imple-
mentation of construction engineering structures 
are overseen by an inspection organisation ap-
proved by STUK. STUK has been overseeing and 
guiding the work of the inspection organisation.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, Fortum provided the 
Quantities of spent fuel and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
The volume of spent nuclear fuel on-site at the 
Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2011 was 7,668 as-
semblies* (1,292 tU, tonnes of original uranium) 
with an increase of 228 assemblies (39 tU) in 2011. 
The volume of low- and intermediate-level waste 
finally disposed of was 5,447 m³. The total increase 
of volume from 2010 is 132 m³. Approximately 81% 
of the waste has been finally disposed of.
*The assembly figures do not include the assem-
blies in the reactors. The average weight of spent 
fuel assemblies at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 is 
170.8 kgU.
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Ministry of Employment and the Economy with 
the revised and supplemented waste management 
scheme and information on the costs and prices 
of nuclear waste management measures at the 
end of June. The update of the waste management 
scheme includes an index adjustment to the cost 
and price information as well as an estimate of the 
amount of nuclear waste at the end of 2011.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statement, STUK assessed the technical plans and 
cost estimates on which the financial provision is 
based and considered them appropriate. At 2011 
prices, the extent of TVO’s liability is EUR 1,207.1 
million.
4.2.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of op-
erating activities, it can be stated that, with a view 
to ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has operat-
ed in a systematic and development-oriented way. 
With regard to organisational operations, STUK 
oversaw the processes, resources and procedures 
of selected subjects during the year. In the sum-
mer, TVO was also required to assess the needs for 
developing the operations of the plants already in 
operation on the basis of the recommendations of 
the report following an investigation of Olkiluoto 3. 
TVO did not make any changes relevant to safety 
in its organisation during 2011.
The general description of TVO’s management 
system complies, in the main, with the require-
ments of YVL Guide 1.4. One of the development 
actions spanning several years set out in the 
implementation decision of YVL Guide 1.4 is the 
development of a process-based management sys-
tem. In 2011, TVO applied for more time to produce 
the process descriptions of the management sys-
tem. TVO updated its operations manual towards 
the end of the year and submitted it to STUK for 
review. The verbal descriptions of updated and de-
fined processes had been entered in the operations 
manual, but TVO is still continuing the process 
description work. The important processes include 
the modification work project and its closely associ-
ated procurement process.
The modification process was a particular sub-
ject of STUK’s oversight in 2011, and it was re-
viewed in several inspections. TVO has introduced 
a process manual containing a compilation of 
modification work-related instructions, document 
templates and examples of good practices. TVO 
is looking for better ways to manage its project 
portfolio, and STUK found in the course of its peri-
odic inspection programme that TVO might benefit 
from asking an external expert to assess TVO’s 
project portfolio management procedures.
TVO is still developing the description of the 
modification work process. STUK required TVO 
to define the measurements for the modification 
work process and to develop further in particu-
lar the instructions for quality management and 
procurement. The power company must develop 
the planning of human resources for modifica-
tion operations as well as the quality manage-
ment competence related to the recruitment of 
persons participating in modification work. TVO 
must improve and further specify the conformity 
assessment of suppliers and subcontractors, the 
definition of requirements for the products to be 
procured, communication of the requirements to 
suppliers, as well as the exchange of information 
with suppliers and their subcontractors so that 
TVO can satisfy itself that it and the product sup-
plier and its subcontractors share the same view of 
the product requirements and the quality manage-
ment applicable to the products. STUK has already 
– for example, in 2010 – required a more robust 
management of the supply chain because that will 
make a major contribution to the safe and success-
ful implementation of modification operations. The 
importance of conformity of procurement opera-
tions and good management of delivery control was 
also highlighted in the investigation conducted 
during 2011 regarding the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit.
In 2007 and 2008, STUK called attention to 
the situation regarding human resources and 
competence in the Reactor Physics and Reactor 
Monitoring Office. In 2011, STUK found that the 
situation has improved and that the office cur-
rently has sufficient human resources and compe-
tencies available. During the year, STUK reviewed 
the allocation of resources at TVO between projects 
and line organisation work and required TVO to 
develop its procedures for better compliance with 
the requirements of YVL Guide 1.4, also taking 
into account the risks related to the ageing of the 
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plant. The risks related to the ageing of the plant 
require that the upgrade projects are given suffi-
cient priorities, also with regard to resources.
Several changes took place in the personnel of 
TVO’s training organisation during 2011. The pow-
er company has developed its definition of training 
requirements and classification of training courses 
during the year in order to develop the effective-
ness of training and its assessment. On the basis 
of its supervision, STUK found that TVO has ap-
propriate overall control of training activities, but 
there is scope for improvement in the competencies 
for quality, process and project management.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are conversant 
with all salient matters related to plant operation 
and safety. In 2011, STUK granted 21 licences to 
shift managers and operators on application by 
the power company and following a successful oral 
examination, four of them to new operators.
All participants passed their examinations in 
2011. The new operators had good results in the 
examination, which is an indirect indication that 
the basic training programme is effective. The 
operators renewing their licences also had good 
results in the examination, which for its part in-
dicates that the power company’s refresher and 
supplementary training is effective.
4.2.8 Fire safety
During 2011, STUK oversaw fire safety at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and nuclear facili-
ties with inspections complying with the periodic 
inspection programme, visits of fire safety experts 
during the annual maintenance outages and in-
spection rounds made in the course of the continu-
ous presence of resident inspectors.
It has been found during oversight of the an-
nual maintenance operations at the Olkiluoto 
plants that the employees wedge fire doors ajar for 
easier passage. STUK has required TVO to pres-
ent an assessment of the extent of the problem, 
together with the actions already carried out and 
the planned actions with their schedules. The ac-
ceptable situation will be verified in the prepara-
tory meetings for next year’s annual maintenance 
operations.
No significant deviations were observed from 
the plant’s instructions regarding the management 
of flammable materials during hot work or mainte-
nance work.
The fire alarm and extinguishing systems of the 
plant had been managed in keeping with the con-
dition monitoring programme. Demonstration of 
earthquake resistance was previously not required 
for the fire extinguishing systems, but following 
the analyses made after the Fukushima accident, 
STUK required TVO to investigate the earthquake 
resistance of the fire extinguishing systems. The 
investigations will be completed during 2012.
The monitoring of fire safety at the NPPs is also 
discussed in section A.II.5 of Appendix 1, “Number 
of fire alarms”.
4.2.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
on the basis of reports, inspection visits and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. 
There are development actions in progress in both 
the internal and external operating experience ac-
tivities at the Olkiluoto power plant.
The Olkiluoto plants had one INES class 1 
event during the year when cracks were detected 
in the valve pistons of the primary circuit over-
pressure protection and residual heat removal 
system during the 2011 annual maintenance. The 
event is described in greater detail in Appendix 3. 
During the year, the power company performed 
two root cause analyses, one of them regarding the 
inspection procedures and ageing management 
problems of the above valves of the primary circuit 
over-pressure protection and residual heat removal 
system and the other regarding the erroneous 
disconnection of a sub-function of the reactor pro-
tection system. The root cause analyses were per-
formed carefully, analysing the technical causes, 
but too little attention was paid to the operation of 
the organisation or to activities during the event. 
The root cause analyses do not indicate how they 
were made or what kind of expertise was used. 
Developing procedures, carrying out generic inves-
tigations and ensuring a sufficiently extensive pool 
of participants at the analysis phase would help 
develop the production of root cause analyses and 
to ensure the prerequisites of continual develop-
ment in the organisation’s operations.
Regarding the unexpected operational event 
occurring in 2011, TVO produced two special re-
ports concerning EDGs. In addition, TVO produced 
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14 event reports and nine operational transient 
reports, of which two and six were submitted 
to STUK, respectively. The reporting instructions 
regarding TVO’s own plant events have been up-
dated, but the event reports have not been sub-
mitted to STUK in keeping with the instructions. 
The reports were only submitted when requested 
by STUK, although the instructions dictate that 
TVO must self-assess the importance of the event 
reports and the need to submit them to STUK.
TVO has been actively developing the procedures 
of its international operating experience activities. 
The new process includes preliminary screening and 
pre-processing of the reports obtained from different 
sources (WANO, IAEA/IRS, NRC, ERFATOM) be-
fore the meeting of the Operating Experience Group 
(KÄKRY). The KÄKRY meetings discuss, in turns, 
the plant’s own events and those of other plants. For 
reports processed in KÄKRY meetings, the rationale 
for why the matter is considered to be in order at 
TVO is also recorded in the operating experience 
database (OPEX). If the reported event causes a 
change in procedures at TVO, the actions are re-
corded in the deviation processing and reporting 
system KELPO that is then used to follow up the 
implementation of approved actions. Action propos-
als are produced for technical modifications. There 
are plans to modify the OPEX database in order to 
improve its user-friendliness and the follow-up of 
implementation of actions. TVO has developed its 
operating experience activities to cater for the needs 
of Olkiluoto 3, and the members of the Operating 
Experience Group now also include representatives 
of operating activities at Olkiluoto 3.
Each office dealing with operating experience 
has appointed one person responsible for the activ-
ity (in all about 20 persons). The aim is to develop 
the collection of international operating experience 
available from many sources so that better infor-
mation is obtained on the nature of information 
exchange between field of technology-specific of-
fices and experts and so that the information can 
be made available to the whole organisation in a 
centralised manner. The information is conveyed 
by the persons responsible for operating experience 
activities in different offices.
The fire that occurred in the containment of 
Ringhals 2 in connection with a leak tightness test 
carried out during the 2011 annual maintenance 
outage and the consequently detected potential 
inoperability of the containment spraying sys-
tem due to foreign material in the pipeline were 
identified as issues requiring investigations at 
the Olkiluoto plant units. Following the fire, TVO 
decided to update the leak tightness test instruc-
tions and enter the noteworthy issues to Olkiluoto 
3 instructions. In addition, TVO has decided to 
carry out endoscopic inspections on the contain-
ment spraying system and to investigate whether a 
system test carried out using air is sufficient.
STUK made preparations for a new report 
to the operating experience database maintained 
by the IAEA regarding the cracks and damage 
detected in the inner parts of the valves in the 
systems required for over-pressure protection of 
the primary circuit and for residual heat removal 
at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, as well as for a 
follow-up report on the repair and modification 
work carried out at the Olkiluoto plant on the 
pipeline penetrations of emergency cooling system 
pump rooms. STUK has reported the deficiencies 
detected in the leak tightness of the pipeline pen-
etrations at the Olkiluoto plant in 2009.
4.2.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
as part of the periodic inspection programme at the 
Olkiluoto power plant, focusing on radiation meas-
urements in particular. The scope of the inspec-
tion included the environmental radiation moni-
toring programme and the instruments intended 
for measuring radiation at the plant. Following the 
inspection, STUK requested a report regarding the 
impact of the dosimeter box and ambient condi-
tions of the dosimeters kept in the plant surround-
ings on their reaponse. STUK also required the 
power company to assess the spare parts situation 
regarding the fixed radiation measurement instru-
ments in the interim storage for spent fuel and to 
specify further the instructions for portable radia-
tion measurement instruments.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses underwent the annual tests. 
The tests comprise irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s radiation metrology laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. The test 
results were acceptable
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Figure 13. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protec-
tion inspections during the annual maintenance 
at the Olkiluoto plant units. In the inspections, 
STUK assessed the radiation protection person-
nel’s instructions, training and resources. At the 
same time, the activities of employees in radiation 
work were assessed. The inspections indicated that 
radiation monitoring at the plant units functions 
well throughout. The resources of radiation protec-
tion were better than usual for the second year 
running because radiation protection was provided 
additional assistance by the power plant operator 
trainees of Olkiluoto 3. In addition, the power plant 
introduced new IT administration procedures that 
improved the internal communications of radiation 
protection personnel and the information admin-
istration. The inspections only revealed individual 
deficiencies regarding the activities of employees 
and the use of protective equipment in the radia-
tion control area.
Radiation doses
In 2011, the collective occupational radiation dose 
was 0.21 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.76 manSv 
at Olkiluoto 2. According to the YVL Guide issued 
by STUK, the threshold for one plant unit’s collec-
tive dose averaged over two successive years is 2.5 
manSv per gigawatt of net electrical power. This 
means a dose value of 2.20 manSv per Olkiluoto 
plant unit. This limit value was not exceeded at 
either plant unit.
The collective radiation dose at the Olkiluoto 
power plant was small in spite of the maintenance 
outage of Olkiluoto 2 that was extensive, both in 
terms of personnel involved and the amount of 
work carried out. The collective occupational ra-
diation doses of employees at the Olkiluoto NPP 
were smaller than the average doses of employees 
working in boiling water reactors in the OECD 
countries.
The occupational radiation doses of NPP work-
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Figure 14. Annual radiation doses to the critical groups since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 
and 2. Over the recent years, the doses to the critical groups has remained below one percent of the set limit, 
0.1 milliSv.
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ers mostly accumulate in work carried out during 
annual maintenance outages. The collective radia-
tion dose of employees due to operations during the 
outage at Olkiluoto 1 was 0.12 manSv, and the 
collective radiation dose due to operations during 
the outage at Olkiluoto 2 was 0.67 manSv. The 
radiation levels at the turbine plants continued to 
decrease thanks to the new steam dryers that were 
installed in 2005 and 2006.
The highest individual radiation dose accumu-
lated was 2.9 mSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 6.2 mSv at 
Olkiluoto 2. The highest individual dose incurred 
during the annual maintenance outages of both 
plant units was 7.5 mSv. The highest individual 
dose incurred during the year was 9.3 mSv. The 
highest individual radiation doses have been less 
than 10 mSv during the last five years. The indi-
vidual radiation dose distribution of workers at the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants in 2011 
is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
STUK inspected the operation of the weather 
measurement system and environmental radiation 
monitoring network at the Olkiluoto power plant 
site. Both systems were upgraded in 2008. The 
weather measurement system and the environ-
mental radiation monitoring network have func-
tioned well, with the exception of individual device 
malfunctions. One of the fourteen stations in the 
radiation monitoring network was out of order for 
most of the year, but it was repaired in the autumn.
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below 
authorised annual limits in 2011. The releases of 
noble gases into the air were approximately 1.2 
TBq (as Kr-87-equivalent activity), which is ap-
proximately 0.007% of the authorised limit. The 
releases of iodine into the air were approximately 
1.7 MBq (as I-131-equivalent activity), which is 
approximately 0.002% of the authorised limit. The 
emissions through the vent stack also included 
radioactive particulate matter amounting to 11 
MBq, tritium amounting to 0.2 TBq and carbon-14 
amounting to approximately 0.8 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, 1.3 TBq, is approximately 7% of the 
annual release limit. The total activity of other 
radionuclides released into the sea was 0.1 GBq, 
which is less than 0.05% of the plant location-
specific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.02 microSv, i.e. less than 0.02% of the set 
limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). The average 
person living in Finland receives the equivalent 
radiation dose from natural and spatial radiation 
sources in about 10 minutes.
A total of 300 samples were collected and anal-
ysed from the terrestrial and aquatic environment 
surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant during 
2011. External background radiation measure-
ment and the whole body counting of people in the 
surroundings were also carried out regularly. Very 
small amounts of radioactive substances originat-
ing from the nuclear power plant were observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts were so small that they are insignificant 
in terms of people’s radiation exposure.
Table 4. Radioactive nuclides originating from the 
Olkiluoto power plant, found in the environmental 
samples.
Number of environmental samples containing radionuclides 
originating from the NPP (several different nuclides may be found  
in the same sample)
Type of sample Mn-54 Co-60 Total
Air – 1 1
Fallout 1 1 2
Dumping ground ditch water – 1 1
Aquatic plants 1 14 15
Seabed fauna (clams) – 1 1
Sedimenting materials – 10 10
Total 2 28 30
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4.2.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
response organisations of nuclear power plants, 
formed of their operating personnel, to act in ab-
normal situations. No situations requiring emer-
gency response actions occurred at the Olkiluoto 
power plant in 2011.
Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto pow-
er plant complies with the main requirements. 
The preparedness arrangements were inspected in 
June as part of the periodic inspection programme. 
The inspected subjects included preparedness 
training, exercises, facilities and equipment, alarm 
arrangements, environmental radiation measure-
ments and weather measurements at the plant 
site, emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto 3 
site and the work for revising the emergency pre-
paredness instructions. The data transfer system 
between the power plant and STUK is being up-
graded; the new system is in trial operation, and it 
was used in the OLKI11 exercise. In the inspection, 
STUK required that the functional design of the 
emergency facilities of Olkiluoto 3 and the revision 
of preparedness plans shall be completed.
Two emergency response exercises were or-
ganised at the Olkiluoto power plant in 2011. An 
exercise related to the formation of a preparedness 
organisation and the initiation of activities was 
organised in April. Joint emergency response exer-
cise OLKI11 was organised in August, with over 50 
different organisations participating. The exercise 
combined for the first time a scenario initiated by 
illegal activities and a technical emergency situa-
tion at the plant.
At the time of the inspection, the assessments 
that began following the Fukushima NPP accident 
were still at their initial stage, and did not yet af-
fect on the emergency response arrangements dur-
ing 2011.
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4.3 Regulatory oversight of the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3 is 
based on the observations made by STUK, the re-
view of plans, the oversight of manufacturing, con-
struction and installation, results of the construc-
tion inspection programme during construction, 
oversight of the plant vendor and its subcontrac-
tors, as well as experience acquired as a result of 
interactions between STUK, TVO and the plant 
vendor.
Detailed design of the plant systems continued 
in 2011. In the summer 2011, the licensee and 
the plant supplier announced that modifications 
will be made to the process and electrical systems 
of the plant unit; some of them will also require 
STUK’s approval. Some of the modifications have 
been made as a result of the requirements STUK 
has imposed on systems design, but the majority 
of modifications have arisen from the licensee’s 
and the plant supplier’s own requirements. The 
modifications made to the systems design will also 
require the corresponding safety analyses to be 
updated so that the final conformity of the design 
with the requirements can be assessed. Several 
updates have also been submitted for the equip-
ment plans. The plans submitted to STUK had 
not been sufficiently finalised or inspected by the 
licensee and the plant supplier. This conclusion is 
also supported by the observations made in connec-
tion with the inspections carried out as part of the 
inspection programme during construction that 
unfinished plans had been submitted to STUK for 
approval.
There are also open questions remaining re-
garding the overall architecture of I&C design, 
such as implementation of the defence-in-depth 
principle throughout the I&C system, the indepen-
dence of different I&C systems from each other, 
compliance with the fault tolerance criteria and 
the suitability of equipment platforms for their 
intended purpose. STUK has emphasised to the 
licensee and the plant supplier how important it is 
to settle the open principal questions before start-
ing the inspection of the detailed system design of 
the I&C system.
The construction work at the plant site was 
completed in 2011, apart from certain finishing 
work and the office building that TVO is having 
built. Concrete construction has continued to pro-
ceed almost without problems, and the procedures 
created for, among other things, determining the 
readiness for concreting have proven to function 
well. The installation of steel platform and sup-
port structures continued inside the building. The 
importance of the platforms has increased because 
pipelines and equipment important to safety will 
be supported on them unlike in the original plans. 
STUK has discovered numerous deficiencies in the 
plans for the steel platforms; some of them will 
also lead to structural modifications. The platforms 
must comply with the requirements of YVL Guides 
before they can be finally commissioned.
Installation of the mechanical and electrical 
equipment, pipelines and cables of the nuclear is-
land continued at the plant site during 2011. The 
installations of the plant’s primary circuit and its 
associated equipment were completed in the sum-
mer 2011, after which the work for inserting the 
internals of the reactor into the reactor pressure 
vessel commenced. Installation of the primary cir-
cuit and its equipment went well, apart from the 
grinding of butt welds made at the plant site where 
the appropriate quality requirements were not 
complied with. Many different deficiencies have 
been discovered in the construction inspections 
and pressure tests of the pipelines, which is why 
the inspections or tests have on many occasions 
been prevented from being performed. In its com-
munications with the licensee, STUK has stressed 
the importance of ensuring the readiness for in-
spection in advance. STUK has earlier required 
the same procedure to be followed with inspections 
carried out at the place of manufacture.
Significant deviations were detected in 2010 in 
the design and manufacture of the auxiliary equip-
ment for emergency diesel generators, and STUK 
initiated investigations into the matter, completed 
in the spring of 2011. TVO and the plant supplier 
assessed the conformity of the auxiliary equipment 
manufacturers’ quality management, and most of 
the construction plans for the auxiliary equipment 
were submitted to STUK for processing. In its in-
spections, STUK has noticed further deficiencies in 
the plans. They require investigations and reports 
by TVO and the plant supplier. The problems re-
lated to the design and manufacture of auxiliary 
equipment have delayed the installations in diesel 
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Procurement of the emergency 
diesel generators (EDGs) for 
Olkiluoto 3 was investigated
During the inspections it carried out in 2010, STUK 
had in particular noted the poor quality of the design 
documents of the auxiliary systems and equipment 
of Olkiluoto 3’s emergency diesel generators. On the 
basis of these observations, STUK suspected that 
there were deficiencies in the quality management 
of the licensee (TVO), the plant supplier (Areva) and 
the supplier of auxiliary equipment, and required 
TVO to carry out follow-up inspections (audits) at the 
main supplier of auxiliary equipment for the EDGs 
(Alstom) and its main subcontractors. The audits 
revealed that Areva had not provided Alstom with up-
to-date design criteria that should have been used as 
the basis for designing and manufacturing the diesel 
generators, nor had it provided Alstom with the lat-
est quality management policies to be followed in the 
Olkiluoto 3 project. There was no evidence on transfer-
ring the quality assurance requirements of the plant 
supplier to the equipment manufacturers, nor had the 
manufacturers been required to have project-specific 
quality plans. STUK considered the audit findings to 
be significant because they made it doubtful whether 
the EDGs and the quality management in their sup-
ply chain met the nuclear safety requirements con-
cerning equipment important to safety. 
On 26 November 2010, the Director General of 
STUK initiated an investigation regarding the sup-
ply of EDGs and associated auxiliary systems for 
Olkiluoto 3 with a view to assessing the actions of 
different parties in this procurement and to making 
recommendations for similar supply projects in the fu-
ture. The investigation established the course of events 
in the procurement of EDGs as well as the control and 
monitoring procedures observed by the license holder 
and the plant supplier. The investigation also assessed 
STUK’s own procedures and oversight activities. 
The procurements for emergency diesel genera-
tors were mainly carried out during 2005–2006 fol-
lowing a brief pre-design phase. This was only the 
second subcontract procurement carried out by the 
plant supplier. The complex contractual arrangements 
hampered the supply management. The supplier of the 
EDGs was a consortium of SEMT Pielstick (nowadays 
MAN Diesel) and Alstom TPEG, the former supplying 
the diesel engines and Alstom the generators and their 
auxiliary equipment, parts for the auxiliary systems 
as well as electrical and I&C equipment. Alstom has 
almost 30 subcontractors, 10 of which further con-
tinue to the next supplier level who in turn rely on 
component-level supplies. Most of the organisations/ 
subcontractors participating in the project had little 
or no experience at all of supplying the nuclear indus-
try. The lack of experience seems to have contributed to 
the problems observed. 
Basic design was initially guided by incomplete 
definition of requirements, their management in the 
course of the supply project and differing ideas of the 
standard of requirements. One reason for the prob-
lems was the fact that the design documentation pro-
gressed in parallel with the manufacturing process or 
lagged behind it, and the modification needs observed 
in it were not monitored at TVO or STUK using such 
a systematic approach that would have revealed the 
recurrence of these needs in time and allowed for ad-
dressing their causes. 
The manufacturing process of parts for the auxil-
iary systems of EDGs had communication problems 
caused by the long subcontracting chains and defects 
in quality assurance due to the inaccurate definition 
of requirements. Control of the subcontracting chains 
and quality control of the parts was a demanding task 
for all parties concerned. Initially, TVO was not fully 
aware of the length of the supply chain, and its con-
trol did not reach the full extent of the supply chains. 
Initially, the EDG project was in the hands of electri-
cal engineering experts at the designing organisation, 
the plant supplier, the licensee and the regulatory au-
thority alike, and the flow of information between dif-
ferent engineering disciplines did not work flawlessly. 
The result was that the definition of requirements 
and quality management of mechanical equipment 
received less attention. 
The event highlighted the issue of using serially 
produced parts in the safety-classified systems and 
installations of nuclear plants. The equipment and 
components intended for nuclear plant use have spe-
cific requirements related to their intended use; for ex-
ample, regarding the inspections during manufacture 
and the traceability of materials. The investigation re-
vealed that TVO had interpreted STUK’s standpoint 
to be that it had approved the use of serially produced 
parts without supplementary quality assurance. This 
interpretation led to the construction plans for equip-
ment and components used in the auxiliary systems of 
EDGs to be incomplete and contributed to a situation 
where the suppliers were not required to have project-
specific quality plans. STUK required the quality of 
the diesel generators and their auxiliary equipment 
to be assessed and their compliance with the required 
level of safety to be demonstrated.
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buildings; work was suspended for the whole year.
TVO and the plant supplier have begun prepa-
rations for starting the commissioning of the plant 
unit. In the summer 2011, STUK reviewed the 
capabilities of Siemens and TVO to start the com-
missioning of the turbine island and found them to 
be sufficient after a few document updates. Due to 
the unfinished state of I&C design, processing of 
the commissioning plans for the process and elec-
trical systems of the nuclear island was suspended 
at STUK, because the operation of the controlling 
I&C system is to be in part tested in the same con-
nection. Besides technical trial runs, commission-
ing also includes verification of the organisational 
capabilities to operate the plant in a safe manner. 
Safe operation requires, for example, the avail-
ability of a sufficient number of licensed opera-
tors and maintenance personnel familiar with the 
plant. The required operating manuals must also 
be available for the plant. The unfinished state of 
system design has prevented the training simula-
tor at the plant from being finalised and the simu-
lator training of operators from being started. The 
production of operating manuals has also been de-
layed due to the unfinished state of system design.
TVO and the plant supplier have jointly au-
dited the contractors working at the plant site in 
order to ensure that their activities are appropri-
ate. The operations of contractors working at the 
Olkiluoto 3 site were audited systematically up to 
the summer 2011, but after that, the audits were 
postponed until 2012 because the plant supplier 
did not have a sufficient number of qualified lead 
auditors at the Olkiluoto 3 site. Since then, the 
plant supplier has decided to increase the number 
of lead auditors at the plant site and has drawn up 
a comprehensive plan jointly with TVO for audit-
ing the contractors in 2012.
During construction, TVO and the plant vendor 
have been able to take into account the modifica-
tion needs which have emerged as design of the 
different areas of technology has become more 
detailed. Defects detected in manufacturing and 
installation have either been corrected so that the 
original quality requirements are fulfilled, or it has 
been demonstrated by means of additional inspec-
tions or analyses that the requirements are ful-
filled. The deficiencies in the work of different par-
ties and in product quality have resulted in addi-
tional work to assess and solve the problems. This 
has had an impact on the progress of the project, 
not on the fulfilment of its quality requirements. 
TVO has been systematically developing and intro-
ducing procedures related to the development and 
monitoring of safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 site. 
The application of monitoring procedures is well-
established, and the activities have been organised 
in an unambiguous manner. In summary, based on 
the results of regulatory activities, STUK can state 
that the original safety objectives of the plant can 
be achieved.
4.3.2 Design
Plant and system design
STUK continued to review the detailed design of 
process, support and electrical systems. The design 
of process, ventilation and electrical systems has 
for the most part been processed at STUK, apart 
from the approval of a few cooling units of the cool-
ing water system; their method of implementation 
is yet to be decided. In addition, updates requested 
by STUK are still awaited for a few system descrip-
tions. TVO also announced in the summer 2011 
that the plant supplier is in the process of making 
modifications to plant systems that will require 
STUK’s approval.
STUK continued to review the overall archi-
tecture of I&C systems. STUK has required that 
TVO and the plant vendor specify unambiguous 
requirements for the design of the overall architec-
ture of I&C systems, and that the I&C architecture 
created on the basis of the requirements is de-
scribed. The descriptions of architecture presented 
to STUK will still need to be supplemented with 
respect to the presentation regarding the defence-
in-depth principle as well as with respect to the 
presentation and analysis of connections between 
the I&C systems. In terms of safety, it is particular-
ly important to specify unambiguous requirements 
for the independence of different I&C systems 
involved in the architecture, because different I&C 
systems back each other up.
The third issue with particular safety signifi-
cance has been the specification of the failure 
criteria to be observed in the I&C systems – the 
internal redundancy of the systems improves the 
reliability of their operation in device and other 
failures. STUK has required that the realisation of 
the requirements for independence and failure cri-
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teria must be demonstrated by means of analyses. 
In 2011, TVO submitted an analysis regarding the 
fulfilling of failure criteria in protection system to 
STUK for review. STUK reviewed the analysis and 
stated in its decision that it cannot be approved 
before the system description of the protection 
system with its associated documentation has been 
processed.
The work for qualifying the equipment plat-
forms of the I&C systems is still in progress. 
During 2011, STUK reviewed the documentation 
regarding the equipment platform intended for 
discrete systems. Review of the equipment plat-
form intended for Safety Class 2 I&C systems be-
gan. The documentation regarding the equipment 
platform intended for the plant operation I&C and 
certain Safety Class I&C systems was not submit-
ted to STUK.
When inspecting the I&C systems for emergen-
cy diesel generator’s load shedding, STUK found 
that a function of a lower safety class may in an 
unfavourable situation overload the EDGs. STUK 
has required TVO to investigate further and ac-
count for the impacts of the faults and malfunc-
tions of I&C systems of lower safety classes on the 
electrical systems and other functions of higher 
safety classes. These accounts were not submitted 
to STUK by the end of 2011.
In 2011, STUK reviewed the updated common 
cause failure analysis concerning the indepen-
dence of the plant’s systems and their equipment 
of other systems and equipment. In its decision, 
STUK required that the analysis be further speci-
fied so that implementation of the diversity prin-
ciple in the plant’s safety functions can be verified.
Transient and accident analyses
In 2011, STUK received for inspection an updated 
analysis of overpressure protection during power 
operation and an updated analysis of the behav-
iour of the plant unit in a transient situation in 
normal connection with the national grid where 
power is supplied through an external auxiliary 
connection. Inspection of the analyses is still in 
progress.
Probabilistic risk analyses (PRA)
The review of Olkiluoto 3 probabilistic risk analy-
ses in 2011 focused mainly on the assessment of 
the scope and traceability of documents submitted 
for information. New risk analyses were not sub-
mitted to STUK in line with the earlier presented 
time schedule. Furthermore, there will be changes 
to the PRA documentation submitted for informa-
tion as the detailed design progresses.
In 2011, STUK continued the assessment of the 
fulfillment of the fundamental design principles 
in the detailed design documentation for systems 
and structures from the risk perspective. The 
key documentation has included pre-inspection 
documentation of systems, topical reports and con-
struction plans for the fuel handling systems. In 
addition, the aim has been to ensure that adequate 
provisions have been made against area events 
(internal fires and flooding) and external events. 
For the PRA documents submitted for information, 
the contents and scope of the first phase of fire risk 
analysis have been assessed. Since the detailed de-
sign of I&C systems is not finalised, the reliability 
assessment of the overall implementation of I&C 
requested by STUK has not been submitted yet.
Radiation safety
During 2011, STUK continued the inspection of 
compliance with radiation safety requirements 
as part of the inspection of process systems and 
structural radiation protection. In connection with 
the suitability assessment of electrical and I&C 
equipment, STUK also inspected fulfilment of the 
requirements regarding the radiation resistance 
of equipment in normal use and during accident 
situations.
During 2011, STUK participated in the factory 
tests of the first instruments for the radiation mea-
surement systems for Olkiluoto 3 as well as in the 
audit of the manufacturer of these systems.
STUK approved the limits for radioactive 
substance releases during normal operation of 
Olkiluoto 3. The release limits will be included in 
the Technical Specification that will be submitted 
to STUK for approval in connection with the oper-
ating licence application.
Fire safety at the plant
STUK reviewed the updated structural fire hazard 
analyses (FHA) of the plant, the purpose of which 
was to demonstrate that the plant structures will 
withstand the fire loads in fire compartments. In 
addition to the structural fire hazard analyses, 
STUK reviewed fire hazard functional analyses 
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safety classified concrete structures. Approval will 
still be sought for minor concrete casting opera-
tions to be done during the installation of certain 
components. The plans for the steel cladding of fuel 
pools have, on the whole, been approved so that 
some plans related to the closer specified cleanli-
ness requirements of surfaces set by STUK are still 
being reviewed by STUK. A major part of the plan-
ning documentation of steel platforms, originally 
only intended for use as maintenance platforms, 
is yet to be reviewed. The safety importance of 
the steel platforms has increased because process 
pipelines and equipment important to safety will 
be supported on them unlike in the original plans. 
This applies to about 150 different steel platforms. 
STUK has reviewed the design documentation of 
these steel platforms and discovered numerous 
deficiencies; some of them will also lead to struc-
tural modifications. STUK has approved a proce-
dure whereby the steel platforms can be partially 
commissioned for equipment installations after 
construction inspections done in stages provided 
that the requirements are fulfilled before the final 
commissioning of the steel platforms. STUK has 
paid inspection visits to the site and verified that 
TVO’s inspections have progressed in line with the 
approved procedure. STUK will review the final de-
sign documentation of steel platforms before start-
ing its own commissioning inspections where fulfil-
ment of the requirements will be finally verified.
During 2011, STUK continued the inspection 
of final strength analyses of the main components 
of the primary circuit. STUK was provided with 
supplementary and modification documentation 
on the strength analyses where the modifications 
made during manufacture had been taken into 
account. The basic inspection plans of periodic 
inspections, periodic inspection programmes and 
qualification documentation concerning inspection 
systems compliant with YVL Guide 3.8 regarding 
pressure vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, valves 
and pipelines continued in 2011.
The design work regarding the reactor plant 
pipelines continued in 2011. Calculations of pipe-
line support structures and pipeline stress analy-
ses as well as construction plans and updates 
concerning Safety Class 1 and 2 components were 
submitted to STUK for review. The amount of 
inspection work carried out by STUK in 2011 
remained high due to the large amount of design 
(FHFA) showing the impact of fires on the safety 
functions of the plant. In the future, all analyses 
must still be updated for conformity with the final 
plant design and final cable routes. Furthermore, 
STUK requires that the plant’s defence-in-depth is 
verified by sensitivity analyses where fire protec-
tion measures are assumed to be in a deteriorated 
state; for example, so that the fire dampers in-
stalled at the plant are inoperable.
VTT completed its fire safety investigations 
regarding the fire-retardant power and I&C cables 
to be installed at Olkiluoto 3 and produced a sum-
mary report in April 2011. The properties of the 
cable types presented by the plant supplier were 
assessed from the point of view of fire safety and 
found to be appropriate regarding the general-level 
fire protection arrangements of the plant. STUK 
is still waiting for the licensee’s account regarding 
demonstration of the sufficiency of fire protection 
in certain cable rooms and routes. Further inves-
tigations and accounts are also required for those 
cable types that were not investigated by VTT. 
Following these additional investigations, STUK 
will make an overall assessment of the acceptabil-
ity of the fire risk carried by FRNC cables.
The plant supplier and the power company 
found that flooding caused by a possible rupture 
in the fire water pipeline in the annulus space 
between the inner and outer containment walls 
could put safety functions at risk. Consequently, a 
bypass line and valve arrangement was designed 
for the fire water line so that the leaks can be lim-
ited to an acceptable level concerning the flooding 
risk while securing sufficient fire extinguishing 
capacity for the early stages of possible fires. STUK 
continued the inspection of the updated risk as-
sessment regarding the risk of flooding in the an-
nulus caused by the fire water system. STUK will 
perform an overall assessment of the acceptability 
of the annulus flooding risk on the basis of PRA 
level 1 and 2 risk assessments.
Design of components and structures
STUK continued the review of detailed plans for 
Safety Class 2 components and structures in 2011. 
The key objects of this review were the construction 
and work plans of concrete and steel structures, as 
well as the construction plans of mechanical equip-
ment and their updates. STUK has reviewed and 
approved almost all construction plans concerning 
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have served to ensure that the plant vendor and 
TVO have reviewed and approved the plans for the 
structures and the work to be carried out before 
STUK is requested to give permission to start the 
work.
The steel cladding of the pools containing radio-
active material during the operation of the plant 
was completed. STUK called attention to the clean-
liness and appropriate corrosion protection of the 
steel cladding surfaces before an acceptable result 
was achieved.
STUK performed the first commissioning in-
spections when it inspected the acceptability of 
concrete and steel structures at the mouths of cool-
ing water intake and discharge tunnels. Following 
the successful commissioning inspections, sea wa-
ter could be let to the gates at the tunnel mouths.
4.3.3 Manufacture
Manufacture of main components
The installations of main components for the pri-
mary circuit were completed during 2011. The 
manufacture and testing of control rod mecha-
nisms continued during the year, and the mecha-
nisms were delivered to Olkiluoto at the end of 
2011. STUK oversaw the manufacture and factory 
tests of the control rod mechanisms in France. It 
was found during the factory tests that the in-
ner surfaces of the mechanism guide tubes were 
scratched. STUK required supplementary tests for 
two control rod mechanisms. The intention is to 
perform the tests in early 2012.
Manufacture of other equipment
During 2011, STUK also oversaw and inspected 
the manufacture of Safety Class 1 and 2 pipelines, 
tanks, heat exchangers, pumps, valves and steel 
structures. STUK maintained a permanent over-
sight at the German factory manufacturing pipe-
line prefabricates until September 2011. STUK 
also oversaw and inspected the manufacture of 
fuel handling equipment and Safety Class 1 and 2 
valves.
In addition to the oversigtht of the manufacture 
of pressure equipment and steel structures, STUK 
oversaw and inspected the manufacture of emer-
gency diesel generators used for emergency power 
supply and their auxiliary equipment.
STUK’s construction inspections, intended to 
modification documentation.
The design work concerning the I&C systems 
of fuel handling systems and Safety Class 3 cranes 
continued in 2011, and no plans compliant with the 
requirements were submitted to STUK for assess-
ment. Some of the subject cranes have been used 
for installation work at the Olkiluoto 3 site before 
the approval of design documentation regarding 
the I&C systems and the equipment tests required 
by the safety classification. However, approval of 
the design and tests is a prerequisite for the final 
commissioning transfer and of lifting equipment 
before fuel is loaded in the reactor. The design 
work and manufacture of auxiliary equipment for 
the emergency diesel generators continued in 2011. 
Several deficiencies had been detected in the con-
struction plan for auxiliary equipment in 2010, and 
the acceptability of certain manufacturers’ quality 
management had remained an open question. The 
results of STUK’s investigations in the matter are 
shown in Section 4.3.1, “Overall safety assessment 
of Olkiluoto 3”. TVO and the plant supplier as-
sessed the conformity of the manufacturers’ qual-
ity management, and most of the structural plans 
were updated and submitted to STUK for review. 
In its inspections, STUK has observed further de-
ficiencies in the plans. They require investigations 
and reports by TVO and the plant supplier. The 
problems related to the design and manufacture of 
auxiliary equipment have delayed the installations 
in diesel buildings; work was suspended for the 
whole year.
Construction and commissioning 
of structures and buildings
Construction oversight by STUK focused on the 
manufacture and installation of Safety Class 2 
steel and concrete structures in particular. STUK 
inspected the readiness to start the concreting of 
Safety Class 2 concrete structures and authorised 
the start of concreting. The final massive concrete 
structures were the outer containment dome cast 
during January–February and the roof structures 
of the airplane crash shelter. Concrete casting 
has been successful from a technical point of view. 
Provisions were made at the site for power cuts 
during casting work, for example.
The procedures to determine readiness to start 
concrete casting, post-tensioning and grouting 
have proven to function well. These procedures 
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ensure that the manufacture of components com-
plies with requirements, still revealed issues pre-
venting the inspections from being carried out 
as planned. The most serious of these issues con-
cerned the equipment’s readiness for inspection 
and open issues related to construction plans. As 
early as 2008, STUK required TVO and the plant 
vendor to ensure before the inspections that the 
prerequisites for construction inspection are in 
place. TVO and the plant vendor have changed 
their supervision and inspection procedures so that 
the aim is to ensure readiness for inspection prior 
to STUK’s inspection.
4.3.4 Installation work
The welding operations on primary circuit pipe-
lines continued in early 2011 with the pressur-
izer surge line welds. The connecting line welds 
were completed in the spring, and all the welds 
in the primary circuit were complete. STUK in-
spected the welds and saw no cause for remarks. 
However, appropriate quality requirements were 
not observed when grinding the weld, which means 
that the ground surface profile will make future 
periodic inspections more difficult. The suitability 
of the joints for periodic inspections will be veri-
fied during 2012. STUK also performed a cleanli-
ness inspection inside the entire interior of the 
primary circuit, and did not find any deficiencies. 
Installation of the inner parts and motors of the 
reactor coolant pumps was completed. Installation 
of the reactor internals began in the summer and 
continued for the rest of the year, including the 
work for setting clearances and installing tempo-
rary vibration measurements. The work for fitting 
equipment on the reactor pressure vessel cover 
head began and will continue in early 2012 with 
installation of the control rod mechanisms.
In an inspection carried out in a storage room 
at Olkiluoto before the installation of Steam 
Generator 3, STUK observed that the exterior 
of the steam generator had damage caused by 
improper handling. There was surface damage in 
about 10 points on the same circumference. The 
damage was ground smooth after installation. The 
repairs were approved in an inspection by STUK.
Welding work on the cladding in the reac-
tor building and fuel building pools continued 
throughout the year. Some of the pools were com-
pleted and filled with water for leak testing. The 
results of leak tests were acceptable. The installa-
tion of filters in the emergency cooling water pool 
began in the spring and continued for the rest of 
the year. Repairs of factory welds and inspections 
were also carried out on the filters.
The installation of pipelines and pipe supports 
at the reactor plant continued at an increasing 
rate. STUK has discovered many different deficien-
cies in the construction inspections and pressure 
tests of the installed pipelines. The repairs of these 
deficiencies have slowed down the inspections and, 
as a whole, STUK has spent a lot of oversight re-
sources on the inspection when compared to the 
results achieved.
The diesel generators were hauled to their loca-
tions but were not yet finally fixed in their respec-
tive component locations because the installation 
work on EDG systems had been suspended.
During the year, STUK has pointed out de-
ficiencies in the cleanliness of the site on many 
occasions. The installation of primary circuit com-
ponents and electrical equipment, for example, 
requires a high standard of cleanliness. The level of 
cleanliness at the installation sites has improved, 
but STUK will continue its close monitoring.
Installation work on the electrical equip-
ment and cabling continued at the reactor plant 
throughout 2011. Approximately 70% of the reac-
tor plant cables had been installed by the end of 
2011. Almost all low- and medium-voltage switch-
gears and distribution and control transformers 
had been installed. Most of the other electrical 
equipment (rectifiers, battery arrays, inverters and 
converters) have been installed. Cable connection 
work has also been in progress throughout 2011.
The low-voltage cable trays in the plant’s main 
cable routes are rather full, which is why the trays 
have to be made wider or parallel trays have to be 
installed, and the dimensioning of certain cables 
may have to be reconsidered. TVO will present 
the modification needs to STUK in early 2012. 
Following a change in the cabling principles, TVO 
has provided STUK with a new cabling concept 
for approval. The essential change is that of cover-
ing the I&C cable trays in locations where cable 
routes cannot be kept sufficiently far apart from 
each other. By covering or otherwise protecting the 
trays, smaller distances can be used between safe-
ty classified and unclassified I&C and power cable 
trays. STUK will decide the matter in early 2012.
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During 2011, STUK inspected TVO’s installa-
tion supervision in several inspections carried out 
in accordance with the inspection programme for 
the construction stage in order to ensure the ad-
equacy of TVO’s supervision procedures. Adherence 
to the approved instructions and procedures was 
monitored during daily inspection rounds. STUK 
also participated in quality audits carried out by 
the plant supplier and TVO at the plant site. No 
significant deviations were observed.
4.3.5 Commissioning
STUK oversaw the activities of the licensee and 
the plant supplier in preparing for commissioning. 
The commissioning itself has been delayed and did 
not commence during 2011.
Inspection of trial operation plans is an impor-
tant element of STUK’s oversight work. The unfin-
ished state of I&C design also affects the commis-
sioning plans. Early in the year, the plant supplier 
announced that testing of the I&C systems will be 
included in the trial operation of process systems; 
this was a deviation from the earlier information. 
STUK required that the role of process system 
trial operation in  the testing of I&C systems be 
announced. The comprehensiveness of test pro-
grammes cannot be assessed before such informa-
tion is available. STUK continued the inspection 
of test programmes that were submitted before 
requesting the additional information, , but most 
of them could not be approved due to ambiguities 
regarding the I&C tests.
STUK continued the inspection of adminis-
trative procedures regarding commissioning. The 
administrative procedures are described in the 
commissioning manual that is submitted to STUK 
for information. STUK had no remarks to make 
concerning the administrative procedures, apart 
from procedures concerning the processing and 
approval of modifications where STUK required 
amendments to be made.
During the year, STUK preformed two inspec-
tions of commissioning activities. The first in-
spection concerned the procedures for processing 
modifications made during commissioning and the 
training of commissioning personnel. During the 
inspection, STUK noted deficiencies in the tools for 
managing open questions and in the training plans. 
The deficiencies were rectified after the inspection.
In June, STUK reviewed the readiness of TVO 
and Siemens to commence commissioning opera-
tions at the turbine plant. In the inspection it was 
found that the organisations have made sufficient 
preparations for starting the commissioning. The 
procedures have been created and instructions 
issued for them, the personnel have been trained 
and the required tools are available. Some of the 
procedural instructions required at the beginning 
of the commissioning process were not yet avail-
able at the time of the inspection. STUK required 
TVO to approve the instructions and submit them 
to STUK before commissioning of the turbine plant 
may begin. The instructions were submitted to 
STUK during the autumn.
Before the trial operation of the systems starts, 
the commissioning inspections of components and 
systems must be performed. STUK continued the 
planning of commissioning inspections, both inter-
nally and in cooperation with TVO and the plant 
supplier. During the year, STUK performed the 
first commissioning inspections of individual com-
ponents.
Besides technical trial runs, commissioning also 
includes verification of the organisational capa-
bilities to operate the plant in a safe manner. Safe 
operation requires, for example, the availability 
of a sufficient number of licensed operators. The 
required operating manuals must also be available 
for the plant. Two meetings were held during the 
year between STUK, TVO and the plant supplier to 
discuss the progress made in operator training and 
in the production and validation of instructions. 
The problems in I&C design work mean delays in 
all these areas.
The training simulator was brought to Olkiluoto 
in the summer, and the factory tests of the simula-
tor were completed at the plant site. The trainee 
operators began practising the start-up and shut-
down of the plant using the simulator. The simula-
tor has not yet been approved for training use be-
cause it does not yet correspond to the final design 
of the plant. STUK has required TVO to approve 
the simulator for training use before starting the 
training and present the grounds for this approval 
to STUK.
In the autumn, STUK received for information 
the validation plan for operating instructions. The 
plan was of a very general nature and did not allow 
STUK to satisfy itself that the validation would be 
comprehensive and appropriate. STUK required 
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the plan to be updated and detailed plans to be 
produced for certain parts of the validation pro-
cess. The situation regarding the instructions was 
also discussed in an inspection of the preparations 
for the operating licence application, performed 
as part of the construction inspection programme. 
Following the inspection, STUK required TVO to 
provide STUK with a description of the structure 
of instructions and a time schedule of the instruc-
tions to be submitted to STUK in relation to the 
submission of the operating licence application.
4.3.6 Organisational operations 
and quality management
The total number of personnel working at the 
Olkiluoto 3 project site was about 3,200 at the end 
of 2011, of which about 2,800 were in the plant 
supplier’s site organisation and about 350 were in 
TVO’s project organisation. TVO’s project organisa-
tion consists of in-house project personnel (about 
60), TVO’s line organisation personnel (about 80) 
and consultants (about 210).
In 2011, changes were made in the project or-
ganisation of Olkiluoto 3 in preparation for the 
commissioning and future operation of Olkiluoto 3. 
One essential change in the organisational struc-
ture was the combination of TVO’s installation 
supervision function and the independent quality 
control into one unit. STUK saw no objection to the 
combination from the point of view of independent 
quality control because TVO’s own installation 
supervision is also independent of the actual per-
formance of work.
STUK inspected the sufficiency of resources 
in electrical and I&C quality control. The quality 
control resources were found to be sufficient for the 
work in progress in 2011, but the licensee must re-
assess the situation as the amount of electrical and 
I&C installation work increases. ,In 2011, TVO and 
the plant supplier increased the I&C design re-
sources in particular. STUK’s earlier observations 
indicate that the project organisation of Olkiluoto 
3 and its structure are appropriate for supervising 
the construction of the new plant unit, but because 
of the organisational model, STUK considers it to 
be an important challenge to transfer and secure 
sufficient competence from the construction phase 
to the commissioning of Olkiluoto 3. In 2011, TVO 
also continued to plan the licensees’ future or-
Safety culture at the Olkiluoto 
3 construction site
TVO has been systematically developing and in-
troducing procedures related to the development 
and monitoring of safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 
site since 2008. The application of monitoring 
procedures is well-established, and the activities 
have been organised in an unambiguous manner. 
In 2010, the license holder carried out a self-as-
sessment of TVO’s safety culture that also covered 
the personnel and consultants of the OL3 project. 
The assessment did not identify any differences be-
tween the safety cultures in TVO’s plants already 
in operation and the Olkiluoto 3 project organisa-
tion; the results were similar in both organisations. 
The site interviews and observation visits made 
by STUK indicated that the overall state of safety 
culture at the Olkiluoto 3 site is good.
Thousands of deviations have been detected in 
different products during the Olkiluoto 3 project. 
The deviations have been processed in compliance 
with the guidelines observed in the project and 
rectified or approved as they were before commis-
sioning the subject system. However, weaknesses in 
the operation or safety culture of organisations are 
not readily identified in connection with process-
ing deviations. STUK is of the opinion that this is 
more affected by the practice observed in the pro-
ject to see deviations as cases of technical problems 
and their rectification instead of seeking to identify 
systematically the underlying organisation-related 
factors behind the technical deviations. In its 
oversight work, STUK has observed deviations 
that should also be discussed when assessing the 
reasons for the deviations and the safety culture 
of the Olkiluoto 3 site as a whole. Such deviations 
include, for example, deficiencies in the cabling 
concept and observations regarding the quality 
of work of welding contractors. On the basis of 
observations made during inspections, STUK has 
recommended that TVO should assess the safety 
culture by utilising more extensively the available 
sources of information, such as deviation reports, 
site events, audit reports and other observations 
regarding the operations of subcontractors, the 
plant supplier and TVO. TVO has added the audit 
observations and processing of deviations to the 
safety culture monitoring procedures.
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ganisation and prepared for the commissioning of 
Olkiluoto 3.
TVO’s independent quality assurance unit mon-
itors the quality of the Olkiluoto 3 project and its 
management by processing any critical deviations 
observed in the operations of the plant supplier 
and its subcontractors, product deviations and 
audit results, as well as by recording into statistics 
and analysing information pertaining to the rea-
sons for deviations. In 2011, the quality assurance 
unit focussed its operation in particular on the 
management of open questions, I&C design and 
commissioning preparations. TVO and the plant 
supplier continued the development of procedures 
and tools required for the follow-up and manage-
ment of open questions. One concern at Olkiluoto 
3 is the large number of open issues and the post-
ponement of their solutions to the operating licence 
phase. TVO’s follow-up records indicate that there 
were over 6,000 open requirements by the regula-
tory authority in the Olkiluoto 3 project at the end 
of 2011.
TVO implemented the internal audits of the 
Olkiluoto 3 project in line with the plans. The 
actions of contractors working at the site were 
audited systematically up to the summer 2011, 
but after that, the audits were postponed until 
2012. According to TVO, the audits were not car-
ried out because the plant supplier did not have a 
sufficient number of qualified lead auditors at the 
Olkiluoto 3 site. On the basis of its inspection ob-
servations, STUK made an additional inspection of 
the activities and resources of Areva’s OL3 Quality 
Management in January 2012. It was established 
during the inspection that AREVA has plans to 
increase the number of lead auditors at the plant 
site, and the company has drawn up a comprehen-
sive plan jointly with TVO for auditing the contrac-
tors in 2012.
STUK’s investigations regarding the procure-
ment of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were 
completed in the summer 2011. The results of the 
investigations are shown in Section 4.3.1, “Overall 
safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3”. The results of 
the investigation show that the nuclear industry-
specific requirements were not appropriately con-
veyed in the supply chain. During 2011, the plant 
supplier investigated the deficiencies in the quality 
management of its suppliers, their safety implica-
tions, as well as the corrective actions for demon-
strating the conformity of auxiliary equipment. 
A significant part of STUK’s resources available 
for the quality management of Olkiluoto 3 was 
used for reviewing the accounts submitted and for 
verifying the sufficiency of the suppliers’ quality 
management.
In 2011, STUK performed one inspection of the 
licensee’s procedures for monitoring the conformity 
of design documentation and the safety implica-
tions of requests for deadline extensions. The in-
spection indicated that the licensee has sufficient 
procedures and competencies in place for identify-
ing the deficiencies in design documentation, but 
that the licensee’s procedures allow submitting in-
complete documentation for review by the author-
ity. STUK required the licensee to specify further 
its procedures and independent quality assurance 
so that basically, incomplete documentation will 
not be submitted for the authority review. In ad-
dition, STUK required the licensee to develop its 
key indicators to allow the conformity of design 
documentation submitted to the authority being 
systematically monitored in the Olkiluoto 3 project 
organisation. In early 2012, STUK will subject the 
conformity of documents to special scrutiny.
The quality management system of the 
Olkiluoto 3 project was developed in a more risk-
based direction. The systematic identification of 
risks related to nuclear safety, quality and organ-
isational activities developed clearly from 2010. In 
its inspections, STUK has emphasised the impor-
tance of further developing the risk management 
of the Olkiluoto 3 project. STUK will oversee the 
implementation of planned development activities 
in 2012.
TVO had to implement an independent assess-
ment of the Olkiluoto 3 project management sys-
tem in compliance with the 2008 implementation 
decision of YVL Guide 1.4. TVO only started the 
assessment work in the autumn of 2011 so that 
completion of the assessment was postponed until 
2012.
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4.4 Actions required following 
the Fukushima accident
Actions after the Fukushima accident
Following the Fukushima accident, several inves-
tigations were initiated regarding how the lessons 
learned from the accident should be taken into 
account in improving the safety of nuclear power 
plants. In Finland, national investigations and 
the so-called EU stress tests are in progress. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have also initiated investi-
gations following the Fukushima accident. The na-
tional investigations and the EU stress tests deal 
partly with the same issues, but they are separate 
and complementary to each other.
The national investigations began immediately 
following the Fukushima accident on 15 March 
2011 at the initiative of the Ministry of Economy 
and the Employment. The accounts required of the 
licensees focussed on the issues most important to 
Finnish nuclear power plants. Particular attention 
was paid to how Finnish nuclear power stations 
have prepared for the effects of floods and other 
extreme weather phenomena on the operation of 
the plants and ensured the availability of electri-
cal power in various different fault and transient 
situations and the success of emergency response 
activities even in an accident situation applying to 
several plant units when the external infrastruc-
ture has been destroyed. The investigations also 
looked at plant unit-specific possibilities to make 
changes for improving safety.
STUK submitted its report based on the licens-
ees’ assessments to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy on 16 May 2011. The national 
investigation did not reveal any such new threats 
or deficiencies that would have required immediate 
improvements to safety. However, STUK’s decision 
associated with the national investigation deemed 
it necessary to continue more detailed plant unit-
specific investigations regarding preparedness for 
certain exceptional environmental conditions. The 
purpose of these investigations was to assess the 
need for plant modifications to improve safety fur-
ther. The assessment is particularly based on situa-
tions that simultaneously jeopardise the operation 
of several parallel safety systems or several levels 
of the in-depth defence. STUK received the power 
companies’ responses to its requests for improving 
the safety of plant units on 15 December 2011. The 
need for plant modifications will be assessed on the 
basis of these responses.
The EU’s stress tests for NPPs in operation and 
under construction were initiated in parallel with 
the national safety investigation. The purpose of 
these assessments is to establish how the plants 
would cope with exceptional external events and 
other situations associated with the simultaneous 
loss of operability of several safety systems. The 
investigation request associated with the stress 
tests was sent to the power companies on 1 June 
2011, and they submitted their reports to STUK on 
31 October 2011. The national report produced by 
STUK on the basis of these licensees’ reports was 
sent to the European Commission on 30 December 
2011. The stress tests will continue in early 2012 
with an international peer assessment, whose final 
report is scheduled for completion by 30 April 2012.
4.5 Preparation for new projects
In 2008 and 2009, Teollisuuden Voima (TVO), 
Fortum and Fennovoima (FV) applied for the 
Government’s decisions-in-principle regarding 
the construction of new nuclear power plant units 
in Finland. The decision-in-principle process in-
cludes STUK’s preliminary safety assessment in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Act. STUK 
completed this assessment in October 2009 when 
the preliminary safety assessment concerning 
Fennovoima was submitted to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The Government 
rejected Fortum’s application and made on 6 May 
2010 positive decisions-in-principle regarding 
TVO’s and Fennovoima’s new plant units. In its de-
cision regarding Fennovoima, the Government re-
duced the number of possible plant units from two 
to one. At the same time, the Government issued 
a positive decision-in-principle to Posiva regard-
ing the final disposal of spent fuel from TVO’s new 
NPP unit. Parliament ratified the Government's 
decisions-in-principle before its summer recess on 
1 July 2010. Following the Government’s decision-
in-principle process, Fortum ended its Loviisa 3 
project.
The next licensing phase prescribed in the 
Nuclear Energy Act for new NPP units will be 
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the construction licence phase. In its decision-in-
principle, the Government ordered that the power 
companies must apply for the licence prescribed in 
the Nuclear Energy Act for initiating the construc-
tion of the NPP unit (construction licence) within 
five years from Parliament’s decision to uphold the 
decision-in-principle (2015).
STUK has established an oversight project 
(VALVE) in preparation for the construction li-
cence application processing phase of Olkiluoto 4 
and Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 NPP units. In its 
preparatory project, STUK has collected, classi-
fied and analysed experience from the Olkiluoto 
3 oversight project. In addition to analysing writ-
ten documentation, the managers of projects and 
sub-projects participating in the oversight project 
were interviewed. The experience gained will be 
utilised when preparing for new projects. In addi-
tion, an Olkiluoto 3 experience seminar was organ-
ised for all power companies, Posiva, the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety and STUK as part of 
the VALVE project. In addition to experience from 
the Olkiluoto 3 project, the seminar also discussed 
the impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident on 
new power plant projects.
STUK continued to work closely with the power 
companies regarding the design maturities, feasi-
bility of plant alternatives and sites. In these meet-
ings, STUK was presented with the preparations of 
power companies for the projects, and STUK pre-
sented observations regarding the organisational 
capabilities of the power companies. STUK also 
participated in the power companies’ meetings as-
sessing the feasibility of plant alternatives, where 
the impact of Finnish nuclear safety requirements 
on the design of plant alternatives was discussed. 
In compliance with Section 2.2 of YVL Guide 
1.1, STUK assessed the safety-related sections of 
Teollisuuden Voima’s and Fennovoima’s invitations 
to tenders.
STUK studied the design basis regarding plant 
sites for Fennovoima and processed them as re-
ceived for information. Following the choice made 
regarding Fennovoima’s plant location, STUK or-
ganised, at the invitation of the Municipality of 
Pyhäjoki, a briefing event and press conference for 
the inhabitants of Pyhäjoki and the media.
4.6 Research reactor
The operating licence period of VTT’s FiR 1 re-
search reactor expired at the end of 2011. In 
November 2010, VTT submitted an application 
to the Government for renewing the operation li-
cence. STUK reviewed and approved the submitted 
documents in compliance with the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, prepared its statement and issued a safety 
assessment for the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in October 2011. According to STUK’s 
assessment, the nuclear safety of the FiR 1 reactor, 
the condition of its structures, systems and compo-
nents, as well as its human resources are sufficient 
for continued safe operation. The Government 
granted the FiR 1 reactor an operating licence val-
id until 2023. The licence carries the conditions 
consistent with the statement of STUK regarding 
the planning of management of the uranium from 
the subcritical test equipment preceding the reac-
tor and the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor in 
2014 and regarding an interim safety assessment 
in 2020 if the reactor is still used at that time.
The issues in STUK’s safety assessment requir-
ing immediate follow-up will be reviewed in 2012. 
In addition to the safe operation of the reactor, 
STUK pays particular attention to safety manage-
ment, more specific planning of decommissioning 
with respect to nuclear waste management, and to 
the development of physical protection.
During 2011, the research reactor was used, 
among other things, for radiation treatment of 
patients and for isotope irradiation operations or-
dered by external parties. In addition, the reactor 
is used in the basic courses in reactor physics or-
ganised annually for the students of universities in 
Espoo, Lappeenranta, Stockholm and Uppsala. The 
reactor had about 200 start-ups during the year.
During the year, STUK carried out inspec-
tions on the operational safety, physical protection, 
emergency preparedness, nuclear safeguards, nu-
clear waste management and radiation protection 
of the FiR 1 reactor.
The licences of the two managers and two op-
erators of the reactor were renewed at the begin-
ning of 2011. In November, an oral examination 
of managers and operators was organised at the 
FiR 1 reactor. STUK issued its approval decision 
for 2012–2015 on the basis of the results of the 
examination.
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5 Regulatory oversight of the spent 
nuclear fuel disposal project
From the perspective of nuclear energy legislation, 
the spent nuclear fuel disposal project may be bro-
ken down into five main stages:
1. Research stage: from the 1970s to the Govern-
ment’s decision-in-principle.
2. Research construction stage: from the decision-
in-principle to the construction permit; compris-
es the on-going construction of an underground 
research facility, Onkalo.
3. Construction stage: from the construction per-
mit to the operating licence.
4. Operating stage: from the operating licence to 
decommissioning.
5. Terminal stage: from decommissioning to the 
termination of the licensee’s waste manage-
ment obligation. When the final disposal of nu-
clear waste has been carried out acceptably, the 
licensee’s waste management obligation ends 
and the responsibility for the nuclear waste dis-
posed of is transferred to the State.
In 2001, Parliament ratified the decision-in-prin-
ciple issued by the Government the year before to 
the effect that the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in the 
bedrock at Olkiluoto is in line with the overall good 
of society. The decision-in-principle states that the 
spent nuclear fuel disposal project may proceed 
to the construction of an underground research 
facility and more detailed investigation. With this 
statement, the Government indicates how far the 
implementation of the final disposal project may 
proceed pursuant to the decision-in-principle, tak-
ing into account that the underground research 
facility, Onkalo, referred to in the decision-in-prin-
ciple is designed to form a part of the final dis-
posal facility to be constructed later. The decision-
in-principle regarding final disposal of spent fuel 
was later extended to cater for the Olkiluoto 3 and 
4 plant units.
After receiving the decision-in-principle, Posiva 
began investigations regarding the suitability of 
the final disposal site at Olkiluoto. Construction of 
the underground research facility began in 2004. 
Since the research facility is designed to form part 
of the final disposal facility to be constructed later, 
it has been constructed in accordance with the re-
quirements concerning nuclear facilities with the 
corresponding regulatory oversight.
5.1 Spent nuclear fuel disposal project
In 2011, during the “research construction stage”, 
the preparations for the disposal project pro-
gressed both with respect to the construction of 
Onkalo and with respect to producing the con-
struction licence documentation. Posiva achieved 
the depth of 437 metres in the excavation work 
for Onkalo, and most of the underground techni-
cal rooms were completed. In addition, Posiva ex-
cavated the underground demonstration tunnels 
to be used for demonstrating the functionality of 
the disposal system. During 2011, STUK reviewed 
and approved an amendment to the overall plan 
of Onkalo, aimed at increasing the underground 
research work on the bedrock. In addition, STUK 
approved the tunnel section-specific design docu-
mentation important to safety, according to which 
Posiva implemented the Onkalo excavation opera-
tions.
Posiva is making preparations for the construc-
tion licence application to be submitted at the end 
of 2012, and STUK made preparations for review-
ing the licence application as part of its oversight 
activities in 2011. Finalising the review of the 
draft documentation for a construction licence, 
submitted by Posiva at the end of 2009, and com-
municating the review observations related to the 
demonstration of safety to Posiva constituted the 
key elements of oversight.
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5.1.1 Oversight of Posiva’s 
management system
STUK completed its review and assessment of the 
change in Posiva’s management system and ap-
proved the management system coming into force. 
Since STUK’s previous review, Posiva has signifi-
cantly changed its method of operations by chang-
ing from a line organisation to a matrix organisa-
tion and by starting to operate more clearly in a 
process-oriented manner. STUK required changes 
be made in the operations management system 
regarding, among other things, clarification of the 
responsibilities of individual employees and groups 
guiding the activities, as well as description of the 
nuclear non-proliferation process. In connection 
with Posiva’s organisational change, STUK ap-
proved the Posiva person responsible for the con-
struction of Onkalo with remarks related to the 
training programme to be created for familiarising 
the person and to the way the deputy to the person 
responsible for construction is determined accord-
ing to the description of Posiva’s operations man-
agement system.
5.1.2 Oversight of the construction of 
research facility (Onkalo oversight)
The construction of Onkalo is divided into five 
excavation stages. In 2011, excavation stage five 
was being implemented, together with additional 
excavation work associated with the stage. The 
excavation work concentrated on the access tun-
nel, pumping station area and technical rooms. In 
addition, the test, or demonstration, tunnels were 
excavated. Posiva intends to use them for dem-
onstrating its capabilities for the rock engineer-
ing construction of disposal tunnels and for carry-
ing out tests related to disposal. During the year, 
construction of the access tunnel progressed from 
4,560 metres to 4,913 metres (to a depth of 455 me-
tres). STUK’s oversight covered geological mapping 
and surveys of the rock to be excavated, excavation 
of the access tunnel with the drilling and blasting 
method, raise boring of vertical shafts, sealing the 
rock with grouting and reinforcement of the rock, 
and review of safety documents.
Site inspections
STUK paid regular inspection visits to the con-
struction site, about twice a month depending on 
the situation of the construction work. Issues re-
lated to the construction and the oversight of the 
construction of Onkalo were discussed at monitor-
ing meetings about once a month. During the year, 
STUK monitored the progress of the construction 
of Onkalo as described below.
There was no need to seal the excavated ac-
cess tunnel due to seepage water by injecting 
concrete into the bedrock. Sealing work was done 
in the other demonstration tunnel where silica 
grouting material was injected for the purpose of 
demonstrating the method. The systematic, final 
reinforcement of the bedrock by rock bolting fol-
lowed the progress of excavation work. The bedrock 
surrounding the intake air, exhaust air and per-
sonnel shafts was sealed by injection in the depth 
range of 290–437 metres. Posiva had problems in 
achieving sufficient leak tightness in the bedrock 
surrounding the shafts with the previous injection 
operations. The matter was discussed, inter alia, in 
the inspection forming part of the inspection pro-
gramme during the construction of Onkalo.
In 2011, STUK paid particular attention to 
occupational safety. A fatal accident occurred in 
Onkalo in January 2011 when a block of rock fell 
off the tunnel ceiling in connection with removal 
of loose rock materials. STUK required Posiva to 
produce a report of the incident. In addition, STUK 
required Posiva to submit reports of any similar 
accidents and near misses in the future. Following 
the occurrences of rocks falling and near misses in 
the autumn of 2011, Posiva changed its bedrock 
reinforcement practices in order to improve occu-
pational safety in Onkalo. STUK approved Posiva’s 
proposal for changing the reporting practice but 
required investigations related to the organisation 
of work and ensuring the availability of sufficient 
bedrock characterisation data.
STUK inspected the readiness to start construc-
tion work of the demonstration tunnels planned in 
Onkalo and granted permission to start the con-
struction work with remarks concerning, among 
other things, missing system descriptions.
STUK carried out eight inspections in order 
to give permission for shotcreting excavated rock 
surfaces. The excavated tunnel sections will be 
shotcreted, apart from the demonstration tunnel, 
which will be reinforced with metal network. The 
aim of the inspections is to ensure the sufficient 
scope and correctness of the survey data before the 
rock surfaces are covered by shotcreting.
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In the follow-up meetings regarding the con-
struction of Onkalo, the situation in the design 
and construction of Onkalo was regularly dis-
cussed along with the research work carried out in 
Onkalo related to, among other things, the stabil-
ity of the bedrock on the surface of the disposal 
hole. Furthermore, the development work of the 
Rock Suitability Criteria (RSC) system, carried 
out in the demonstration tunnels of Onkalo, was 
discussed in the follow-up meetings. The status of 
repository design work was also monitored in the 
meetings.
Posiva’s construction organisation and its op-
erating methods were the focus of the Onkalo 
construction inspection programme. STUK carried 
out nine inspections according to the inspection 
programme. The inspections concerned:
•	 Posiva’s	management	system;
•	 Processing	of	safety	issues;
•	 Quality	management	of	the	Onkalo	project;
•	 Development	 of	 excavation	 methods	 used	 for	
Onkalo;
•	 Limitation	of	the	amount	of	groundwater	seep-
ing into Onkalo by injecting concrete grouting 
material into the bedrock (excessive injection 
may disturb the favourable chemical conditions 
of the bedrock);
•	 Use	 and	 amount	 of	 foreign	 materials	 which	
could disturb the bedrock’s chemical conditions 
(e.g. explosives, concrete, fuels); and
•	 Impacts	of	the	construction	work	of	Onkalo	on	
the hydro-geochemical conditions in Olkiluoto, 
including research into the salinity of ground-
water inside the bedrock.
The inspections in the construction inspection pro-
gramme of Onkalo concentrated on, among other 
things, the instructions and procedures concerning 
the construction of the research facility. The fol-
lowing actions were required on the basis of the 
inspections:
•	 Update	 of	 the	 instructions	 for	 quality	 control	
activities;
•	 Delivery	of	test	results	related	to	hardening	of	
the grouting material to STUK;
•	 Update	of	the	outdated	shaft	injection	plan;
•	 Ensuring	adherence	to	the	instructions	regard-
ing the use of foreign materials and further 
specification of the location of the safety data 
sheets of foreign materials.
STUK’s regulatory oversight of Posiva’s subcon-
tractors was based on the safety significance of 
the work they perform. STUK participated, in the 
capacity of an observer, in Posiva’s supplier audit 
concerning Destia Oy, the excavation contractor for 
Onkalo.
Construction document reviews
STUK approved the amendment of Onkalo’s gen-
eral design and the amendment of Onkalo’s im-
plementation extent intended for increasing the 
volume of underground bedrock research and thus 
helping the later migration to implementing the 
disposal facilities. The tunnel section leading to 
the second exhaust air shaft at the depth of 437 
metres and the first part of the vehicle access route 
later leading to the technical rooms at the depth 
of 420 metres were approved as new Onkalo parts. 
Implementation of the new premises required, 
among other things, that an additional testing plan 
regarding the rock classification system developed 
by Posiva as well as the plans regarding rock en-
gineering plans for the areas were submitted to 
STUK.
STUK reviewed Onkalo’s design documents and 
their updates that were sent to STUK in compli-
ance with the construction documents delivery 
plan and the construction communication plan 
produced by Posiva. STUK approved the rock en-
gineering implementation and type plans and the 
update of construction communication plan with 
remarks concerning, among others, the following 
issues: Informing STUK of serious hazard situa-
tions. The key subjects for review and assessment 
also included the rock engineering type and imple-
mentation plans regarding additional excavation 
work during stage 5 of the Onkalo tunnel contract 
as well as their associated construction engineer-
ing drawings, reinforcement calculations, as well 
as forecasts of bedrock status and stress-induced 
damage. The additional excavation work concerned 
the technical rooms, pumping station area and 
extension to the access tunnel. The standard de-
signs describe the design bases and optional solu-
tions which are used in Onkalo’s implementation. 
Monitoring procedures for the repository facilities 
will also be developed in conjunction with the re-
view of the designs.
STUK reviewed the updates of Onkalo’s rock 
engineering and construction engineering plans as 
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well as Onkalo’s research plans, including Onkalo’s 
research plan for the depth range of 420–460 
metres and the survey plan for the eastern areas 
of Olkiluoto. In addition, STUK reviewed HPAC 
design documents for the classified systems of 
the ventilation and lifting equipment building to 
be constructed above ground. Onkalo will later 
be ventilated through the ventilation and lifting 
equipment building.
Furthermore, Posiva gave STUK the following 
sets of documentation for processing:
• Updates of Posiva’s operations management 
system
•	 Posiva	Oy’s	crisis	communication	plan
•	 Quality	 plan	 and	 safety	 plan	 for	 the	 Onkalo	
site.
5.1.3 Overseeing the research, development 
and design work for further 
specification of the Safety Case
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
required in 2003 that the parties under the nuclear 
waste management obligation shall, either sepa-
rately, jointly or through Posiva submit a status re-
port on the preparation of the construction licence 
application for the encapsulation and final disposal 
facility during 2009. STUK issued a statement of 
the report to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy in late 2010. In addition to the statement, 
STUK sent the observations made during review 
of the draft application and its opinion regarding 
fulfilment of the safety requirements to Posiva in 
June 2011. In this safety evaluation report regard-
ing the preliminary application documents, STUK 
has gone through the safety requirements regard-
ing final disposal (Government Decree 736/2008) 
and assessed, as its conclusion, the situation re-
garding fulfilment of the requirements. STUK is of 
the opinion that the plant can be implemented so 
that it meets the safety requirements, but achiev-
ing the required standard of design following the 
suggested time schedule will be challenging. The 
following is a summary of the issues STUK consid-
ers most critical for the construction licence ap-
plication:
•	 Formation of scenarios meeting STUK’s re-
quirements and describing the entire final dis-
posal system, analysis of the release and migra-
tion of radionuclides in these scenarios, as well 
as a comprehensive analysis of uncertainty 
factors.
•	 In its documentation, Posiva has not explained 
how the parts of the final disposal system will 
reach the target status and how they will meet 
the set performance requirements (performance 
analyses). Deficiencies are obvious, particularly 
with regard to the buffer, in understanding the 
processes affecting performance and in demon-
strating the planned performance of the buffer.
•	 Demonstration of the development work and 
functionality of the bedrock classification sys-
tem as well as demonstration of the final dis-
posal tunnels and holes in Onkalo.
•	 The documentation submitted by Posiva does 
not shed any light on how the defence-in-depth 
principle and single failure tolerance of sys-
tems, for example, have been taken into account 
in plant design work.
In 2011, STUK monitored in particular the prog-
ress made in the above issues in Posiva’s work, 
and safety issues were discussed in many subject-
specific meetings between STUK and Posiva. One 
of STUK’s key tasks in 2011 was to start prepara-
tions for processing Posiva’s construction licence 
application for the disposal facility of spent nuclear 
fuel to be submitted in 2012. In the first stage 
of the preparatory work, the first version of the 
review plan was compiled on the basis of safety 
requirements and areas and subjects of review 
composed of them. External international experts 
also assisted in producing the review plan, and 
the work was observed by representatives of the 
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM).
During 2011, STUK actively monitored Posiva’s 
design work for the encapsulation plant and dis-
posal facility, particularly the situation in system 
design. Posiva is developing its process and system 
descriptions to the standard required for the con-
struction licence application. This requires devel-
oping Posiva’s organisation and operations to meet 
the safety requirements of nuclear facilities, and 
STUK is of the opinion that Posiva should, for ex-
ample, pay attention to ensuring the availability of 
sufficient resources as well as to the guidance and 
quality assurance of design work.
During 2011, STUK has monitored the research 
and development work on the final disposal sys-
tem, and that on the canister and bentonite buffer 
in particular. Posiva has several projects in prog-
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ress aimed at demonstrating the performance of 
the buffer. STUK’s oversight focussed on the defini-
tion of functions and goals set for the buffer and on 
the associated open questions regarding safety. In 
2011, STUK began the review of the detailed buffer 
plan and the freezing-thawing analysis related to 
the penetration of permafrost. These reviews will 
be completed in early 2012.
STUK has assessed the documentation on 
Posiva’s disposal canister manufacturing, weld-
ing and inspection techniques and sent to Posiva, 
in June, the resulting statement on the status 
of development work regarding the manufactur-
ing, welding and inspection techniques of disposal 
canisters. It can be stated as a conclusion on the 
assessment work that the descriptions, quality re-
quirements and acceptance criteria regarding the 
manufacturing, welding and inspection techniques 
of disposal canisters have become more specific 
compared to what was presented earlier. In the 
opinion of STUK, the descriptions, quality require-
ments and acceptance criteria must be further 
developed and specified for the construction licence 
application documents so that the impacts of dif-
ferent stages of the manufacturing, welding and 
inspection techniques on the operational and long 
term safety of the disposal canisters are shown 
comprehensively enough. In addition, STUK began 
the review of documents concerning the design and 
corrosion resistance of canisters; this review will 
be completed in early 2012.
Regarding disposal scenarios, STUK analysed 
Posiva’s safety analysis methodology for scenario 
analysis. The focus of STUK’s oversight in this 
area was on assessing the international situation 
and knowledge regarding the formation of sce-
narios and on assessing the safety requirements. 
Furthermore, STUK began its own comparable 
scenario analysis work that can be used as support 
when analysing the scenarios presented by Posiva 
in the construction licence application.
STUK has monitored Posiva’s development 
work on the bedrock classification system by as-
sessing the results of the project and the efforts 
to demonstrate its functionality, by overseeing the 
research work carried out in Onkalo and by analys-
ing development subjects with Posiva. Testing of 
the bedrock classification system was an important 
part of the implementation of Onkalo’s demon-
stration facilities, and Posiva produced detailed 
descriptions of the bedrock in the area for the pur-
pose of indicating in advance the suitability of the 
subject rock volume for final disposal. In its over-
sight work, STUK paid particular attention to the 
reliability of descriptions and the bedrock criteria 
set in the classification system.
As a summary, it can be stated that STUK 
presented in 2011 its views to Posiva regarding 
the open safety questions raised in the prelimi-
nary application documentation and monitored in 
particular the research, development and design/
planning work related to these areas. At this stage, 
Posiva is concentrating its efforts in preparing the 
construction licence documentation to be submit-
ted at the end of 2012, and it has therefore sub-
mitted less preliminary documentation to STUK. 
Consequently, STUK’s regulatory activities mainly 
consisted of plan assessments, inspection visits 
and analysis of observations jointly with Posiva.
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6 Regulatory oversight of 
nuclear non-proliferation
6.1 The basis, subjects and 
methods of regulatory control 
of nuclear materials
Regulatory control of nuclear materials 
and activities is based on the Nuclear 
Energy Act, Nuclear Energy Decree 
and on international treaties
Safeguarding nuclear materials and nuclear ac-
tivities constitutes a requirement for the peace-
ful use of nuclear energy. In Finland, the national 
system for nuclear material control is maintained 
by STUK. Provisions on the control system are laid 
down in section 118 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
and its purpose is to carry out the safeguards for 
the use of nuclear energy that are necessary for the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure 
that the activities are compliant with the obliga-
tions of international treaties.
International safeguards are implemented by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Energy, Directorates D and E, 
“Euratom”. IAEA safeguards are based on the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193) signed by non-nuclear 
weapon EU Member States, the European Atomic 
Energy Agency and the IAEA, as well as the 
Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/193/Add.8). EU safeguards are based on 
the Euratom Treaty and Commission Regulation 
EURATOM No. 302/2005. According to section 63 
of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK’s participation is 
required in inspections performed by the IAEA and 
the European Commission in Finland.
The IAEA must be able to satisfy itself that 
the member country has no undisclosed activi-
ties related to the nuclear fuel cycle, and that the 
member country honours its obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition to 
the nuclear material records, states must notify 
the IAEA of nuclear facility sites, research and de-
velopment projects related to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
as well as of the manufacture of certain, separately 
defined, components in the nuclear field and their 
export. The operators in the industry report nucle-
ar materials to the Commission and STUK in com-
pliance with the Commission Regulation. STUK 
submits to the IAEA and the Commission the dec-
larations concerning Finland and Finnish facilities 
required by the Additional Protocol. In support of 
its controls, the IAEA gathers information from 
open sources, uses satellite imagery and collects 
environmental samples. The Additional Protocol 
also allows the IAEA more extensive access rights 
to inspect activities related to the nuclear fuel 
cycle in the whole country.
In the IAEA’s integrated safeguards, the con-
trol under the Safeguards Agreement and that 
under the Additional Protocol have been matched 
together so that the IAEA carries out fewer rou-
tine inspections, but it has the possibility to make 
inspections unannounced or at very short notice on 
plants or activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. 
The IAEA’s integrated control began in Finland 
on 15 October 2008. The implementation of the 
IAEA’s Integrated Safeguards in Finland is made 
possible by the national control system main-
tained by STUK. STUK has enhanced its inspec-
tors’ capabilities for participating in the IAEA’s 
Unannounced Inspections (UI) or Short Notice 
Random Inspections (SNRI).
In parallel with the expansion of the IAEA’s 
regulatory control, the Commission also developed 
its inspection activities. The number of inspections 
carried out by the IAEA and the Commission has 
been decreasing since 2009. The number of inspec-
tions carried out by STUK has increased. The 
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new subjects of control, Posiva’s Onkalo, TVO’s 
Olkiluoto 3 and 4, Fennovoima and Talvivaara, 
have increased the number of inspections. STUK 
reports all nuclear material inspections to the 
Commission.
Plants and operators within the 
nuclear fuel cycle under control
STUK’s nuclear safeguards apply to all nuclear 
fuel cycle activities in Finland as well as to nu-
clear commodity accounting and control systems, 
import, use, transport, storage, transfers, removal 
from use and final disposal. Nuclear items include 
nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and tho-
rium), deuterium and graphite, as well as nuclear 
devices, equipment, software and technology. Most 
nuclear materials in Finland (99.8%) are contained 
in nuclear power plants. A few consignments of 
fresh nuclear fuel are imported to Finland and 
transported in the country annually.
STUK inspects the holders of nuclear items 
and stakeholders in the nuclear industry through 
facility and transport inspections and document 
reviews. At the facilities, STUK verifies that the 
quantity of nuclear items and their physical loca-
tion comply with the accounting records. STUK 
reviews the documents on the facilities’ nuclear 
items management: reports, notifications and nu-
clear safeguards manuals, and grants licences 
required by legislation. In addition, STUK is re-
sponsible for the approval process of international 
inspectors.
The technical analysis methods applied to nu-
clear items ensure that nuclear materials and 
operations are in accordance with the notifications 
and that all operations are notified. STUK ap-
plies non-destructive methods and environmental 
sample analyses to verify that the information no-
tified by the facilities regarding nuclear materials 
and their use – for example, the degree of uranium 
enrichment as well as fuel burn-up and the cooling 
period – is correct and complete.
The quantities of nuclear materials in Finland 
by plant and material category are shown in 
Figures 15 and 16, as well as in Table 5.
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Figure 15. Amount of uranium in Finland.
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Figure 16. Amount of plutonium in Finland.
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Control of transfers of nuclear products
In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and sensitive nuclear technology, STUK 
controls the transfer of nuclear products and co-
operates with Finnish Customs, the police and 
other public authorities. A licence granted by ei-
ther STUK or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
is required for the import and export of nuclear 
products. Licence from STUK, as well as a trans-
port plan and transport security plan approved by 
STUK, are required for the transport of nuclear 
materials. Customs and STUK co-operate in pre-
venting illegal imports and exports at Finnish bor-
ders.
Nuclear security and cooperation 
between authorities
Another objective of the oversight of non-prolifera-
tion is to ensure that appropriate security arrange-
ments are in place for nuclear items. In this con-
text, the expression ‘security arrangements’ refers 
to the deterrence, prevention and detection of and 
response to illegal activities related to nuclear and 
other radioactive materials, as defined by the IAEA 
under the heading ‘Nuclear Security’. In addition, 
the security arrangements of the oversight of non-
proliferation include acting as a liaison authority 
for Customs in actions required by irregularities 
observed in radiation monitoring at the borders, 
and also as an expert when developing these radia-
tion monitoring operations.
Oversight of non-proliferation in 
final disposal of nuclear fuel
Final disposal of nuclear fuel in inaccessible un-
derground facilities sets new kinds of challenges 
for nuclear safeguards. It is no longer possible to 
verify nuclear material after encapsulation in the 
same way as in traditional facilities or in long-term 
storage. STUK has obligated Posiva Oy, the com-
pany in charge of the disposal project, to ensure 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards during 
the construction of Onkalo, the underground re-
search facility, as it is designed to become part of a 
final disposal facility. The aim of the obligation is to 
ensure that all necessary information on the final 
disposal facility will be available in due course, and 
that it will be possible to show that no undeclared 
facilities or operations relevant to nuclear safe-
guards exist in the final repository area.
The nuclear safeguards at the final disposal 
facility must be implemented so that international 
regulatory organisations can take care of their 
regulation obligations in an appropriate way: the 
IAEA must be able to satisfy itself that there are 
no undisclosed nuclear activities in Finland dur-
ing the construction or use of the final disposal 
facility or after its closure. The Commission will 
verify that the operator’s actions are sufficient 
for implementing nuclear safeguards at the final 
disposal facility. The development of nuclear safe-
guards for the final disposal facility is a demanding 
task because there is no experience of controlling 
a similar facility anywhere in the world. Both the 
IAEA and the Commission plan and implement 
their own regulation and inspection procedures on 
the basis of declarations made by the operator and 
the Government.
The IAEA finalised the control criteria for the 
final disposal facility and encapsulation plant in 
2009 and 2010. On their basis and on the basis 
of experience from overseeing Onkalo, STUK has 
participated in the development of international 
requirements for nuclear safeguards in the IAEA’s 
ASTOR support group for control activities. The 
practical control requirements were prepared in 
October in a joint seminar organised with the 
IAEA, the EC and Posiva in Vuojoki. In addition, 
STUK established an R&D project for nuclear safe-
guards at the final disposal facility, concentrating 
Table 5. Amounts of nuclear materials in Finland 31 December 2011.
Location
Natural uranium 
kg
Enriched uranium 
kg
Depleted 
uranium kg
Plutonium 
kg
Torium 
kg
Loviisa plant – 593 001 – 5 304 –
Olkiluoto plant – 1 491 233 – 10 971 –
VTT / FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 ~0 ~0 ~0
Other facililties 4 402 < 1 1 353 ~ 0 ~ 3
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on developing verification equipment and the man-
agement of continuity of control information. Late 
in the year, the project was presented to the SSM 
of Sweden, an important partner in safeguards 
development.
6.2 Nuclear safeguards, activities 
and results in 2011
Licences and approvals
During 2011, STUK received 31 licence applica-
tions concerning nuclear items and 358 nuclear 
safeguards reports, notifications or other applica-
tions. All licence applications were approved. No 
significant deviations were detected in document 
reviews. In 2011, STUK granted five import licenc-
es for nuclear materials and eight import licenc-
es for nuclear equipment or components, as well 
as three licences for the possession of equipment. 
STUK also granted a total of 17 licences for the im-
port, possession or assignment of nuclear technol-
ogy. The licences according to the Nuclear Energy 
Act are listed in Appendix 4. Furthermore, STUK 
issued a statement on the uranium extraction proj-
ect in Talvivaara. VTT’s FiR1 reactor organisation 
and Posiva submitted the updates of nuclear safe-
guards manuals, compliant with YVL Guide 6.9, 
for approval. STUK approved VTT’s manual, but 
the approval of Posiva’s manual was postponed to 
2012.
During 2011, STUK approved three transport 
plans for fresh fuel, one transport security plan 
for the transport of fresh fuel and one update to 
a transport security plan. STUK also granted ap-
provals for design of a transport package, a trans-
port with special arrangements and an additional 
report regarding transport. In addition, STUK 
issued a certificate for non-objection related to 
transports.
There were considerably more applications for 
the approval of responsible directors and persons 
responsible for nuclear safeguards referred to in 
the Nuclear Energy Act than in previous years. 
The following responsible persons were approved 
in 2011, nine approvals in all:
•	 Fortum: Deputy to the responsible director, 
deputy to the person responsible for nuclear 
safeguards and person attending to the duties 
of the person responsible for nuclear safeguards 
in matters pertaining to the control of other 
nuclear items in the nuclear safeguards support 
organisation.
•	 Posiva: Person responsible for the construction 
of Onkalo (see responsible director) and person 
responsible for nuclear safeguards.
•	 STUK / Research and Environmental Surveil-
lance: Responsible director and deputy to the 
responsible director.
•	 TVO: Deputy to the person responsible for nu-
clear safeguards (international transportation 
of uranium).
•	 VTT: Deputy to the responsible director.
The qualification requirements of the responsible 
persons include sufficient knowledge of the leg-
islation and other regulations governing nuclear 
safeguards. STUK is responsible for assessing the 
fulfilment of these qualification requirements be-
fore approval. Competence was assessed by writ-
ten questions and an oral examination. This pro-
vided a good indication of the person’s competence. 
When required, additional familiarisation may be 
required of the person in connection with the ap-
proval. In such a case, fulfilment of the require-
ment is also monitored and the person’s level of 
competence is later re-assessed.
During 2011, the IAEA and the European 
Commission sent a total of 12 applications regard-
ing the appointment of new inspectors. STUK 
asked the major holders of nuclear materials and 
the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to pro-
vide statements regarding the inspectors and ap-
proved all the proposed inspectors, 67 IAEA inspec-
tors and 10 European Commission inspectors.
Declarations and inspection visits 
pursuant to the Additional Protocol 
to the Safeguards Agreement
STUK submitted all declarations pursuant to the 
Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards 
Agreement within the set time limits. STUK was 
also able to verify that the Commission had sub-
mitted the declarations regarding Finland under 
its responsibility within the time limits. The IAEA 
did not request any additional accounts on the 
basis of the declarations sent from Finland, and it 
has been able to verify on the basis of the declara-
tions sent that activities in Finland have been in 
line with the notifications. In 2011, one supple-
mentary inspection visit was paid by the IAEA in 
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Finland to the Loviisa power plant, and two inspec-
tions were made at short notice: one at the spent 
fuel storage in Loviisa and the other at Olkiluoto 1. 
No cause for remarks was discovered in the in-
spections and the supplementary inspection visit. 
STUK delivered protocols of all inspections to the 
IAEA and the Commission for information within 
three days of the inspection, even in cases where 
the IAEA or the Commission did not participate in 
the inspection.
Inspections as part of nuclear safeguards
In 2011, STUK carried out a total of 44 nuclear 
safeguards inspections; four planned inspections 
were postponed to 2012 due to reasons attribut-
able to plant operation. All items of minor holders 
of nuclear material were inspected apart from the 
Tornio plant of Outokumpu, where the items will be 
inspected during 2012. No deficiencies were detect-
ed in the inspections. The inspection reports by the 
IAEA and the European Commission (Statement 
90a) indicate that the Finnish nuclear operators 
have met the obligations of international control. 
No significant deviations were detected in document 
reviews. In December 2011, STUK submitted a pre-
liminary safeguards inspection plan for 2012 to the 
IAEA and the Commission for information.
During 2011, STUK has paid particular atten-
tion to the security arrangements of minor holders 
of nuclear items. The inspections of nuclear items 
also included inspections of the security arrange-
ments of five minor holders of nuclear items: 
Inspecta Oy, AEL Oy, the Department of Physics 
at the University of Jyväskylä, MAP Medical 
Technologies Oy and Rautaruukki Oyj. No defi-
ciencies were found. The update of YVL Guides by 
STUK takes the security arrangements of nuclear 
items into account more specifically than before.
STUK carried out nuclear fuel verification mea-
surement campaigns: two at the Olkiluoto plant 
units and one at the Loviisa plant. STUK took en-
vironmental samples at the Olkiluoto power plant 
and acquired new environmental sampling equip-
ment. VTT provided STUK with an analysis report 
of the samples.
Inspections as part of nuclear safeguards 
regarding the disposal facility
STUK has carried out nuclear safeguards control 
at the Onkalo facility constructed by Posiva, in-
tended as part of the disposal facility. STUK’s con-
trol activities were implemented in line with the 
national nuclear safeguards plan. Finland is the 
first country in the world to implement nuclear 
safeguards regarding disposal facilities, which is 
why STUK holds a key position in the development 
and implementation of international (by the IAEA 
and the Commission) nuclear safeguards regarding 
disposal facilities. The biggest challenge in imple-
menting international safeguards is the fact that 
Posiva is not a licensee referred to in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. International safeguards do not recog-
nise the licensee; instead, the need for safeguards 
is initiated by a nuclear facility under construction. 
The IAEA and the Commission have carried out 
the inspections under their inspection programme 
at the Onkalo construction site and at the plant 
area referred to in the Additional Protocol.
Control meetings with licensees
Control meetings between STUK and the respon-
sible directors of plants and the persons respon-
sible for nuclear safeguards have been found to be 
a good and necessary forum for regular discussions 
on topical issues every six months or so. In 2011, 
control meetings were held with TVO and Fortum; 
next year, control meetings will also be held with 
Fennovoima, Posiva, VTT and Talvivaara.
Conclusions and results of 
inspection activities
STUK delivered protocols of all nuclear material 
inspections to the IAEA and the Commission for 
information within three days of the inspection, 
even in cases where the IAEA or the EC did not 
participate in the inspection.
The IAEA and the Commission sent 20 re-
ports to STUK on the results and conclusions of 
inspection activities. The reports did not contain 
inconclusive results. STUK compared the inspec-
tion results in the IAEA’s and the Commission’s 
reports to the results of its own inspections and 
found the information to be very coherent. STUK 
sent the inspection results to the inspected plants 
for information.
Safeguards by Design
It is important that nuclear safeguards are includ-
ed in the design and construction of new plants. 
This saves costs and additional work required for, 
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for example, installation of surveillance cameras in 
the reactor hall when the plant is otherwise ready. 
In June 2011, STUK organised a training event 
entitled “Safeguards by Design” at Sannäs Manor 
in cooperation with the IAEA and the European 
Commission. The training event provided the nu-
clear operators with an overall picture of the basis 
of nuclear safeguards, as well as of their prin-
ciples applied to the design and construction of 
new plants. The training event also included an 
exercise on how the safeguards could be taken into 
account at the participants’ own plants. After the 
training event in September 2011, STUK organ-
ised jointly with the IAEA and the Commission 
events for both TVO and Fennovoima, where tak-
ing the safeguards into account in TVO’s OL4 
and Fennovoima’s FV-1 projects was discussed in 
practical terms. STUK has informed TVO, Fortum 
and Fennovoima of the updated IAEA instruction: 
Nuclear Safety Series, NPP Design (into force on 
10 August 2011), which now takes nuclear safe-
guards and security arrangements into account for 
the first time.
Remote surveillance and data 
transfer at nuclear facilities
The IAEA and European Commission use surveil-
lance cameras for control. The cameras are located 
in the reactor halls and spent fuel storage facilities 
at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plants. The camera 
surveillance of the IAEA and the Commission has 
been in use at both plant units for about twen-
ty years. The IAEA and the Commission have 
changed the video tapes / hard disks in connec-
tion of their inspections. Now technology allows 
sending real-time surveillance video directly to 
the IAEA and Commission headquarters. Remote 
Data Transmission has advanced to a stage where 
the plants have been asked to investigate the im-
pacts of its introduction on safety and security 
arrangements. It is expected that Remote Data 
Transmission will be introduced to Finnish NPPs 
during 2012. Remote Data Transmission will, for 
its part, allow reducing the number of inspection 
visits by the IAEA and the Commission.
Regulatory control of transport 
of nuclear material
STUK inspected transports in line with the inspec-
tion plan for 2011. Experts from the Nuclear Waste 
and Material Regulation and Nuclear Security 
Unit participated in the inspections. Two of the 
inspections concerned TVO’s transports and one of 
Fortum’s.
Cooperation between STUK and the police was 
seamless and functioned well in the transport in-
spections. The police has allocated ample resources 
to the transport events and contributed to the suc-
cess of STUK’s inspection activities. In addition 
to individual transports, the requirements of YVL 
Guide D.2 and preparations for Posiva’s spent fuel 
transports have been discussed with the police, 
among other things. In addition, STUK discussed 
the uranium transports associated with the op-
erations of the Talvivaara mine with the Kajaani 
Police Department in September.
Enhancement of radiation control at borders
Finnish Customs and STUK launched a joint proj-
ect for revising radiation control at borders. The 
project is called RADAR. The project will be imple-
mented during 2009–2014, and it includes equip-
ment purchases, an update of common operational 
methods and instructions, as well as a training 
plan and provision of training together with the 
Customs School.
In 2011, new items of equipment were procured 
for new border crossing points in Vaalimaa and the 
harbours of Helsinki. Procurement of the radiation 
control system for Helsinki Airport has advanced 
to its final stage. Trial operation of the system will 
begin at the beginning of 2012 and production op-
eration three months later.
6.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty was 
opened for signing in 1996. It will enter into force 
after ratification by 44 separately designated states. 
Of these, nine are yet to ratify the Treaty. Finland 
ratified the Treaty in 1999, and a total of 182 coun-
tries had signed and 155 counties had ratified the 
Treaty by the end of 2011. Adherence to the Treaty 
is monitored by a global network of 321 observa-
tion stations. Of these, 80 stations detect radioactive 
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particles in the atmosphere and 40 are also capable 
of detecting radioactive xenon gas. The other sta-
tions measure seismic, hydro-acoustic or infrasound 
waves. The measurement results of the monitoring 
system are available to all Member States.
A special Preparatory Commission, convening 
in Vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s entry 
into force. All signatory states are represented 
in the Commission. The Provisional Technical 
Secretariat, whose tasks include constructing and 
maintaining the international monitoring system, 
also operates in Vienna.
The National Data Centre, based on the 
CTBT and operating by STUK, contributed to 
the work of the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organisation (CTBTO) in establishing a cost-effec-
tive international organisation that is functional 
from the Finnish perspective. The automatic analy-
sis software used for the NDC’s own routine moni-
toring analysed on average more than 800 spectra 
per day towards the end of 2011. Routine monitor-
ing is facilitated by an alarm system transmitting 
data on unusual observations to NDC personnel. 
Following the Fukushima accident, the results of 
the CTBT’s global radionuclide measurement net-
work provided by the National Data Centre from 
these analyses improved the picture of the situa-
tion maintained by STUK’s emergency prepared-
ness organisation.
Activities of the National Data Centre in 2011
The data systems of the National Data Centre have 
for the first time in their history operated without 
interruptions for the whole year, apart from a few 
maintenance breaks lasting a few minutes. The 
external vulnerability scan of the data systems 
performed in November (TIH/Nixu Oy) detected 
vulnerabilities in the systems of the Data Centre, 
most of which could be eliminated immediately af-
ter discovering them.
During 2011, the National Data Centre cre-
ated several new connections to the international 
data centre. They allow following the status of the 
international monitoring system more accurately 
and easily.
Health Canada has provided the first new de-
velopment version of the Xenon analysis software 
for testing. New modifications and corrections were 
decided upon on the basis of the tests and discus-
sions. The project is making good progress, and it 
will continue in 2012.
STUK has participated in WGB meetings and 
chaired its radionuclide expert group.
Finland’s national CTBT cooperation meeting 
was held in June at the Institute of Seismology. 
In addition, a national meeting was held at the 
initiative of the Institute of Seismology, where the 
proposal of nominating the Rovajärvi exercise area 
as a candidate for OSI IFE2014 exercise area was 
discussed.
STUK’s representative was a co-author of the 
publication “Biegalski, S.R., et al., Analysis of 
data from sensitive U.S. monitoring stations for 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor accident, 
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity (2011), 
doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2011.11.007”.
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7 Nuclear security
Regulatory oversight of security in the 
use of nuclear energy is a versatile task
Oversight of nuclear security is the responsibility 
of the Nuclear Security Unit YTS, a part of the 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department YTO. YTS 
reports to the director responsible for prepared-
ness, security and regulations. YTS also oversees 
the security of the final disposal project for spent 
nuclear fuel and the recovery project for the ura-
nium in the Talvivaara mine, as well as the secu-
rity of transportation of nuclear materials, even if 
these matters, as a whole, are the responsibility of 
the Department for Nuclear Waste and Material 
Regulation YMO.
Oversight of the nuclear facilities’ security is also 
performed by using experts in the Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation Department representing various areas 
of technology, such as construction and electrical en-
gineering. The organisation of the Nuclear Security 
Unit was strengthened by recruiting a new expert 
to deal with inspections of administrative informa-
tion security from 1 September 2011 onwards. Thus, 
at the end of 2011, the staff of the Nuclear Security 
Unit YTS comprised four employees.
In matters related to the oversight of nuclear 
security, STUK also co-operates with other au-
thorities.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
The licensee has revised its instructions concern-
ing security in the Loviisa power plant and re-
named it as the Security Plan. The new guidelines 
consist of four parts:
A. General (principles and issues that have not 
been dealt with in other guidelines)
B. Security Standing Order, SSO (document re-
quired under the Nuclear Energy Act and the 
Government decree 734/2008)
C. Security Operating Procedures, SOP (set of 
procedures for carrying out practical security 
measures by the nuclear security officers)
D. System description of security surveillance sys-
tems.
These documents and certain other documents con-
cerning security are handled as confidential doc-
uments. This is due to the fact that should they 
come into the possession of anyone planning un-
lawful actions, it would undoubtedly compromise 
the achievement of the objective of the security ar-
rangements (Act on the Openness of Government 
Activities 621/1999, section 24, subsection 7). The 
SSO (part B) was approved with a separate decision 
by STUK in 2010, and the General section (part 
A) of the Security Plan was approved in January 
2011. STUK handled the SOP (part C) and sys-
tem description (part D) as documents received for 
information. The security organisation’s identifiers, 
which are associated with the uniforms and which 
indicate nuclear security officer’s rank and powers 
related to legislation, were adopted in June 2011.
The Security Plan is based on Guide YVL 6.11 
valid at the time of drawing up the plan (YVL 6.11 
is still valid). The Guide will eventually be re-
placed by Guide YVL A.11, which, once completed, 
requires also the Security Plan to be updated and 
revised. The same is true for the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT). The Security Plan took into account 
the 2009 recommendation by the international 
IPPAS expert team (described later separately) 
on increasing the level of detail in the Plan. This 
is illustrated by, among other things, the addition 
of a completely new part D (system description of 
security surveillance systems).
STUK inspected the plant’s security arrange-
ments during both annual maintenance (13 
September 2011) and plant operation (inspection 
of the periodic inspection programme, 2 November 
2011). No significant deviations were detected in 
the inspections. Measures resulting from remarks 
made in the course of inspections that preceded 
these inspections were also considered appropriate.
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Information security was also inspected be-
tween 1 and 2 February 2011 as part of the peri-
odic inspection programme. The inspection concen-
trated on the information security practices in the 
power plant and had two priorities:
•	 providing instructions for operations related 
to information security, and maintaining those 
instructions
•	 reviewing the information security lessons 
learned during the first phase of the I&C mod-
ernisation project (LARA) and taking them into 
account when operations are developed.
Progress made with respect to findings in the pre-
vious information security review in 2006 was also 
followed. A positive observation was the licensee’s 
representative’s constructive approach. It was also 
reassuring to see the attitude of representatives 
at the Group level towards finding solutions to the 
challenges in the Loviisa power plant. Development 
needs, on the other hand, were identified in risk as-
sessment in the organisation, and the ICS systems 
had a number of different development targets. 
Attention was also paid to improving training.
On 29 July 2011, STUK followed the security 
organisation’s annual refresher training on the 
use of force, which was arranged in the accommo-
dation village of the power plant. Trainers were 
officers from the Helsinki Police Department who 
are authorised under the provisions of the Decree 
1121/2010 of the Ministry of the Interior to pro-
vide use-of-force training to security guards. The 
training was arranged in line with the curriculum 
approved by the National Police Board, and it in-
cluded both theory and practical exercises.
In 2011, STUK also reviewed documentation on 
training and training programmes of the licensee’s 
security organisation. Similarly, issues related to 
security engineering, such as the construction of a 
new Central Alarm Station (CAS) and plans relat-
ed to modifications of the plant area double fence, 
have also been reviewed.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
At Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, inspections con-
ducted in 2011 included a security inspection ac-
cording to the periodic inspection programme (16 
November 2011) and an outage inspection made 
during annual maintenance (19 May 2011). These 
inspections concentrated on improvements made 
on the security of the facility as follows:
•	 on the basis of the periodic safety review (OL-
MATA) carried out in 2009, the licensee TVO 
assessed how well the requirements of Govern-
ment Decree 734/2008 concerning biological, 
chemical and electromagnetic threats were met
•	 in 2010, an extensive external review of secu-
rity issues was conducted in Olkiluoto, and on 
the basis of the review, TVO improved the secu-
rity arrangements at the Olkiluoto NPP in the 
course of 2011
•	 the extension of the spent fuel storage (KPA) 
was reviewed from the perspective of security, 
and TVO carried out some related reforms
•	 following a decision in 2011 by STUK, security 
officers started using new identifiers, which are 
associated with the uniforms and which indi-
cate rank and powers related to legislation
•	 as the construction of Olkiluoto 3 progressed, 
security arrangements were developed accord-
ingly.
An information security inspection according to 
the periodic inspection programme was conducted 
between 17 and 18 November 2011. The inspection 
concentrated on the licensee’s information security 
practices in the operating plants. The audit had 
two priorities:
•	 managing information security risks, with the 
emphasis on ICS equipment and software
•	 managing information security values/targets 
that need to be secured, with the emphasis on 
ICS equipment and software.
Progress made with respect to findings in the pre-
vious Surveillance Programme inspection in 2010 
was also followed up. A positive observation was 
that TVO has significantly improved its informa-
tion security practices related to laptop computers 
and memory devices. The inspection touched on 
the positive experiences in the previous annual 
maintenance, when the new practices were already 
in use. Development needs were identified in risk 
assessment in the organisation. The ICS systems 
had a number of different development targets as 
well. Attention was also paid to training and its 
improvement.
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Hanhikivi nuclear power plant project
In October 2011, Fennovoima Oy decided to concen-
trate its efforts on the preparation of the construc-
tion permit application solely on the Hanhikivi 
plant site, located in the Pyhäjoki municipality in 
North Ostrobothnia. Fennovoima asked STUK to 
review certain plans and documents it had pre-
pared and to provide preliminary instructions con-
cerning, among other issues, security of the plant 
and the plant site. STUK responded to the request 
with respect to the design basis requirements nec-
essary for nuclear security and other issues.
Otaniemi research reactor
STUK requested a statement from the Ministry of 
the Interior concerning the updated Security Plan 
of the FiR 1 research reactor, after which STUK 
approved the corrected Security Plan to be used 
in carrying out security measures. In addition, the 
SSO (Security Standing Order) of the reactor was 
approved by STUK to be implemented in 2011. 
Comments provided by the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Security 
have been taken into account in the approved SSO.
An external review on the structural and organ-
isational security of the research reactor was con-
ducted on 29 and 30 August 2011. The review team 
pointed out several targets for improvement in 
security management, security culture, guidelines, 
orientation and training provided to the personnel 
as well as response and structural protection.
Following Section 37 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, STUK asked the Ministry of the Interior 
to provide a statement, related to the operating 
licence application, on nuclear security and emer-
gency preparedness arrangements of the FiR 1 
research reactor. The Ministry of the Interior, for 
its part, requested the National Police Board pro-
vide a statement on the security of the plant. In its 
statement, the National Police Board was of the 
opinion that there are shortcomings in the security 
arrangements that need to be corrected immedi-
ately. In its statement issued on 13 October 2011, 
the Ministry of the Interior agreed with the state-
ment of the National Police Board. The statements 
by the Ministry of the Interior and the National 
Police Board take into account the afore-mentioned 
external review on the structural and organisa-
tional security measures at the plant.
On 25 October 2011, VTT – Technical Research 
Centre of Finland prepared an action programme 
to resolve the shortcomings identified by the re-
view team and to improve security. Urgent meas-
ures following from the action programme were 
taken during 2011, and a majority of the corrective 
measures will be carried out in 2012. Evaluation 
of the requirements concerning DBT will be con-
ducted once the DBT is completed, which is also 
estimated to take place in 2012. Urgent measures 
following the action programme were reviewed 
on 28 December 2011. At that occasion, STUK 
conducted an inspection on the security of the re-
search reactor, as provided for in Section 20 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, and did not find any obstacles 
to continue operating the plant in the operating 
licence period beginning on 1 January 2012.
Spent nuclear fuel disposal project
Posiva Oy presented STUK with a number of lay-
out plans on the construction and use of the dis-
posal facility for spent nuclear fuel and the related 
security aspects. In its safety assessment concern-
ing documentation contained in Posiva’s prelimi-
nary construction permit application, STUK also 
provided Posiva with its comments as regards to ia. 
security of the disposal facility.
Talvivaara uranium recovery project
Planning and construction of a uranium recov-
ery plant in Talvivaara began in 2011. STUK dis-
cussed matters related to security with the ap-
plicant, Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy, and the local 
police (Kainuu police department). Requirements 
concerning security of the uranium recovery plant 
were defined, employing the requirements set for 
nuclear facilities but bearing in mind that the 
plant in question is not actually a nuclear facility. 
The security arrangements at the Talvivaara site 
was inspected on-site and the necessary memoran-
dums were drawn up to facilitate its improvement.
Transport of nuclear material 
and nuclear waste
STUK ensured that transport of nuclear fuel took 
place according to approved Security Plans. STUK 
inspected an updated Security Plan for nuclear 
fuel transports by TVO; the update concerned the 
procedure of submitting information related to the 
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Security Plan to STUK. STUK inspected on-site 
the implementation of the security measures on 
one transport by Fortum and two by TVO.
Posiva informed STUK of an on-going study 
concerning the security of disposal-related trans-
ports of spent nuclear fuel. STUK discussed with 
Posiva the assessment of Security Plans of the 
transports at different phases of the disposal pro-
ject, and heard Posiva in the preparation of Design 
Basis Threat related to the transports. In its safety 
assessment concerning documentation contained 
in Posiva’s preliminary construction permit appli-
cation, STUK also provided Posiva with transport-
related comments.
STUK discussed the security requirements 
of transports of natural uranium oxide (yellow 
cake) with Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy and Cameco 
Corporation. In its statement on the permit ap-
plication by Talvivaara submitted to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy, STUK also pre-
sented its assessment on the transports of ura-
nium products.
Security regulations, their development 
and the Design Basis Threat
On 22 December 2011, the Government presented 
Parliament with a proposal concerning the amend-
ment of the Nuclear Energy Act. Finalisation 
of a proposal concerning the amendment of the 
Government Decree 734/2008 on Security in the 
Use of Nuclear Energy was, on the other hand, 
postponed until 2012.
Version L4 (Draft 4) of Guide YVL A.11 concern-
ing security at nuclear facilities was completed 
and submitted for statements to both the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Security and the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. The Ministry of the 
Interior and the National Police Board provided 
their statements concerning version L3 of the 
Guide. Version L4 of the Guide was translated into 
English.
Version L1 (Draft 1) of Guide YVL D.2 was 
completed. STUK had a meeting with representa-
tives of the police on matters related to security of 
transports of nuclear material and nuclear waste, 
including the requirements contained in the up-
coming Guide YVL D.2.
Design Basis Threat (DBT) is one of the tools 
for setting official requirements on nuclear secu-
rity. It defines the threat employed as the basis 
for planning and evaluating security. The DBT is 
based on the threat scenario of unlawful action 
related to use of nuclear energy and radiation, and 
the potential consequences of such unlawful action. 
The threat scenario has been drawn up under the 
management of the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service (SUPO) and is maintained in cooperation 
with relevant authorities. In 2009-2011, STUK 
prepared a draft DBT. During the preparation, 
STUK consulted the operators of nuclear facili-
ties and requested statements from the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Advisory Commission on 
Nuclear Security. The DBT will be approved once 
the assessment concerning its implementation is 
completed.
Emergency preparedness instructions, 
emergency response training and exercises
STUK’s emergency preparedness (or contingency) 
instructions for threat situations related to un-
lawful action were updated with the experiences 
gained from, for example, the emergency response 
training arranged in 2011 in mind. STUK dis-
cussed the contents of the emergency preparedness 
instructions, particularly those related to coopera-
tion with the police, with police representatives.
STUK arranged emergency response training 
related to security. Topics covered included the 
threat scenario of unlawful action related to the 
use of nuclear energy and radiation as well as the 
roles, responsibilities and actions of various stake-
holders in a threat situation.
In Loviisa, a cross-authority exercise called 
Moni11 took place. In the course of the exercise, 
special units from a variety of authorities practised 
the counteraction of an unlawful threat in coop-
eration with the licensee’s security organisation. 
The exercise also contained elements related to 
an insider threat. STUK participated in planning, 
organising and monitoring the exercise.
In Olkiluoto, the Olki11 rescue service exercise 
took place. It is an extensive exercise arranged eve-
ry three years, and this time it was based around 
a scenario where an accident at the plant was 
combined with unlawful action concerning security. 
In addition, one unannounced exercise on security 
was arranged outside the daily working hours.
The Nuclear Security Unit YTS participated in 
the planning and implementation of the INEX4 
(International Nuclear Emergency Exercise).
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Internal cooperation in STUK 
concerning nuclear security
STUK has a cross-department cooperation team 
on security, responsible for ensuring that in STUK, 
tasks related to nuclear security are carried out in 
close cooperation, employing the resources of dif-
ferent departments and units. In 2011, the team 
met regularly, followed the implementation of 
STUK’s security tasks and conducted internal, na-
tional and international collaborational communi-
cation. The team participated in STUK’s strategic 
work by drawing up an assessment and a plan for 
the operating programme of the next strategic pe-
riod and launched the preparation of the operating 
programme.
National and international cooperation 
for developing nuclear security
The Advisory Commission on Nuclear Security, 
appointed by the Government and functioning in 
conjunction with STUK, met three times in 2011. 
The Commission discussed, among other topics, 
the operation of the research reactor and it’s SSO 
(Security Standing Order), the draft Guide YVL 
A.11, and matters related to the DBT (Design 
Basis Threat).
A working group on competencies in the nuclear 
sector and a working group on the nuclear sector of 
the so-called NSA cooperation group, established 
by the National Security Authority (NSA), met 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy in 2011. STUK has participated 
in both working groups and acted as a secretary 
in the latter group. The NSA subgroup met seven 
times during the year, and it has contributed to 
the preparation of a cooperation agreement (MoU) 
for exchanging confidential information on new 
nuclear power plant projects between Finland and 
Japan and Finland and South Korea.
STUK participated in the national cooperation 
group for the prevention of terrorism, operating 
under the auspices of the National Police Board, 
and in the CBRNE cooperation forum of the po-
lice. STUK also participated in Satakunta Police 
Department’s OL3 project steering group in 2011.
In 2011, STUK launched tests on structural 
endurance of nuclear facilities in cooperation with 
the Defence Forces Technical Research Centre.
STUK was the Finnish representative of the Ad 
Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) of the 
Council of the European Union.
In addition, STUK participated in international 
cooperation on nuclear security in 2011 as follows:
•	 participation in ENSRA (European Nuclear Se-
curity Regulators Association)
•	 preparation of international security recom-
mendations and guides belonging to the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Series
•	 communication via IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking 
Database (ITDB) on irregularities related to 
nuclear material and other radioactive material
•	 participation, at IAEA’s request, of STUK’s ex-
perts in peer reviews of security and training 
events arranged by IAEA in other countries: in 
2011, one IPPAS mission and one DBT work-
shop
•	 preparation of a framework agreement on co-
operation in nuclear security issues between 
IAEA and STUK
•	 preparation of the nuclear security summit to 
be arranged in Korea in 2012.
Reporting related to international 
assessments of nuclear security
In 2009, Finland completed the International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mis-
sion under the management of IAEA. The objec-
tives of the mission was to obtain an independent 
evaluation of the nuclear security planning, imple-
mentation and regulatory control by comparing 
those with the Finnish requirements, international 
conventions, IAEA recommendations and guide-
lines, and internationally recognized best practices. 
STUK’s final IPPAS report, based on the recom-
mendations and suggestions of the assessment, 
was completed on 28 February 2011, and it has 
been published on the STUK website. The recom-
mendations and suggestions of the assessment 
team have mostly been completed. Measures taken 
as part of the updating process of STUK’s YVL 
Guides will be completed according to the YVL 
Guide schedule. The Ministry for Employment and 
the Economy has invited IAEA to conduct a similar 
IPPAS follow-up assessment, which will be carried 
out between 16 and 27 April 2012.
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The purpose of publicly funded safety research is 
to ascertain that the authorities have adequate 
expertise available, including a concern for un-
foreseeable issues affecting the safety of nuclear 
facilities. Safety research is divided into two re-
search programmes, of which SAFIR2014 focuses 
on nuclear power plant safety and KYT2014 on 
the comparison of different ways of implementa-
tion and methods of nuclear waste management. 
The projects under the research programmes are 
selected annually on the basis of a public call for 
projects. The projects selected for the programmes 
must be of a high scientific standard and their re-
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted by 
research institutions, universities and utilities operat-
ing nuclear power plants. In general terms, nuclear 
safety research comprises two distinct areas of re-
search: nuclear power plant safety and nuclear waste 
management safety.
The public research programmes related to nu-
clear safety operational in Finland until 2010 were 
the nuclear power plant safety research programme 
SAFIR2010 (2007–2010) and the national nuclear 
waste management research programme KYT2010 
(2006–2010). The new research programmes, which 
started at the beginning of 2011, are SAFIR2014 and 
KYT2014.
The purpose of these programmes is not only to 
provide scientific and technical results, but also to 
ensure the maintenance and development of Finnish 
expertise. Further information on the projects is avail-
able on the websites of the research programmes at 
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2010/, http://vir-
tual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2014/, http://www.ydinjate-
tutkimus.fi and http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/.
Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the parties with 
nuclear waste management obligations are unam-
biguously responsible for the design, implementation 
and cost of managing the waste they have produced, 
including the associated research and development 
work. Regarding final disposal, this research and 
development work is carried out by Posiva Oy with its 
extensive research programme.
Finnish actors contribute extensively to interna-
tional nuclear safety research within the framework 
of the following programmes and organisations: the 
European Union’s framework research programmes 
(both fission and fusion research), the Nordic NKS 
safety research programme, the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the OECD, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the UN family.
Finnish actors have also preliminarily charted 
issues related to the technology, safety and economy 
of new-generation GEN4 reactors. GEN4 research 
is financed within the four-year Sustainable Energy 
(SusEn) research programme of the Finnish Academy 
of Science and Letters, launched at the beginning of 
2008. Research into fourth-generation reactors is part 
of energy technology research.
sults must be available for publication. The results 
must have a broader scope of applicability than the 
nuclear facility of a particular licensee. Funding is 
not granted for research which is directly connect-
ed with projects licensees or parties representing 
them carry out for their own needs or for research 
which is directly provided by nuclear energy regu-
latory oversight.
STUK controls this research by contributing to 
the work of the programmes’ steering and reference 
groups. Every year, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy ascertains that the proposed 
set of projects meets the statutory requirements 
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and STUK’s research needs related to nuclear 
safety. STUK issued its statement on the projects 
under the SAFIR2014 research programme in 
January 2011, and a corresponding statement on 
the KYT2014 programme in February 2011.
In 2011, a new four-year safety research pro-
gramme, SAFIR2014, was initiated as a continu-
ation of the previous SAFIR2010 programme. The 
new programme is more extensive than the previ-
ous one due to the decisions-in-principle issued 
in the summer 2010 regarding new plant units. 
Following the decisions, funds for the research 
programme were also collected according to the 
maximum thermal power defined in the licence 
conditions for the new plant units (funding from 
the National Nuclear Waste Management Fund). 
The annual volume of the SAFIR2014 programme 
was EUR 9.6 million, of which the share of the 
National Nuclear Waste Management Fund was 
EUR 5.3 million. The project programme initiated 
at the beginning of the year provided funding for 
38 projects. The organisation providing the largest 
amount of funding was VTT whose share was EUR 
2.9 million.
The SAFIR2014 research programme is divided 
into nine competence areas, which mainly cor-
respond to the support group areas of the previ-
Figure 17. Research	areas	of	SAFIR2014	programme	
and their shares of the total funding in 2011.
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ous research programme. The new support group 
introduced at the beginning of 2011 is Support 
Group 9, Infrastructure, since the construction of 
significant arrays of test equipment is funded and 
guided at, for example, VTT and the Lappeenranta 
University of Technology. The areas of research un-
der SAFIR2014 and their shares of the total fund-
ing are shown in Figure 17.
Two new appendices to the body plan of the 
SAFIR2014 programme were prepared in the au-
tumn 2011 for the 2012 application round for 
projects. One appendix concerned the needs for 
research on social and crisis communications, and 
the other the needs to supplement the body plan of 
the programme following the experience from the 
nuclear power plant accident at the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi plant units in March 2011. The 2011 
round of applications for projects received research 
proposals complying with the latter appendix, but 
no project proposals qualifying for funding were 
received for research on social and crisis commu-
nications.
The concluding seminar of the SAFIR2010 re-
search programme was held in March 2011. The 
SAFIR2010 programme has been the largest pub-
licly funded research programme: EUR 27.5 mil-
lion, 197 person-years, 866 publications and 40 
academic degrees.
The research programme involved extensive 
development of Finnish expertise for defining the 
design basis of nuclear power plants and for pro-
ducing safety analyses, as well as for managing or-
ganisations with a high standard of safety culture 
and expert work. One topical detail is the re-
search on external threats where the potential 
impacts of climate change on the extreme 
weather conditions and sea water levels 
occurring in Finland were studied, along with the 
seismic requirements for nuclear facilities.
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Figure 18. Research areas of KYT2014 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2011.
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Safety assessment
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The new four-year research programme 
KYT2014 covering the period 2011–2014 was also 
initiated in 2011. The programme has a revised 
framework programme consisting of research sub-
jects important to national competence. The aim 
is to establish coordinated projects for the most 
salient subjects. The programme guidelines were 
updated to correspond with the new framework 
programme and practices. Furthermore, the cri-
teria for the project proposals for the research 
programme were revised, following, among other 
things, feedback from the support groups.
The KYT steering group gave its funding rec-
ommendations to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, relying on the assessments of 
support groups. In 2011, the research programme 
provided funding for 30 research projects rep-
resenting new and alternative technologies for 
nuclear waste management (3 projects) and safety 
research on nuclear waste management (27 proj-
ects). The latter category had two extensive, coor-
dinated projects: Safety Case and the performance 
of buffer and backfill materials. The other safety 
studies represented about 40% of the total volume 
of the programme. In 2011, the total funding of the 
KYT2014 programme was about EUR 2.8 million, 
of which funding from the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund makes up about EUR 1.7 mil-
lion. Figure 18 shows the relative shares of these 
areas of the total funding.
A total of 34 research project proposals were 
submitted for 2012 for the KYT2014 programme, 
and the work of evaluating them is in progress. 
The topical research subjects in line with the guid-
ance of the management group included the les-
sons learned from the Fukushima accident regard-
ing water pool storage of spent nuclear fuel, and 
crisis communications. The project proposals will 
be evaluated by applying specific criteria.
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9 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in numbers
9.1 Review of documents
In all, 3,706 documents were submitted to STUK 
for review in 2011. Of these, 1,593 concerned the 
nuclear power plant under construction, and 268 
were related to the final disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel. 3,745 document reviews were com-
pleted, including documents submitted in 2011, 
those submitted earlier and licences granted by 
Figure 20. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 21. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2.
Figure 22. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 19. Number of documents received and 
reviewed as well as average document review time.
STUK in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, which are listed in Appendix 4. The average 
document review time was 138 days. The number 
of documents and their average review times in 
2007–2011 are shown in Figure 19. Figures 20, 21 
and 22 present the distribution of document review 
times for the different plant units.
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9.2 Inspections on site and at 
suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
A total of 24 inspections at the Loviisa plant and 21 
at the Olkiluoto plant were carried out under the 
2011 periodic inspection programme. Appendix 5 
contains a summary of the contents and results of 
the periodic inspection programme. STUK carried 
out 15 inspections within the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion inspection programme (Appendix 6) and nine 
inspections within the Onkalo construction inspec-
tion programme (Appendix 7). The main findings 
of the inspections are presented in the chapters on 
regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 753 inspections on site or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2011 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the safeguards of nuclear materi-
als and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground research facility at Olkiluoto, 
which are discussed separately). An inspection 
comprises one or more partial inspections, such as 
a review of results documentation, an inspection of 
a component or a structure, a pressure or leakage 
test, a functional test or a commissioning inspec-
tion. Of the inspections, 254 were related to the 
regulatory oversight of the plant under construc-
tion and 499 to that of the plants in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 3,820. 
This number includes not only inspections pertain-
ing to the safety of nuclear power plants, but also 
those associated with nuclear waste management 
and safeguards, and audits and inspection of the 
underground research facility at Olkiluoto. In addi-
tion, a total of 251 inspection days outside normal 
working hours were spent at operating nuclear 
power plants, mostly during annual maintenance 
outages, as well as 120 inspection days at the plant 
under construction. Six resident inspectors worked 
at the Olkiluoto power plant and two resident in-
spectors at the Loviisa power plant. The numbers 
of on-site inspection days during 2007–2011 are 
shown in Figure 23.
9.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to, and not subject to, a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
consisted of the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to oversight. Those basic operations not subject 
to a charge included international and domestic 
co-operation, as well as emergency response and 
communications. Basic operations not subject to a 
charge are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-
making and support functions (administration, 
development projects in support of regulatory ac-
tivities, training, maintenance and development of 
expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2011, the total cost of the regulatory over-
Figure 23. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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sight of nuclear safety subject to a charge was 
EUR 16.5 million. The total cost of nuclear safety 
regulation was EUR 18.3 million. The share of ac-
tivities subject to a charge was 90.3%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2011 was EUR 16.5 million. Of this, EUR 2.7 mil-
lion and EUR 10.9  million came from the in-
spection and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants, respectively. In addition to 
the operating plant units, the income from the 
Olkiluoto plant includes that derived from the reg-
ulatory oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
project. The income from the regulatory oversight 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant also includes 
the costs invoiced for the work done in prepara-
tion to the regulatory oversight of the new nuclear 
power plant project. The income from the inspec-
tion and review of Posiva Oy’s operations was EUR 
2.2 million, while that from preparations for the 
regulatory oversight of Fennovoima’s NPP project 
was EUR 0.3 million. Figure 24 shows the annual 
income and costs relating to nuclear safety regula-
tion during 2007–2011.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant was 12.2 person-
years, i.e. 8.3% of the total working time of the nu-
clear regulatory personnel. For the Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant’s operating units it was 11.8 person-
years, which accounts for 7.9% of the total working 
time. In addition to the oversight of the operation 
of nuclear power plants, the figure includes nuclear 
material control. The time spent on the inspection 
and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 33.5 person-years, 
i.e. 22.6% of the total working time. Work related 
to the new power plant projects amounted to 1.4 
person-years, i.e. 1.0% of the total working time. 
The time spent on nuclear waste management 
inspection and review was 10.6 person-years. The 
time spent on international co-operation regard-
ing regulatory oversight of nuclear safety was 
5.8 person-years, and that spent on the FiR 1 re-
search reactor was 0.4 person-years. The working 
time spent on small-scale users of nuclear material 
was 0.07 person-years. The working time spent on 
follow-up and assessing the Fukushima accident at 
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department was 
about 1.1 person-years. Figure 25 shows the divi-
sion of working hours of the personnel engaged in 
nuclear safety oversight (in person-years) by sub-
ject of oversight during 2001–2011.
Where necessary, STUK commissions indepen-
dent safety analyses and research in support of 
regulatory decision making. Figures 26 and 27 
show the costs incurred for orders during 2007–
2011. The costs in 2011 were mainly related to 
assessment and inspection work concerning the 
plant unit under construction, carried out by ex-
ternal consultants, as well as to assessment work 
concerning the safety documentation for final dis-
posal of nuclear waste. Appendix 8 shows the as-
signments financed by STUK in 2011 regarding 
the safety of nuclear power plants and final dis-
posal of nuclear waste. Assessment of the safety 
documentation for final disposal of nuclear waste 
is discussed in Section 5.1.2.
The distribution of the annual working time of 
the nuclear safety regulatory personnel to different 
duty areas is shown in Table 6.
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Figure 26. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 27. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
  Technical support for regulatory decision making
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
M€
2.0
Table 6. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Basic operations subject to a charge 55.7 60.7 68.0 70.5 70.2
Basic operations not subject to a charge 6.1 6.3 6.6 7.8 8.8
Contracted services 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.7
Rule-making and support functions 30.3 31.5 33.6 38.2 43.0
Holidays and absences 19.1 21.1 23.5 24.3 24.7
Total 113.4 121.8 133.5 142.9 148.4
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10 Development of 
regulatory oversight
10.1 STUK’s own development projects
Changes in practices and the organisation 
were updated in the quality manual
A total of 22 guides were updated in the quality 
manual for nuclear safety regulation, and 32 ap-
pendices to the guides were updated. Four new 
guides were completed, together with a total of 
five appendices to different guides. The new guides 
concerned the regulatory oversight of chemistry 
at the NPPs, use of the IT system intended for 
producing electronic inspection protocols, audits of 
the providers of technical support, as well as the 
induction training for new employees. The guides 
were updated following changes in procedures as 
well as changes in the personnel of the Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation Department and the Nuclear 
Waste and Material Regulation Department.
Development project for the 
periodic inspection programme
An procedure that allows a more illustrative and 
systematic assessment of the operation of nucle-
ar power plants in relation to the requirements 
set out in the YVL Guides was developed in the 
Periodic Inspection Programme Development 
Project (KOTKA). For this purpose, the regula-
tory oversight subjects describing the operation 
of organisations as well as the criteria for assess-
ing their status were defined on the basis of YVL 
Guides. The amendments to the inspection pro-
gramme were updated in the internal quality man-
ual guides, and training sessions were organised 
for inspectors in order to familiarise them with 
the new procedure. In 2012, the inspections will be 
conducted following the new procedure.
Development of the records 
management system
The records management system introduced in 
2009 was improved further during 2011. The work-
flow associated with the records management sys-
tem, intended for improving the follow-up of un-
completed matters, did not meet STUK’s require-
ments, which is why its introduction was further 
delayed. A further development project was initi-
ated during the year for developing the records 
management of several state departments as a 
joint project on the basis of the system now in use.
Electronic inspection protocols 
were introduced
Over 10 different inspection protocol forms are 
used in nuclear safety regulation. The so-called 
TARKKA project was initiated at the beginning 
of 2009 for introducing electronic inspection pro-
tocols. The electronic inspection protocols were in-
troduced in June 2011. Their launch was delayed 
by approximately one year, as more additional 
work was required than anticipated. On the ba-
sis of feedback collected during the commissioning 
phase, a further TARKKA development project was 
initiated. It will be implemented during 2012 and 
it will improve the functionality and ease of use of 
the system.
10.2 Renewal and human resources
Training for inspectors was organised, for example, 
concerning systems of nuclear power plants and 
regulatory activities. New STUK inspectors par-
ticipated in a national training programme in the 
nuclear safety field (the YK course), which STUK 
organises together with other actors in the field. 
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The total duration of the eighth YK course was 
19 days in six periods. Three periods took place in 
spring 2011. Ten STUK employees attended the 
YK8 course. In the autumn 2011, the YK9 course 
began with eight STUK inspectors participating. 
The total number of participants in the YK9 course 
was 70.
The two-day pilot course in nuclear waste man-
agement organised in 2010 was followed in 2011 
by a national nuclear waste management course 
of more than one week’s duration, organised by 
actors in the field of nuclear waste. The course had 
23 participants. The lecturers were experts from 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
STUK, Posiva, Fortum, Fenno voima, TVO, Aalto 
University, the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at 
the University of Helsinki, and Saanio & Riekkola. 
The course concentrated on the main themes of 
nuclear waste management, covering the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle.
STUK’s inspectors also participated in train-
ing provided by external enterprises, such as lead 
auditor training, project management training and 
audit training. STUK’s inspectors also participated 
in various domestic and international training 
events in the sector, both as participants and 
lecturers. In addition, supervisors in the nuclear 
safety field participated in management and lead-
ership skills coaching programmes.
Two Master’s theses were completed at the 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department in 2011: 
‘Studying Failure Tolerance with Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment’ and ‘Prevention of Common Cause 
Failures in Nuclear Power Plant Electrical Systems 
in Case of Electrical Network Disturbances’. In ad-
dition to these, two Master’s theses were prepared 
for completion in 2012.
On average, 9.5 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation and 7.3 
days per inspector in the field of nuclear reactor 
regulation were spent on developing the expertise 
of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2011.
Four new inspectors were hired for nuclear 
reactor regulation in 2011. Their positions are in 
the regulatory oversight of nuclear fuel, radiation 
protection, information safety and operations. One 
new inspector was recruited for the regulatory 
oversight of nuclear waste management to be re-
sponsible for the performance analyses of the buf-
fer and tunnel backfill materials used in the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
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11 Emergency preparedness
In 2011, the Finnish nuclear power plants reported 
16 events of failures to the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority. The nuclear power plant control 
rooms tested regularly the secured telephone con-
nection built for emergency situations and real-
time data transfer from power plant process com-
puters to STUK’s emergency response centre.
STUK organised emergency training and exer-
cises related to nuclear power plant and radiation 
emergencies. The exercises test the operation of 
the emergency response organisation, the func-
tionality of the emergency response guidelines and 
the usability of the emergency response premises 
in practice. Functions, guidelines and tools are up-
graded on the basis of the feedback received from 
the exercises. In addition, they familiarise new per-
sonnel with their duties in the emergency response 
organisation.
An emergency exercise was conducted at the 
Olkiluoto power plant on 28 April 2011 without 
any advance notice. It began before office hours and 
lasted for about two hours. In conjunction with the 
exercise, new members of personnel were trained 
to operate as part of STUK’s on-site response team. 
In addition to STUK and the Olkiluoto power 
plant, the Satakunta Fire and Rescue Service at 
Rauma also participated in the exercise. Only a 
part of STUK’s emergency response organisation, a 
total of 24 persons, participated.
The actual weather conditions were used in the 
exercise. STUK practised the initiation of activities 
and the organisation of a status assessment group. 
In addition, the persons in charge of calculating 
dispersion of radioactive releases and the manage-
ment of the group assessing radiological conse-
quences participated in the exercise.
An emergency exercise was conducted at the 
Loviisa power plant on 26 May 2011 without any 
advance notice. It began before office hours and 
lasted for about three hours. The tests carried out 
in connection with the exercise revealed scope for 
improvement in the emergency preparedness of 
Fortum’s Support Team based in Keilaniemi. In 
addition to STUK and the Loviisa power plant, the 
Eastern Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services, the 
police and the Emergency Response Centre of the 
region participated in the exercise. Only a part of 
STUK’s emergency response organisation, a total 
of 22 persons, participated.
The actual weather conditions were used in the 
exercise. STUK practised the initiation of activities 
and the organisation of a status evaluation team. 
In addition, the persons in charge of calculating 
dispersion of radioactive releases and the manage-
ment of the group assessing radiological conse-
quences participated in the exercise.
A full-scale rescue exercise for the Olkiluoto 
power plant was conducted on 31 August 2011. It 
was a cooperation exercise for the nuclear power 
plant and the authorities, conducted every three 
years. The advance preparations for the exercise 
include double checking the action plans and train-
ing the personnel. The purpose of the exercise was 
to test and enhance cooperation between different 
authorities. This exercise also had the further pur-
pose of testing the management conditions when 
moving from a police-controlled situation to a situ-
ation controlled by rescue services. More than 30 
organisations of central, regional and local levels 
participated in the exercise, which was also at-
tended by reporters from the local media. A total of 
87 persons from STUK participated.
The other specific goals of the exercise included 
the use of the revised USVA website for conveying 
simulated measurement results of external radia-
tion dose rates. The conveyance of status reports 
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and other information using VIRVE call group was 
also tested between the head of STUK’s emergency 
management group, the head of rescue operations 
at Rauma and the on-site emergency manager of 
the Olkiluoto plant.
The actual weather conditions were used in the 
exercise. STUK produced the status assessments, 
recommendations for the protection activities re-
quired by the hypothetical situation as well as the 
press releases published in Finnish. Information 
was conveyed to relevant authorities and other ac-
tors via the protected Finri website.
On the basis of the assessment on the exercise, 
scope for improvement was identified in the main-
tenance of status information and operational re-
sponsibilities in case of a nuclear security scenario 
at the plant.
A training-type emergency exercise concerning 
a nuclear security scenario was conducted at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant in November. The par-
ticipants included representatives from the power 
plant, STUK, the police and the fire and rescue 
services.
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12 Communication
Fukushima news dominated 
nuclear safety communications
In 2011, STUK’s nuclear safety communications 
were dominated by news of the Fukushima NPP 
accident. The largest recorded earthquake in the 
history of Japan on 11 March 2011 and the result-
ing tsunami inflicted severe damage on the nuclear 
power plant in Fukushima, on the eastern coast of 
Japan.
For the first few weeks after the accident, 
STUK’s media service operated non-stop, around 
the clock. STUK and its radiation and nuclear 
safety experts had an important role as a source 
of information for the Finnish media. Hundreds of 
interviews were given to various parts of the mass 
media. STUK’s experts appeared in dozens of live 
news broadcasts and current affairs programmes.
STUK first broadcast the news about the acci-
dent on 11 March at 3:40 p.m. Finnish time in the 
Ajankohtaista ydinturvallisuudesta (Topical issues 
in nuclear safety) column of its website. In all, 55 
news items were published regarding Fukushima. 
STUK organised two Fukushima-related press 
conferences, which were broadcast live through 
the Internet. In addition, a representative of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority participat-
ed in a press conference organised by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs.
STUK kept a close eye on the events in 
Fukushima even after the situation at the plant 
had been stabilised. STUK established a dedicated 
Fukushima page on its website. The page was 
regularly updated for eight months. A total of 21 
status reports were published on the page.
In addition to reports directly related to the 
events in Fukushima, STUK published four 
news bulletins on nuclear safety issues, plus a 
total of 29 news items in its topical issues column 
Ajankohtaista ydinturvallisuudesta. Throughout 
the year, the news releases monitored the prog-
ress made in the assessments regarding the safe-
ty of Finnish nuclear facilities. The assessments 
were initiated after the Fukushima accident, and 
STUK’s national final report on the so-called stress 
tests required by the EU was completed at the end 
of the year. The report was released in a press con-
ference on 30 December. In the press conference, 
reporters were particularly interested in hearing 
what provisions Finnish NPPs have made for a loss 
of offsite power.
In March, STUK announced that WENRA had 
elected director Lasse Reiman of STUK to chair a 
working group established for the purpose of devel-
oping uniform safety requirements for European 
NPPs.
The topical issues column contained infor-
mation on faults, transients and other irregular 
events observed at the nuclear power plants. At 
the beginning of March, STUK announced in the 
column that it is in favour of granting a new op-
erating licence for VTT’s FiR 1 research reactor in 
Otaniemi, Espoo.
As the YVL Guide revision progress progressed, 
the Guides in the process of being revised were 
published in the Guide Extranet service, where 
they can be commented on while they are being 
prepared. The link to the service can be found on 
STUK’s website.
Immediately following the Fukushima accident, 
STUK organised the sixth Säteilyn salat (Secrets 
of Radiation) course aimed at the media. Twenty 
reporters attended the course. During the course, 
STUK’s experts discussed topical nuclear safety is-
sues, such as new NPP projects, nuclear waste and 
oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 construction work. The 
course included visits to the Loviisa NPP and the 
Sosnovyi Bor NPP in Russia.
Nuclear safety issues were also discussed in 
four events organised at the NPP localities. In May, 
STUK’s experts discussed the operation and safety 
at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants in 2010 
in public events organised in Loviisa and Eurajoki.
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In October, STUK invited the local media 
around the Olkiluoto region to a morning coffee 
meeting in Rauma. Six reporters attended the 
meeting and asked questions about various sub-
jects, including the I&C system of Olkiluoto 3, the 
progress of the final disposal project and the suf-
ficiency of STUK’s regulatory oversight resources.
In December, STUK’s experts also met munici-
pal decision-makers, local reporters and inhabit-
ants in Pyhäjoki to discuss the role of the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority as an overseer of nu-
clear safety in Pyhäjoki when Fennovoima starts to 
build a nuclear power plant in the locality.
During the year, STUK’s Alara magazine dealt 
with nuclear safety issues from many different 
angles. Among other things, the magazine evaluated 
the nuclear safety work done with Russia, reported 
on the progress made in revising the YVL Guides, 
described the important characteristics of a nuclear 
waste disposal site and the relevance of the Nuclear 
Waste Directive, and explained the course of events 
in Fukushima. The last issue of the year focussed 
on the theme of nuclear safety and reported on the 
qualifications and training of employees working at 
NPPs, and took a look at the plant world from the 
resident inspector’s perspective.
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13 International cooperation
International conventions
STUK’s experts presented Finland’s nation-
al report at the statutory review meeting of the 
International Nuclear Safety Convention in the 
spring of 2011. The report was well received by 
the meeting. The participants were particularly 
interested in Finland’s plans to build new nuclear 
power plants, in the flow of the licencing process 
and in the experience gained from the Olkiluoto 3 
project. The meeting found that the good practices 
observed in Finland include the provisions made 
for serious accidents, the practice of systematic im-
provements at the plants and the advanced public 
authority infrastructure. The challenges for future 
years were found to include ensuring the avail-
ability of Finnish competence, the allocation of re-
sources for the new plant projects and the revision 
of regulations.
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent 
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management requires that a report is pre-
sented every three years on how the obligations 
stated in the Convention are met. STUK was re-
sponsible for the Finnish national report, which 
was submitted to the IAEA, functioning as the 
Convention’s secretariat, according to the agreed 
schedule in October 2011. Corresponding reports 
have previously been submitted in 2003, 2005 
and 2008. The reports will be reviewed by the 
Contracting Parties at an extensive international 
conference in Vienna in the spring of 2012.
Cooperation within international 
organisations and with other countries
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established on the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves 10 coun-
tries with the objective of improving cooperation in 
the field of the assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and developing convergent regulatory prac-
tices. In addition to the USA, the following coun-
tries participate in the programme: South Africa, 
Japan, Canada, China, Korea, France, Finland, the 
United Kingdom and Russia. Participants in the 
programme include only those countries with new 
nuclear power plants at some stage of assessment 
by the regulatory authorities. The OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency functions as the secretariat for the 
programme.
The MDEP’s work is organised in Design-
Specific and Issue-Specific Working Groups. In 
addition, the MDEP has a Management Group and 
a Steering Group. STUK is represented in both 
groups. There are two Design-Specific Working 
Groups: the EPR Working Group and the AP 1000 
Working Group. Of these, Finland only participates 
in the EPR Working Group because a plant of that 
type is being built in Olkiluoto. The other coun-
tries in the EPR group include France, the USA, 
the United Kingdom, Canada and China. STUK’s 
representative chairs the EPR Working Group. The 
Working Group has four Subgroups dealing with 
plant automation, accidents and transients, severe 
accidents and probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). 
STUK’s representative chairs the PRA Subgroup. 
The EPR group’s work was originally a continu-
ation of cooperation between the Finnish and 
French authorities concerning safety assessment 
of EPR power plants.
The MDEP Programme Working Groups inde-
pendent of plant design dealt with the following 
three subjects:
•	 Inspections of plant and equipment suppliers
•	 Pressure equipment standards
•	 Programmable I&C.
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STUK participates in the activities of all three 
Issue-Specific Working Groups. The objective of the 
Working Group dealing with plant and equipment 
supplier inspections is to establish the procedures 
and requirements applied to inspections by the 
participating countries and to create the proce-
dures and goals for joint inspections. The objec-
tive of the Working Group dealing with pressure 
equipment is the harmonisation of requirements in 
different standards. The Digital Instrumentation 
and Controls Working Group aims to promote co-
ordinated development of the IEC and IEEE stan-
dards. In addition, some individual issues have 
been chosen, on which common positions have been 
drafted.
Co-operation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory 
guides on nuclear safety. STUK had a representa-
tive in both the Commission on Safety Standards 
(CSS) managing the preparation of the regulatory 
guides and in the committees dealing with the 
content of the regulatory guides, i.e. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the Waste 
Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) 
and the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC). STUK issued statements on the IAEA 
regulatory guides under preparation. STUK also 
participated in the composition of regulatory guide 
drafts in small expert groups.
The International Nuclear Safety Group 
(INSAG) is convened under the auspices of the 
IAEA at the invitation of the IAEA Director 
General with the objective of providing strategic 
opinions for the development of nuclear safety 
globally. STUK’s Director General acts as the 
deputy chairperson of the group.
STUK’s representatives participated in expert 
groups summoned by the IAEA for the purpose of 
reviewing the regulatory authorities’ operations in 
Korea, Germany and Switzerland.
The IAEA’s International Seismic Safety Center 
(ISSC) coordinates the research into safety against 
the threats posed by earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, 
volcanoes and illegal human activities. The ISSC 
also coordinates the work for preparing the IAEA’s 
related instructions. In addition, the ISSC provides 
international expert assistance for controlling the 
consequences of threatening situations. STUK’s 
representatives participated in the cooperation 
and expert meetings of the IAEA/ISSC.
STUK is the Finnish contact organisation for 
the following nuclear energy information exchange 
systems maintained by the IAEA:
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	(IRS)
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	 for	Research	Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
•	 International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES)
•	 Power	Reactor	Information	System	(PRIS)
•	 Nuclear	 Fuel	 Cycle	 Information	 System	 (NF-
CIS)
•	 Net	 Enabled	 Waste	 Management	 Database	
(NEWMDB)
•	 Directory	for	Radioactively	Contaminated	Sites	
(DRCS)
•	 Illicit	Trafficking	Database	(ITDB)
•	 Database	 on	 Events	 that	 have	 arisen	 during	
Transport of Radioactive Material (EVTRAM).
Cooperation within the EU
STUK participated in the activities of the EU 
Member States’ nuclear safety regulators’ co-oper-
ation group (ENSREG, European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group) and in two of its subgroups 
(Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Waste Management). 
The cooperation group participates in the prepa-
ration of directives pertaining to nuclear safety 
nuclear waste management and coordinates the 
implementation of directives in the Member States.
STUK participated in the nuclear safety, nu-
clear waste and decommissioning work carried 
out by WENRA (Western European Regulators’ 
Association) and its Working Groups. The groups 
have developed common safety reference levels on 
the basis of the IAEA standards, and an agreement 
regarding their implementation in all member 
countries has been concluded between the mem-
bers of WENRA. WENRA continued the earlier 
initiated work for defining the safety objectives of 
new plants and for establishing the differences and 
common features of inspection operations in dif-
ferent countries. STUK’s Director General chaired 
WENRA until November 2011. STUK’s represen-
tative was appointed chairperson of the Nuclear 
Safety Group in March 2011.
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Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for co-operation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 nuclear safety regulation (CNRA, Committee on 
Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 safety research (CSNI, Committee on the Safety 
of Nuclear Installations)
•	 radiation safety (CRPPH, Committee on Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 nuclear waste management (RWMC, Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee)
STUK participated in a meeting of the Network 
of Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS). 
The aim of the NERS cooperation is to promote co-
operation between the authorities of small nuclear 
power countries in issues typical of these countries. 
In addition to Finland, the following countries 
participate in NERS: Argentina, Belgium, South 
Africa, Holland, Pakistan, Slovakia, Switzerland 
and the Czech Republic. Finland was elected as the 
next country to chair the NERS forum.
STUK participated in the co-operation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with VVER 
power plants (such as the Loviisa NPP) via the 
VVER Forum. STUK’s representative chairs the 
Working Group considering the ways of oversee-
ing the operations of organisations. The working 
group’s theme was the assessment and oversight of 
management systems.
STUK’s representative participated in the 
Swedish supporting committee and in the Reactor 
Safety Working Group of the French nuclear safety 
authority.
STUK participated in the work of the European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association 
(ESARDA). The purpose of ESARDA is to promote 
and harmonise the European research and devel-
opment work on nuclear safeguards.
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APPENDIX 1 STUK’s safety performance 
indicators for NPPs in 2011
SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 110
Background and objectives of the indicator system 110
Results of the safety performance indicators for the nuclear power plants in 2011 111
Summary of indicator results for the Loviisa power plant 111
Summary of indicator results for the Olkiluoto power plant 112
SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 114
A.I Safety and quality culture 114
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs 114
A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the Operational Limits and Conditions 121
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems 122
A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses 125
A.I.5 Radioactive releases 128
A.I.6 Investments in facilities 131
A.II Operational events 132
A.II.1 Number of events 132
A.II.3 Risk-significance of events 134
A.II.4 Accident risk of nuclear facilities 138
A.II.5 Number of fire alarms 140
A.III Structural integrity 141
A.III.1  Fuel integrity 141
A.III.2 Primary circuit integrity 143
A.III.3 Containment integrity 147
110
STUK-B 147 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2011 APPENDIX 1
Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. The power companies and 
STUK evaluate and oversee the safety and op-
eration of the plants in many ways. Along with 
inspections and safety reviews, indicators are a 
method of acquiring information on the safety level 
of the plant and on any changes to the safety level. 
The STUK indicator system consists of two main 
groups: 1) plant safety indicators, and 2) indicators 
describing the efficiency of the authorities. This 
summary covers the indicators describing plant 
safety.
The objective of the indicator system is to rec-
ognise changes in plant safety as early as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the factors behind the 
development are investigated and changes to plant 
operation and STUK’s oversight of the area are 
considered. Indicators can also be used to monitor 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the corrective 
measures. The information yielded by the indica-
tors is also used when communicating nuclear 
safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is divid-
ed into three sectors: 1) safety and quality culture, 
2) operational events, and 3) structural integrity. 
STUK began the development of its own indicator 
system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator information 
has been managed in STUK’s INDI (INdicator 
DIsplay) information system. Nominated STUK 
representatives are responsible for the mainte-
nance and analysis of the indicators. Individual 
indicators, their maintenance procedures and the 
interpretation of results are presented at the end 
of this summary. A brief summary of the safety 
situation in each plant in 2011 is presented below, 
followed by the detailed results by indicator.
Nuclear safety
A.I Safety and quality culture A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2011
Summary of indicator results for 
the Loviisa power plant
Structural integrity
In 2011, neither plant unit reactor in Loviisa had 
any leaking fuel, meaning that fuel integrity was 
good. The low activity values of primary coolant 
during shutdown of the plant units for annual 
maintenance outages indicated the success of the 
shutdowns from the perspective of radiation pro-
tection.
The indicator system values show that both 
plant units have enjoyed good primary circuit in-
tegrity during 2011.
The indicators show that the leak-tightness of 
outer containment isolation valves has improved 
from the previous year at both Loviisa plant units. 
The indicator describing the overall as-found leak-
age of the personnel airlock, material airlock, 
emergency personnel airlock, reactor pit, inward 
relief valves, cable penetrations and bellows seals 
(RA, RL, TL23), is good at both plant units.
Radiation doses and releases
The radiation doses received by employees and the 
releases into the environment remained small and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations. 
The total time spent on annual maintenance out-
ages was short, and there were few operations of 
significance for radiation protection. Consequently, 
the total collective dose of the Loviisa power plant 
was the lowest ever in the history of the Loviisa 
NPP. The releases into the environment were 
small, well below the set limits.
Operational events at the plant
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa plant units 
during 2011. The one event classified as an op-
erational transient at Loviisa 1 was a turbine trip. 
The leaking seal in the steam generator flange 
was a significant operational event at Loviisa 1. 
The plant unit was shut down for a short out-
age to repair the seal. The operational events had 
no safety significance. The annual maintenance 
outages were so-called refuelling outages. For the 
Safety and quality culture is assessed on the 
basis of information concerning the radiation pro-
tection and the operation and maintenance of the 
plant. The operation and maintenance of the plant 
is monitored using the failure and maintenance 
data for the components with an effect on the safe 
operation of the plant, as well as by monitoring 
compliance with the operational limits and con-
ditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. When assessing the safety and qual-
ity culture, attention is also paid to investments to 
improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of the 
plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety 
of the plant, the personnel or the environment. A 
special report is required for any special situa-
tions. Correspondingly, a disturbance report must 
be prepared for any significant disturbances oc-
curring at a plant unit. Such disturbances include 
reactor and turbine trips, and other operational 
transients leading to a forced reduction of more 
than 5% in the reactor power or average gross 
power. Risk indicators are used to monitor the 
safety effect of the equipment’s unavailability pe-
riods and the development of the plant’s risk level. 
The results provide insight into the operational 
activities at the plant and the efficiency of the op-
erating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control primary and second-
ary circuit integrity. The monitoring is done by 
indices depicting water chemistry control and by 
following selected corrosive impurities and corro-
sion products. The integrity of the containment is 
monitored by testing the leak tightness of isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
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Loviisa power plant, the most significant factors 
affecting the overall accident risk include internal 
plant events during outages (such as falling heavy 
loads in the reactor hall), fire, a high level of sea-
water during power operation and oil spills during 
a refuelling outage. The annual probability of a 
severe reactor accident calculated for the Loviisa 
plant units has decreased by about 17% from the 
previous year. Several minor plant modifications 
and the improvements of computational model-
ling have contributed to the reduction of the risk. 
Loviisa power plant’s accident risk has continued 
to decrease over the last 10 years, and new risk fac-
tors discovered as the scope of the risk analysis has 
been extended, have been systematically removed. 
The functionality of safety systems is monitored 
at the Loviisa power plant on the basis of the un-
availability of the high-pressure safety injection 
system, the emergency feedwater system and the 
emergency diesel generators. The unavailability of 
the emergency make-up water system at Loviisa 
2 increased somewhat from the previous year due 
to pump motor failures and the poor availability 
of spare parts. The indicators show that the main-
tenance of and fault repairs to components impor-
tant to safety was otherwise appropriate.
There were no events classified as fires at the 
Loviisa power plant or in its immediate vicinity in 
2011. The power plant’s fire detection system had 
a similar number of faults as in the previous year. 
The average fire safety of the Loviisa plant has re-
mained at the same level.
Summary of indicator results for 
the Olkiluoto power plant
Structural integrity
The impurity and corrosion product levels in reac-
tor water and feedwater, followed in STUK’s in-
dicator scheme, were in keeping with the guide 
values set by the license holder at both plant units 
almost throughout the year. The indicators show 
that reactor circuit integrity has been good at the 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2011.
In 2011, fuel integrity was good at Olkiluoto 
1. Two fuel leaks were observed at Olkiluoto 2. A 
fuel leak was detected immediately after the 2010 
annual maintenance outage, and the leaking fuel 
assembly was removed from the reactor during 
the 2011 annual maintenance outage. The leak 
remained very small throughout this time. A new 
fuel leak was detected at Olkiluoto 2 on 5 August 
2011. The leak has remained small throughout the 
monitored period, and the leaking fuel assembly 
will be removed from the reactor during the 2012 
annual maintenance at the latest. Several fuel 
leaks have occurred in the 2000s at the Olkiluoto 
plant units, particularly at Olkiluoto 2. The main 
reason for the leaks has been small loose objects 
entering the reactor during maintenance opera-
tions. Among other things, foreign object sieves of 
a new type have been designed for the fuel assem-
blies in order to prevent loose objects from entering 
the assemblies. Fuel assemblies fitted with these 
are to be introduced in 2012.
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit was extremely 
small, clearly below the limit set in Tech Specs. 
At Olkiluoto 2, the as-found leakage of the outer 
isolation valves was also below the limit set in the 
Tech Specs and has remained approximately the 
same as before. The percentage of isolation valves 
that passed the leak tightness test at first attempt 
has remained high for both plant units. The total 
as-found leakage rate of containment penetrations, 
in which TVO includes leakages in the upper and 
lower personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome 
and the containment dome, has remained small for 
both plant units.
Radiation doses and releases
The radiation doses received by employees and the 
releases into the environment remained small and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations. 
At Olkiluoto, the radiation dose of employees was 
the lowest in the power plant’s operational history. 
The releases of substances with gamma activity 
into the sea from the Olkiluoto power plant have 
been decreasing in recent years. In 2011, the atmo-
spheric releases of radioactive substances were of 
the same magnitude as in previous years.
Operational events at the plant
For the Olkiluoto power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient). In 2011, the annual probabil-
ity of a severe reactor accident calculated for the 
Olkiluoto plant increased by approximately 30% 
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from 2010. The change was caused by supplement-
ing the model with the risks caused by an oil spill 
into the sea, as well as by an update of initiating 
event frequencies of fires and internal transients.
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant during 2011. Based on the data 
from the last 10 years, an average of one reactor 
trip per year occurs at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant.
The production losses due to failures were 
higher than in previous years. This is particularly 
due to the fact that there were three maintenance 
outages during which inspections and repairs were 
carried out. The production losses due to failures 
at Olkiluoto 1 during 2011 were mainly (>80%) 
caused by the maintenance outages in June and 
August. In June, inner parts of the primary circuit 
overpressure protection and residual heat removal 
system valves were inspected and damaged parts 
were replaced. The inspections were made fol-
lowing the observations made during the annual 
maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2. In August, the 
motor of one main circulation pump was replaced 
by an overhauled pump because the motor’s vibra-
tion levels had been increasing during the operat-
ing cycle. The inspections revealed that this was 
caused by a damaged bearing. The production 
losses due to failures at Olkiluoto 2 were mainly 
(>70%) caused by the maintenance outages in 
August, in which inner parts of the primary circuit 
overpressure protection and residual heat removal 
system valves were replaced. The damage was dis-
covered during the annual maintenance outage in 
May–June. Not all parts could be replaced at that 
time due to an insufficient inventory of spare parts. 
A root cause report was produced for this event.
Based on data from the last 10 years, the aver-
age number of annual events warranting a special 
report or a transient report is five. The number 
of events warranting a special report in 2011 (2) 
was below the average. In contrast, the number of 
events warranting a transient report (9) was above 
the average. Both special reports concerned faults 
in the emergency diesel generators. The events are 
described in greater detail in Appendix 3 to the 
report. The majority of transient reports (6 out of 
9) concern the main circulation pumps. As a rule, 
operational transients do not warrant any actions 
on STUK’s part. 
A latent fault was discovered in 2011 at 
Olkiluoto 1 in an emergency diesel generator, 
making the addition or risks due to faults in 2011 
larger than in previous years. In 2011, the un-
availability of EDGs was over four times higher 
than in 2010 because of faults detected in exhaust 
manifolds and exhaust pipes, the highest figure 
ever recorded while the parameter has been moni-
tored. However, the risk significance of events at 
the Olkiluoto plant in 2011 remained, on aver-
age, at the level of previous years. The number 
of failures occurring and preventive maintenance 
operations carried out during power operation and 
causing the unavailability of components subject to 
Technical Specifications increased somewhat from 
2010.
Fire safety has remained at the 2010 level, 
i.e. no events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto plant area (OL1/2) in 2011.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject to 
the Operational Limits and Conditions
Definition
The number of failures causing the unavailability 
of components defined in the Operational Limits 
and Conditions (OLC components) during power 
operation is monitored as an indicator. The failures 
are divided by plant unit into two groups: failures 
causing an immediate operation restriction and 
failures causing an operation restriction in connec-
tion with repair work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of the power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to assess the plant life-cycle 
management and the development of the condition 
of components.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2011, the number of failures in OLC components 
causing an operating restriction was 164, while in 
2010 it was 204. The number of failures was lower 
than the average of the four preceding years (190). 
No single significant reason can be identified for 
the decrease.
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The number of failures per year has remained 
stable. Any variation therein has been caused by 
the random occurrences of failures that occur in 
any large number of components. Failure detection 
and anticipation have been continuously improved 
in plant maintenance operations at Loviisa, and 
components have been replaced. Thanks to these 
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measures, the operability of components signifi-
cantly affecting the safe operation of the plant has 
remained well under the NPP’s control. 
Based on the above, it can be stated that the in-
dicator or the failure data behind it does not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of facilities, which is an indication of well-
functioning component life-cycle management and 
component maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of failures occurring during power 
operation and causing the unavailability of compo-
nents subject to Operational Limits and Conditions 
has been increasing since 2009. The number of 
failures occurring in 2011 was almost double com-
pared to the failures in 2009. The number of fail-
ures had decreased during the period 2007–2009. 
The number of failures indicates that maintenance 
work has been successful. 
The unavailability times of OLC components at 
OL1 were short during all quarters of 2011 except 
for the failure of a valve in the containment build-
ing gas treatment system that occurred during 
the first quarter. The failures occurring during the 
third quarter mainly concerned the seawater sys-
tem of a shut-down reactor.
At OL2, the failures during the first quarter of 
2011 mainly consisted of cases of unavailability of 
the diesel generator. The unavailability times of 
OLC components were in the main short. 
Heat exchanger washing operations increased 
the number of operation restrictions at both plant 
units.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components subject 
to the Operational Limits and Conditions
Definition
As the indicator, the number of fault repairs and 
preventive maintenance work orders for compo-
nents defined in the OLCs are followed by plant 
unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and fault repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator describes the volumes of fault re-
pairs and preventive maintenance and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. The indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy executed at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A new IT system was commissioned at the pow-
er plant in 2006. The scope of the indicator was 
changed in conjunction with the IT system revi-
sion. The annual maintenance operations also in-
cluded the work for such components covered by 
OLCs to which no operating restriction applied. 
Due to the IT system change and the extension and 
further specification of the scope of the figures, the 
maintenance figures are only fully comparable for 
the last six years. 
When considering the variation in the volume 
of fault repairs and particularly in the number of 
preventive maintenance works, the scheduling of 
various annual maintenance works (fuel replace-
ment outage, four-year annual maintenance, brief 
annual maintenance, eight-year annual mainte-
nance) included in the maintenance strategy of the 
Loviisa power plant during a four-year cycle should 
be considered as this can have a significant impact 
on the annual figures. The Loviisa plant units had 
short refuelling outages in 2011. 
Judging by the data behind the indicator, 2011 
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was markedly different from the previous years as 
concerns the number of fault repairs and amount 
of preventive maintenance. The number of mainte-
nance operations on OLC equipment reduced from 
the previous year by 19%, so that the reduction in 
preventive maintenance operations was 14%, while 
the reduction in fault repairs was 39%. Due to the 
fact that the reduction was different in the differ-
ent types of work, their ratio changed significantly 
from 4.6 in 2010 to 6.5 in 2011. 
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level. 
The decrease in the fault repairs included in the 
indicator and the ratio of preventive maintenance 
operations to fault repairs may be regarded as an 
indication of a functional maintenance strategy.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The data for the indicator is obtained from the 
plant work order system and operating documenta-
tion. Due to changes in the work order system im-
plemented by the power company from 1 January 
2006, the data is not comparable with the figures 
for earlier years. Class 3 data (systems subject 
to the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs)) 
has been removed from the work order classifica-
tion, since the Class 3 category covers all systems 
specified in the OLCs. Nowhere near all of these 
systems are subject to restrictions set out in the 
OLCs. As a result, this indicator is used to monitor 
the ratio of the number of preventive maintenance 
works causing the unavailability of components to 
the number of fault repairs.
The number of maintenance works causing 
the inoperability of components, included in the 
indicator, has been decreasing during 2006–2009 
due to the decreasing number of fault repairs. In 
2010, the number of fault repairs increased while 
the number of preventive maintenance operations 
decreased.
In 2011, the number of fault repairs causing 
unavailability increased at both plant units from 
2010. At the same time, the number of preventive 
maintenance operations increased by 30% with the 
result that the ratio of preventive maintenance 
operations to fault repairs is better than in 2010.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and 
the assessment of the work behind the figures, the 
maintenance strategy can be considered functional.
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A.I.1c Repair time for components subject 
to the Operational Limits and Conditions
Definition
As the indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the OLCs is monitored. With each repair, the 
time recorded is the time of inoperability. It is cal-
culated from the detection of the failure to the end 
of the repair work, if the failure causes an immedi-
ate operation restriction. If the component is oper-
able until the beginning of repair, only the time of 
the repair work is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and maintenance, and the operational documents 
of the power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator shows how quickly failed OLC com-
ponents are repaired in relation to the repair time 
allowed in the OLCs. The indicator is used to as-
sess the strategy, resources and effectiveness of 
plant maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The Operational Limits and Conditions define the 
maximum allowed repair times for components 
based on the components’ safety significance. 
The times vary between four hours and 21 days. 
Failures in OLC components are to be repaired 
within the allotted time without undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring 
operation restrictions and the varying allowable 
repair times, an individual operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator value even when 
it is performed within the allotted time. This as-
pect of the indicator is taken into account in the 
interpretation of the indicator by evaluating the 
significance of individual long-term failure repairs 
in terms of maintenance strategy, resources and ef-
ficiency of operations.
The average repair times for failures causing 
the unavailability of components have remained 
stable at the Loviisa plant for several years. 
However, a decreasing trend can be seen over the 
last three years in these times. In 2011, the aver-
age repair time at the plant units was 23.4 hours 
while the average for the four preceding years was 
33.0 hours. The average repair time of OLC compo-
nent failures that had an allowed repair time of 72 
hours or less was 11.1 hours at LO1 and 14.3 hours 
at LO2 in 2011.
Based on the 2011 indicators and the data be-
hind them, the plant’s maintenance operations can 
be considered appropriate. In spite of the positive 
development in repair times, attention needs to be 
paid to the power plant’s maintenance on having 
the necessary resources available for fault repairs 
and on carrying out the repairs without unneces-
sary delays.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the Operational Limits 
and Conditions. The repair time allowed in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions is usually 30 
days for faults concerning one subsystem and 
three days for faults concerning two subsystems. 
Depending on the system and the component, 
other allowed repair times may be defined in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions.
Over a longer period, the average repair time 
has varied from six to ten hours with the excep-
tion of 2007. In that year, repair times increased 
strongly for both plant units to 1.5 times the previ-
ous figure at OL1 and to more than six times the 
previous figure at OL2. For both plant units, the 
increase was due to a failure in a single device. In 
2011, the average repair time of failures causing 
the unavailability of components defined in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions was about six 
hours at OL1 and about seven hours at OL2. At 
both plant units, the average repair time of failures 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the Operational Limits and Conditions was of 
the same order of magnitude as in 2010.
On the basis of the 2011 indicators and the data 
behind them, the plant’s maintenance operations 
met the requirements.
A.I.1d Common cause failures
Definition
As the indicator, the number of common cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the OLCs 
is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the utilities of works causing an operation re-
striction.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2011, one safety-significant common cause fail-
ure was identified at the Loviisa power plant. The 
start-up problems occurring in the periodic tests 
of recombiners at the upper section of the reactor 
building were identified as such failures. Hence, 
the situation is almost as good as in previous years.
Olkiluoto
Less common cause failures were identified than 
in previous years. At Olkiluoto, six common cause 
failures important to safety were identified in 
2011. Four of these cases concerned the EDGs. The 
other two were the cracks observed in the inner 
parts of blowdown system valves and the faults in 
the speed governors of the start-up and shutdown 
piping system. The EDG system faults were the 
cracks and damage observed in the exhaust pipes, 
generator isolation faults and impurities in the 
cooling water. TVO has initiated a planning pro-
cess for replacing the EDGs.
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A.I.1g Production loss due to failures
Definition
As the indicator, the loss of power production 
caused by failures in relation to rated power (gross) 
is monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the significance of 
failures from the point of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Jouko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Production losses due to failures have been small 
at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, as is also indicated 
by the plants’ high load factors.
Loviisa
Loviisa 1 experienced higher production losses 
from component failures in the previous years. 
Most of the losses were due to a leaking steam 
generator flange. The plant was run down to a cold 
shutdown state for repairing this fault. Loviisa 
2 experienced less-than-average production losses 
from component failures.
Olkiluoto
The production losses due to failures were higher 
than in previous years. This is particularly due to 
the fact that there were three maintenance out-
ages during which inspections and repairs were 
carried out. 
The production losses due to failures at 
Olkiluoto 1 during 2011 were mainly (>80%) 
caused by the maintenance outages in June and 
August. In June, inner parts of the blowdown 
system valves were inspected and damaged parts 
were replaced. Inspections were made following 
the observations made during the annual mainte-
nance outage of Olkiluoto 2. In August, the motor 
of one main circulation pump was replaced by an 
overhauled motor because the motor’s vibration 
levels had been increasing during the operating cy-
cle. The inspections revealed that this was caused 
by a damaged bearing. The production losses due 
to failures at Olkiluoto 2 were mainly (>70%) 
caused by the maintenance outages in August, 
when inner parts of the blowdown system valves 
were replaced. The damage was discovered during 
the annual maintenance outage in May–June. All 
parts could not be replaced at that time due to an 
insufficient inventory of spare parts. 
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and Conditions
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-compliances with 
the Operational Limits and Conditions, as well as 
the number of exemptions granted by STUK, are 
monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the utilities’ activi-
ties in accordance with the OLCs: compliance with 
the OLCs and identified situations during which it 
is necessary to deviate from them; of which conclu-
sions can be made as regards the appropriateness 
of the OLCs.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Jouko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLCs exemption pro-
cedure is to enable alterations and maintenance 
promoting safety and plant availability.
Non-compliance with the OLCs refers to a situ-
ation where the plant or a system or component 
of the plant is not in a safe state as required by 
the Operational Limits and Conditions. The objec-
tive is for no events with non-compliance to the 
Operational Limits and Conditions to occur at 
the plants. The licensee always prepares a special 
report on the non-compliance and any corrective 
action, and submits it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
The Loviisa power plant applied for permissions 
from STUK for four planned deviations from the 
Operational Limits and Conditions during 2011. 
The number of applications was slightly lower 
than the average of previous years (7). The num-
ber of deviations in 2011 is at the lower limit of 
the variation range. Two of the applications were 
related to fault repairs and one to tests on the new 
emergency diesel generator. The fourth application 
was related to the periodic inspection of a chemical 
tank. STUK approved all the applications because 
the deviations had no significant safety implica-
tions for the safety of the plant or the environment.
Events non-compliant with the OLCs
In 2011, two events took place at the plant during 
which the plant was not in a state compliant with 
the Operational Limits and Conditions. One event 
was a case where the hydrogen analysis had been 
omitted, and the other related to beginning the an-
nual maintenance operations on the DC systems 
of the emergency diesel generator while the plant 
was in a state of power operation. The number of 
events is similar to that in previous years.
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Olkiluoto
Based on the results of the last 10 years, the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applies for STUK’s 
approval for non-compliance with the OLCs seven 
times per year on average. Hence, the number of 
applications in 2011 (7) was in line with the aver-
age. Five of the applications were related to modi-
fications (including replacement of the plant’s ra-
diation measurement systems) and two to periodic 
tests. The planned deviations had no significant 
safety implications, so STUK approved all the ap-
plications but imposed certain restrictions related 
to the deviations in a few of its decisions. They con-
cerned, among other things, the period of validity 
of the permission and operations during the devia-
tion. STUK also approved two applications for ex-
tending the validity period of two earlier approved 
deviations from the OLCs. TVO could not start the 
work according to the intended schedule before the 
permissions expired. In 2004 and 2005, the number 
of deviations was increased by work and installa-
tions related to the modernisation of OL1 and OL2 
and the construction of OL3. Similarly, major modi-
fications were carried out during 2010 and 2011.
Events non-compliant with the OLCs
The Olkiluoto power plant did not report any situ-
ations during the year in which the Operational 
Limits and Conditions would have been breached.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored by the plant unit. The systems 
monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant are 
the containment vessel spray system (322), the aux-
iliary feed water system (327) and the emergen-
cy diesel generators (651…656). Those followed at 
Loviisa nuclear power plant are the high-pressure 
safety injection system (TJ), auxiliary feed water 
system (RL92/93, RL94/97) and the emergency die-
sel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabil-
ity hours and its required availability hours are 
calculated as the indicator. Unavailability hours 
are the combined unavailability of redundant 
subsystems divided by the number of subsystems.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL sys-
tems. For diesels, the requirement is continuous, 
i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
Subsystem unavailability hours include the 
time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to failures. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior to 
failure detection. If a failure is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test, but to have 
escaped detection, the time between periodic tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a failure has 
occurred between tests such that its date of occur-
rence is unknown, half of the time period between 
tests is added to the unavailability time. Whenever 
the occurrence of the failure can be identified as an 
operational, maintenance, testing or other event, 
the time between the event and the fault detection 
is added to the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. Licensee representatives submit the 
necessary data to the relevant person in charge at 
STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The condition and status of safety sys-
tems and their development can be monitored by 
means of the indicator.
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Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems (TJ) of the plant 
units and their background information shows that 
the LO1 plant unit had two faults causing system 
unavailability amounting to 13.2 hours. Similarly, 
LO2 had two faults that caused 229.5 hours of 
unavailability; of this, 206.5 hours were spent in 
the inspection and complete overhaul of the mo-
tor of pump TJ11D0001 following the excess vi-
bration observed in the motor. The failures of TJ 
systems were not serious. Apart from the repair 
on TJ11D0001, the repairs were completed within 
the allowed repair times. In the case of the repair 
of TJ11D0001, the permissible three-day operation 
restriction time was deviated from by exemption 
permit 1/B42272/2011 granted by STUK.
The significant unavailability of the high pres-
sure safety injection systems was caused by a 
single fault at LO2. When that is taken into ac-
count, it can be stated that the unavailability of 
TJ systems was low in 2011, i.e. their condition 
and availability were good.
RL system
At LO1, the total unavailability time was 129.1 
hours, of which 53.8 hours were attributable to 
a single fault occurring during power operation. 
The rest of the unavailability hours at LO2 were 
caused by annual maintenance of the RL94 system 
that took 75.3 hours. 
At LO2, the total unavailability time was 74.7 
hours, which was exclusively caused by the annual 
maintenance of the RL97 system.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
systems was low in 2011, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2011, the total unavailability for all eight diesel 
generators was 474.4 hours, of which repairs made 
up 309.1 hours, and the estimated total duration of 
unavailability before detecting the faults was 165.3 
hours. There were 18 faults in all, of which seven 
caused immediate operation restrictions while 11 
caused operating restrictions from the beginning of 
the repair work. The failures detected were mainly 
caused by the normal ageing of components and 
did not have any serious implications. 
The unavailability of the emergency diesels 
(EY) increased slightly from the previous year’s 
level, but still remained low, i.e. their availability 
was satisfactory.
Unavailability of high pressure safety injection system (TJ), 
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability times of the containment spray 
system have been decreasing since 2005. In 2007, 
2008, 2010 and 2011, the unavailability was zero 
for both plant units, and almost zero in 2009.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system increased significantly after 2004, when 
the unavailability was practically zero. The in-
creased unavailability of Olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was 
due to faults in the recirculation and safety valves 
in system 327. As corrective measures, the torque 
settings of the recirculation line’s valve actuator 
motors were adjusted, and a separate safety valve 
testing line was installed for one of the lines lead-
ing to the reactor core in 2008. Testing lines were 
installed in other similar lines at OL1 and OL2 
during 2009 and 2010. No significant faults oc-
curred in 2007, 2008 or 2009, and the unavailabil-
ity of the auxiliary water system was reduced to 
zero in 2009 at both plant units. In 2010, unavail-
ability at OL1 was still zero but increased slightly 
at OL2 from the previous year, mainly as a result 
of the new faults discovered during the outage. 
In 2011, the figure for OL1 was multiplied many 
times over as the result of a latent fault in one aux-
iliary feedwater system valve that was faulty for 
504 hours. Confer with Section A.II.3.
The unavailability of the diesel generators has 
decreased since 2004, and was very low in 2006 
and 2007. In 2008, the value increased by nearly 
95% compared to the previous year. The increase 
was due to latent faults in the compressed air mo-
tors of the diesels in both plant units. In 2009, the 
unavailability of diesel engines decreased consider-
ably from the 2008 figures. In 2010, unavailability 
increased somewhat from the previous year as a 
result of failures occurring in connection with pe-
riodic tests. At OL1, the stator winding of a diesel 
generator failed in connection with a periodic test 
in August 2010, and the generator was replaced 
with an overhauled unit. The other similar genera-
tors were inspected at both plant units, and visual 
inspection did not reveal any deviations in them. 
The failed generator was sent for repairs. During 
the repairs, which lasted until early 2011, there 
were no spare generators available at either plant 
unit. In 2011, the unavailability of EDGs was over 
four times higher than in 2010, the highest figure 
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ever recorded while the parameter has been moni-
tored. The reason for the increase was the genera-
tor fault discussed above, which may have lasted 
as long as from August 2010 to May 2011. In ad-
dition, there were faults in exhaust manifolds and 
exhaust pipes.
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A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure by 
plant site and plant unit is monitored, as well as 
the average of the 10 highest yearly radiation ex-
posures.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure is ob-
tained from quarterly and annual reports. The 
data on individual radiation doses is obtained from 
the national dose register.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. In addition, compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculated threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive 
years is followed. The threshold value, 2.5 manSv 
per one gigawatt of net electrical power, means a 
radiation dose of 1.22 manSv for one Loviisa plant 
unit and 2.15 manSv for one Olkiluoto plant unit. 
The collective radiation doses describe the success 
of the plant’s ALARA programme. The average of 
the 10 highest doses indicates how close to the 
20  manSv dose limit the individual occupational 
doses at the plants are, at the same time indicating 
the effectiveness of the plant’s radiation protection 
unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Antti Tynkkynen
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protec-
tion affect the yearly radiation doses. Both Loviisa 
plant units have more extensive annual outages 
every four and eight years (the four-year annual 
maintenance and the eight-year annual mainte-
nance) so that both plant units never have a major 
annual maintenance outage in the same year. The 
four-year and eight-year outages have been held 
in even years and normal annual outages in odd 
years. The effect of annual outages on collective 
doses can be seen on the Collective radiation dose, 
Loviisa graph. In 2011, the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant 
units had refuelling outages. The time used for 
annual maintenance outages was short, and there 
were few operations of significance for radiation 
protection, which resulted in the total collective 
dose of the Loviisa power plant being the lowest 
ever in the history of the Loviisa NPP. The previ-
ous lowest collective dose ever was recorded in 
2007.
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The radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers were below the individual dose limits. In 
2011, the average of the 10 highest radiation doses 
was the lowest ever recorded at the Loviisa power 
plant. The trend of the 10 highest radiation doses 
has been a declining one with the exception of 2010 
when the individual doses were higher due to the 
extensive eight-year maintenance. The Radiation 
Decree (1512/1991) stipulates that the effective 
dose for a worker from radiation work must not 
exceed the 20 manSv/year average over any period 
of five years, or 50 manSv in any one year.
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Furthermore, the threshold set for the collective 
occupational dose was not exceeded in 2011. If, at 
one plant unit, the collective occupational radiation 
dose average over two successive years exceeds 2.5 
manSv per one GW of net electrical power, the util-
ity is to report the causes of this to STUK, and any 
measures possibly required to improve radiation 
safety (Guide YVL 7.9).
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protec-
tion affect the yearly radiation doses. The annual 
outages for the Olkiluoto power plant units are 
divided into two groups: the refuelling outages and 
the maintenance outages. The refuelling outage is 
shorter in duration (approx. 7 days). The length of 
the maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are scheduled so 
that in the same year, one plant unit has a mainte-
nance outage and the other a refuelling outage. In 
2011, the collective radiation dose at the Olkiluoto 
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity 
averaged over two succesive years,
Olkiluoto NPP
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power plant was the fourth-lowest recorded during 
the plant’s history, in spite of the maintenance out-
age of Olkiluoto 2 that was extensive both in terms 
of the personnel involved and the amount of work 
carried out. The lowest-ever collective radiation 
dose was recorded at the power plant in 2010. The 
new steam dryers installed at the plant units in 
2005–2006 have reduced the radiation levels and 
collective doses at the turbine plant.
In 2011, the average of the 10 highest radia-
tion doses was lower than average. The prescribed 
dose limits (Radiation Decree 1512/1991) were not 
exceeded.
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A.I.5 Radioactive releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the atmosphere (TBq) from the plant are moni-
tored, as well as the calculated dose due to releases 
to the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the utili-
ties’ quarterly and annual reports. From this data, 
the calculated radiation dose for the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the plant is defined.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and to assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Antti Tynkkynen
A.I.5a Releases into the atmosphere
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2011, the radioactive releases into the atmo-
sphere from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants were of the same magnitude as in 
previous years. The releases into the environment 
were small, well below the set limits.
The releases of noble gases and particulate 
aerosols from the Loviisa power plant were of the 
same magnitude as in previous years. The releases 
of iodine isotopes decreased markedly and were at 
the 2007 level. The iodine releases from the Loviisa 
power plant were larger than average during 
2009–2010 as a result of small fuel leaks.
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Of the releases from the Olkiluoto power plant, 
the atmospheric releases of noble gases were larger 
in 2011 than in previous years, while the iodine 
releases were smaller than in 2010. The noble gas 
and iodine releases were affected by the fuel leaks 
occurring at the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit in 2011. The 
atmospheric releases of particulate aerosols were 
smaller than previously.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, from 
the minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication, 
and from reactor surface contamination from ear-
lier fuel leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, there 
have been very few leaking fuel rods and the leaks 
have been small. One fuel rod leak was detected at 
the Loviisa 2 plant unit during the refuelling cycle 
of 2008–2009 and one at the Loviisa 1 plant unit 
during the refuelling cycle of 2009–2010. The leak-
ing assemblies were replaced with fresh assem-
blies during the annual maintenance outages of 
the plant units. Both plant units at Olkiluoto also 
had a leak in one fuel assembly each before the 
annual maintenance outages in 2010, plus a leak 
in a fuel assembly at Olkiluoto 2 plant unit dur-
ing the refuelling cycle of 2010–2011. The leaking 
assemblies were removed from the reactors dur-
ing the annual maintenance outages of the plant 
units. Furthermore, a new fuel leak was detected 
at the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit immediately after the 
2011 annual maintenance. The indicator A.III.1 
describes fuel integrity. The noble gas releases 
from the Loviisa plant are dominated by argon-41, 
an activation product of argon-40, found in the air-
space between the reactor pressure vessel and the 
main radiation shield. Aerosol nuclides (including 
activated corrosion products) are released during 
maintenance work.
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A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Releases of radioactive substances emitting 
gamma radiation into the environment from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
clearly below the set limits. During 2001, 2004 and 
2009, the Loviisa power plant discharged low-ac-
tivity evaporation residues into the sea as planned. 
Consequently, the releases of substances with 
gamma activity were larger than average in those 
years. The releases of substances with gamma ac-
tivity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased in 
recent years.
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A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2011, the doses of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity, calculated on the basis of releases 
from the plant, were below the set limit both at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto. At Loviisa, the dose of the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity was lower 
than average, while at Olkiluoto, it was the lowest 
ever recorded in the plant’s history. As a result of 
the planned release of low-level evaporation waste 
to the sea at Loviisa, the dose of the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the Loviisa power plant 
was higher than usual in 2009.
For both plants, the calculated doses of the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity were less than 
0.1% of the 100-microsievert limit established in 
the Government Decree (733/2008).
STUK-B 147
131
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2011
A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
Investments in plant maintenance and modifica-
tions in the current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
The indicator demonstrates the relative fluc-
tuation of investments. The amounts given in euro 
are the confidential information of the utilities in-
volved, and not to be published here. Furthermore, 
the scales of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power 
plants’ investment and modernisation diagrams 
are not mutually comparable.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctua-
tions.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa
Interpretation of the indicator
The variation in the indicator distinctly shows the 
investments related to the power upgrades and 
modernisation projects of the plants. Both plants 
have paid great attention to life-cycle management, 
which also shows as continuous long-term invest-
ment plans. The renewal of the operation permit of 
the Loviisa plant in 2007 and the intermediate as-
sessment carried out at Olkiluoto in 2008 have also 
had an effect on the investment plans.
Loviisa
The increase in investments, starting from 2007, 
is caused by the modernisation of I&C systems 
at Loviisa. Other major investments in 2011 in-
cluded the construction of a new diesel emergency 
power plant, extension of the repository for low- 
and intermediate-level waste, modification of the 
pressure equalisation system, replacement of the 
service water system pipelines, construction of a 
new training simulator and the replacement of 
safety valves in the fresh steam pipelines. Many 
modification projects span over many years, which 
means that their total cost is also divided between 
several years.
Olkiluoto
The major modifications, mainly implemented 
during the 2010 annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 and the 2011 annual maintenance out-
age of Olkiluoto 2, show in the investment figures 
for 2010 and 2011. These modifications included 
the replacement of inner isolation valves of the 
seawater pipes, the replacement of low-pressure 
turbines and the replacement of main seawater 
pumps.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicators, the numbers of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are monitored. 
(Events warranting a special report, reactor trips 
and reports on operational events.)
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from STUK’s 
document administration system.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Jouko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa power 
plant. The previous occurrences of reactor trips 
were in 2004 and 2010. The total number of reac-
tor trips has remained small. There have been two 
during the last 10 years.
Based on data from the last 10 years, the aver-
age number of annual events warranting a special 
report or a transient report is three per year, while 
the average number of events warranting a tran-
sient report is seven per year. In 2011, there were 
fewer of both types of reportable events than in 
previous years.
One operational transient occurred in 2011. 
This was a turbine trip that occurred in connection 
with a planned ramp-down of power at the Loviisa 
1 unit, carried out to allow maintenance work on 
the control rod mechanism.
The licensee reported two special situations. 
One was a case of the equipment not being in a 
condition compliant with the Operational Limits 
and Conditions. In the other event, the operations 
were not compliant with the requirements of the 
Operational Limits and Conditions regarding pri-
mary circuit water sampling.
The indicator shows that the plant’s operations 
have continued to be of a good standard. 
When considering the indicators, it must be 
noted that the number of reports does not give 
the correct conception of the division of events by 
plant unit, since, for system technical reasons, the 
reports for both plant units have been entered for 
Loviisa 1.
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Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. Based on the data from the last 10 
years, an average of one reactor trip per year oc-
curs at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. During 
the previous decade (1993–2001), an average of 
almost three to four reactor trips occurred per year. 
The figure is explained by the fact that it also in-
cludes reactor trips during annual maintenance 
outages that occurred, for example, in connection 
with testing the reactor protection system.
Based on data from the last 10 years, the aver-
age number of annual events warranting a special 
report or a transient report is five. The number 
of events warranting a special report in 2011 (2) 
was below the average. In contrast, the number of 
events warranting a transient report (9) was above 
the average. Both special reports concerned faults 
in the emergency diesel generators. The events 
are described in closer detail in Appendix 3 to the 
report. The majority of transient reports (6 out of 
9) concern the main circulation pumps. Of these, 
three reports deal with the planned control of one 
main circulation pump at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2 to lower revs due to a transient in the external 
electricity grid. One report deals with the control 
of one circulation pump at Olkiluoto 1 to lower 
revs, caused by a damaged bearing in the pump 
motor. The motor was replaced during a main-
tenance outage (Section 4.2.2). Two reports deal 
with the stoppages of one main circulation pump 
at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. As a rectifying ac-
tion, TVO replaced parts of the frequency convert-
ers and sent them to the equipment manufacturer 
for investigation. The investigations regarding the 
cause of the fault are in progress. STUK has sent 
TVO a letter requesting it to submit the results 
for information to STUK before the 2012 annual 
maintenance outages. The other transient reports 
concern the errors detected during the testing of 
the new main generator of Olkiluoto 2 and its volt-
age regulator (wrong setting of the voltage regula-
tor, error in planning the tests) and the closure of 
the inner isolation valve of one main steam line at 
Olkiluoto 2 during the operating cycle. The 
valve closed because the contact breaker of its 
control valve opened for an unknown reason. One 
of the most significant events during the year was 
the discovery of damage in the blowdown system 
valves at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The event 
is not included in these indicators because a root 
cause report was produced for the event.
When considering the indicators, it must be 
noted that the number of reports does not give 
the correct conception of the division of events by 
plant unit, since, for system technical reasons, the 
reports for both plant units have been entered for 
Olkiluoto 1. In 2011, one event warranting a tran-
sient report and three warranting a special report 
concerned both plant units.
Number of Special Reports, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 4 7 2 3 4 3 6 4 2 2
 3 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 0
Number of operational transient reports, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0
2
4
6
8
10
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 3 0 3 5 3 1 3 2 2 5
 2 8 3 1 1 2 2 3 0 4
Number of reactor scrams, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0
1
2
3
4
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0
134
STUK-B 147 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2011 APPENDIX 1
A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicators, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is moni-
tored. As the measure of risk, an increase in the 
Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) as-
sociated with each event is employed. CCDP takes 
the duration of each event into consideration. 
Events are divided into three categories: 1)  un-
availability due to component failures, 2) planned 
unavailability, and 3)  initiating events. In addi-
tion, events are grouped into three categories ac-
cording to their risk-significance (CCDP): the 
most risk-significant events (CCDP>1E-7), other 
significant events (1E-8≤CCDP<1E-7) and other 
events (CCDP<1E-8). The indicator is the number 
of events in each category.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. Possible non-compliances with the OLCs are in 
category 1, if they can be utilised for this indica-
tor. Non-compliances with the OLCs are also dealt 
with under indicator A.I.2.
N.B.! The calculations concerning the Olkiluoto 
plant were performed using FinPSA software 
and those concerning the Loviisa plant us-
ing RiskSpectrum software. Calculations for the 
Loviisa plant regarding simultaneous multiple 
failures are only based on the power operation 
model, making them indicative only. All states (17 
of them) could be modelled, but the calculation 
time would be too long compared to the benefits.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators is col-
lected from utility reports and applications for ex-
emptions.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
CCFs, simultaneously occurring failures and hu-
man errors. Another objective of the event analysis 
is to identify systematically signs of a deteriorating 
organisational and safety culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) 
(failure data)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risk is given below:
Loviisa 1:
1. On 22 January 2011, the replacement of con-
necting rod bearings of diesel EY01. Accord-
ing to information received from the supplier, 
the bearing in the diesel was from an obso-
lete batch. Unavailability lasted for 123.5 h. 
CCDP: 1.20 E-7. During the replacement work, 
valve VF62S006, pump TF12D001 and valve 
RA54S003 were also broken (part of the time). 
If these faults are taken into account, we obtain 
3.1E-7 for the CCDP of the entire fault complex.
2. On 8 November 2011, valve VC10S0001 stoped 
in an intermediate position when it was being 
closed. Seawater is discharged from VF 70/21 to 
VC through this valve. Unavailability lasted 7.7 
h. CCDP: 2.55E-7.
3. On 24 November 2011, a bellow was torn in 
the suction line of blower UV20D0001, and the 
blower was rotating in the wrong direction. Un-
availability lasted 128.8 h. CCDP: 4.6E-7.
Loviisa 2:
1. On 7 February 2011, the temperature regulator 
of inlet air heating element UV40W0001 was 
repaired and checked. Unavailability lasted 241 
h. CCDP: 8.8E-7. During the fault, EY02S0204 
was also broken (leaked diesel fuel) for 77.5 
hours. Combined CCDP: 9.6E-7.
2. On 10 March 2011, leaky diesel fuel valves 
EY02S0201, 202 and 203 were repaired. The 
day-tank for diesel fuel could not be filled while 
the work was in progress. Unavailability lasted 
223.6 h. CCDP: 2.8E-7. 
3. On 29 August 2012, start-up air valve EY01S014 
of diesel EY01 was repaired. Unavailability 
lasted 339.9 h. CCDP: 3.3E-7.
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Most risk-significant events
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The analysed events are considered to be part of 
normal nuclear power plant operation, and no fur-
ther measures were required from STUK.
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Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7 
Olkiluoto 1 (total number of events)
0
1
2
3
4
5
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0 1 0 0 0
 2 2 1 1 0
 1 1 0 2 2
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Other significant events
1E-8 ≤ CCDP < 1E-7 
Olkiluoto 1 (total number of events)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0 0 0 0 0
 4 10 6 3 5
 9 0 4 9 5
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Other events CCDP < 1E-8 
Olkiluoto 1 (total number of events)
0
20
40
60
80
100
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0 0 0 0 0
 42 27 20 20 10
 49 23 36 29 33
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7 
Olkiluoto 2 (total number of events)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 3 1 0 1 0
 2 0 2 2 2
 0 1 1 2 0
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Other significant events
1E-8 ≤ CCDP < 1E-7 
Olkiluoto 2 (total number of events)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0 0 0 0 0
 6 3 5 3 5
 5 0 0 6 10
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Other events CCDP < 1E-8 
Olkiluoto 2 (total number of events)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0 0 0 0 0
 70 17 26 21 14
 37 17 16 28 23
Initiating events
 Planned 
unavailabilities
Component failures
Olkiluoto
A brief description of the significant events is given 
below:
Olkiluoto 1:
1. On 5 May 2011, the exciter of diesel gen-
erator 653G401 was repaired. The fault had 
demonstrated itself when the switch-over and 
re-switching automation of the 660 V emer-
gency power supply was tested during an-
nual maintenance R111. The generator switch 
tripped with overvoltage. TVO identified the 
fault in a thyristor that did not respond to 
controls. The fault would not have been found 
in normal monthly tests, which means that 
it could have been latent since the previous 
time of operation (since 18 August 2010). If 
3120 h is taken as the value for unavail-
ability, CCDP is 1.65E-6. This also takes into 
account other faults (327V107, 323P004, 612 
T291, 322V436, 653G101, 322V301, 351P001, 
653G301, 327P002, 327P004, 321V305, 
351P002, 712P003, 327P001, 327P003, 721P001, 
721P003, 721P004, 324P001, 721P002) occur-
ring during the time the EDG was faulty.
2. On 18 January 2011, valve 327V107 was re-
paired. This was a motor-actuated valve in the 
bypass line. The valve did not close automati-
cally or when controlled from the MI unit. This 
was a latent fault with an unavailability time 
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
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of 504 h, yielding 4.3E-7 as the value of CCDP 
when the fact was also taken into account that 
653G401 was also faulty at that time (without 
the diesel vault, the CCDP would be 3.5E-7).
Olkiluoto 2:
1. Diesel package Dip-D lasted for 102 h (17 Jan 
2012 4:03 hrs – 21 Jan 2012 9:55 hrs). CCDP: 
1.2E-7.
2. Diesel package Dip-B lasted for 156 h (11 Apr 
2012 4:02 hrs – 17 Apr 2012 15:42 hrs). CCDP: 
1.4E-7.
OL1 case 1 led to additional investigations because 
it involved a diesel fault that was not discovered in 
normal tests. The other Olkiluoto events are con-
sidered to be part of normal nuclear power plant 
operation, and they did not give rise to any further 
measures by STUK.
The combined total CCDP of all three cat-
egories divided by the probability of a severe ac-
cident gives an overview of the risk-significance 
of operational events. To facilitate analysis, risk 
calculation is based on conservative assumptions 
and simplifications, which materially weakens the 
applicability of the results for trend monitoring. 
If the risk-significance remains on average at the 
same level year after year, the annual fluctuation 
does not warrant particular attention.
In 2011, the risk arising from operational activi-
ties reduced slightly at the Loviisa plant compared 
to previous years. At Olkiluoto (OL1), the fault de-
tected in the 2010 outage tests in the pilot valves of 
the pressure reduction system 314 causes alone an 
increase of 160% in the risk during the operational 
cycle of 2009–2010. Such events, causing a major 
increase in the risk, will inevitably occur from time 
to time. However, they are rare because, roughly 
speaking, the design principles of nuclear power 
plants dictate that the probability of events must 
be smaller, the bigger the risk increase they cause. 
The pilot valve fault could possibly have prevented 
the 314 main valves from closing, which would 
have caused a serious cooling transient in the pri-
mary circuit. In addition, the probability of a major 
coolant leak was considerably increased, because 
the normal operation of overpressure protection 
would have caused a major coolant leak that was 
clearly more probable than usual. The event was 
discovered during outage tests, which is probably 
why the major risk increase caused by it was inad-
vertently ignored when first analysing the events 
in 2010, and it was not included in the report for 
2010. Of course, the seriousness of the event was 
well understood, and it gave rise to many actions, 
both at STUK and TVO. Leaving this one serious 
event aside, the results of Olkiluoto have remained 
roughly at the same level as in previous years. 
The latent fault of diesel generator 653G401, pres-
ent throughout the operating cycle of 2010–2011, 
slightly increases the result of OL1.
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A.II.4 Accident risk of nuclear facilities
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is followed. The accident risk is 
presented per nuclear power plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilis-
tic risk analyses (PRA/PSA) of the nuclear power 
plants. The risk analysis is based on detailed calcu-
lation models, continuously developed and comple-
mented. A total of 200 man-years have been used 
at Finnish nuclear power plants to develop the 
models. As the basic data of the risk analyses, the 
globally collected reliability information of compo-
nents and operator activities, as well as the oper-
ating experience from Finnish power plants, are 
used.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the nuclear power 
plant so that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Risk analyses can help detect a need 
to make modifications to the plant or change oper-
ating methods.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (failure data)
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, it must be remem-
bered that it is affected by both the development 
of the power plant and the development of the 
calculation model. Plant modifications and changes 
in methods, carried out to remove risk factors, will 
decrease the indicator value. An increase in the 
indicator value may be due to the model being 
extended to new event groups, or the identification 
of new risk factors. In addition, developing more 
detailed models or obtaining more detailed basic 
data may change risk estimates in either direction. 
For example, the increase in the Loviisa indicator 
in 2003 was due to the analysis being extended to 
cover exceptionally harsh weather conditions and 
oil accidents at sea during a refuelling outage. In 
the following year, the indicator value decreased, 
partly as a result of a more detailed analysis of 
these factors.
Loviisa power plant’s accident risk has contin-
ued to decrease over the last 10 years, and new 
risk factors discovered as the scope of the risk 
analysis has been extended, have been efficiently 
removed. The indicator decreased in 2007 due to 
the new seawater line completed during the period. 
The new line allows for the alternative intake of 
seawater from the outlet channel to cool the plant 
in shutdown operation. The change will decrease 
risks in situations where algae, frazil ice or an 
oil release endanger the availability of seawater 
through the conventional route. The decrease of 
the indicator in 2008 results from more detailed 
analyses performed in conjunction with the re-
newal of the operating licence, as well as changes 
at the plant planned to be carried out earlier or in 
connection with the licence renewal. Such changes 
include: the I&C renewal LARA; the decrease in 
the probability of a criticality accident using, for 
example, boron analysers; modernisation of the 
refuelling machine and the decrease in the prob-
ability of an external leak.
Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
for Loviisa plant units during 2002–2011
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Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
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For the Loviisa power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal plant events during outages (such as the 
falling of heavy loads or a power surge caused by 
the sudden dilution of the boron used to adjust 
reactor operation), fire, a high level of seawater 
during power operation and oil releases during a 
refuelling outage.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Loviisa plant units was 
approximately 4.3 × 10-5 in 2011. The value has 
decreased by about 17% from the previous year. 
Several minor plant modifications and the im-
provements of the PRA model have contributed to 
the reduction of the risk. The PRA modifications 
carried out in 2011 concerned, among other things, 
the modelling of replaced sump screen meshes in 
the recirculation pipes of emergency cooling water, 
new procedures for recovering the 400 kV main 
transformer in cold shutdown states, replacement 
of the old gas turbines in Hästholmen with a new 
diesel emergency power plant (EY07) and replace-
ment of the EDG relays (P8 relays). For the backup 
system for residual heat removal, the introduc-
tion of own operating experience data and further 
specified assessment of human errors reduced the 
estimated unavailability of the system. In addition, 
the assessed seismic risk has decreased when the 
analysis has been updated and the susceptibil-
ity of components to seismic damage has been re-
assessed using up-to-date computational methods.
The indicator for the Olkiluoto plant decreased 
approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previ-
ous years’ relatively stable value. The decrease 
was mainly due to the more detailed modelling of 
earthquake events and the plant changes carried 
out to improve seismic qualification. The increase 
in 2009 was due to the fact that the heat exchanger 
of the screening system cannot be used for residual 
heat removal after all, contrary to earlier assess-
ments. For the Olkiluoto power plant, the most im-
portant factors affecting the overall accident risk 
include internal events during power operation 
(component failures and pipe ruptures leading to 
an operational transient).
In 2011, the annual probability of a severe re-
actor accident calculated for the Olkiluoto plant 
was 1.33 × 10-5. The increase of approximately 30% 
from 2010 is caused by supplementing the model 
with the risks caused by an oil spill in the sea, as 
well as by an update of initiating event frequencies 
of fires and internal transients.
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Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As the indicators, the number of fire alarms and 
actual fires are followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Civil Engineering and Fire Protection (RAK)
Pekka Välikangas
Interpretation of the indicator
There were no events classified as fires at the 
Loviisa power plant or outside the plant area in 
2011. The fire detection system faults occurring at 
the Loviisa power plant remained in 2011 at the 
same level as in 2010. The actual alarms given by 
the detectors at the Loviisa 1 plant unit remained 
in 2011 at the same level as in 2010, while they de-
creased slightly from the 2010 level at the Loviisa 
2 plant unit.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto plant area (OL1/2) in 2011. Eight events 
classified as fires occurred outside the plant area, 
seven of them at the OL3 NPP unit site (a substa-
tion located outside in a container burned, there 
were cases of insulation panels catching fire, a 
heater burned, cables on the outside of the build-
ing burned), in addition to which, a chip crusher 
was generating smoke at the landfill site. The fire 
events were of a minor nature. No fire detection 
system failures were observed at the Olkiluoto 
power plant (OL1/2) in 2010. The situation was the 
same in 2011. The number of actual fire alarms 
was of the same order in 2011 as in 2010.
The automatic fire detectors were upgraded at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2000 and at Olkiluoto 
in 2001. The number of alarms increased at both 
units after that because of the more sensitive 
detectors. The distinct reduction in alarms at the 
Loviisa plant since 2003 and at the Olkiluoto plant 
since 2004 is due to pre-alarms no longer being 
included in the calculations.
On average, fire safety at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plants has remained at the earlier level, 
as no events classified as fires have occurred. 
Alarms from the fire alarm system have also been 
at a relatively low level. Most of the alarms were 
caused by dust, smoke or humidity. Fire alarm sys-
tems are not always disconnected in a wide enough 
area for maintenance work. The number of alarms 
from the fire alarm system is also affected by the 
amount of maintenance and repair work performed 
at the plants.
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A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1  Fuel integrity
Definition
As the indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (start-up operation or power opera-
tion for Loviisa and power operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
in conjunction with shutdowns or reactor trips, 
as well as the number of leaking fuel bundles re-
moved from the reactor, are also followed as indica-
tors.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available in 
the quarterly reports submitted by the utilities.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the operating cycle. The in-
dicators for the shutdown situations also describe 
the success of the shutdown concerning radiation 
protection.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Kirsti Tossavainen
A.III.1a Primary coolant activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2011, neither plant unit reactor at Loviisa had 
any leaking fuel. A leaking fuel assembly was last 
removed from the reactor of Loviisa 1 in 2010 and 
from the reactor of Loviisa 2 in 2009. The fuel 
leak at Loviisa 1 had been so small that the re-
moval of the leaking fuel assembly did not affect 
the I-131 activity content of primary coolant. The 
I-131 activity content of primary coolant at Loviisa 
2 has clearly decreased following the removal of 
the leaking fuel assembly. In 2009, the I-131 activ-
ity content of primary coolant at Loviisa 2 briefly 
exceeded the OLC limit value (see STUK-B 118). In 
2011, the maximum values of I-131 activity content 
related to shutdowns occurred during shutdowns 
for annual maintenance outages. After removal of 
the leaking fuel assemblies, the maximum activity 
values related to shutdowns also returned to the 
level before the leaks.
In 2011, fuel integrity at both Loviisa plant 
units was good.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The reactor of Olkiluoto 1 did not have leaking 
fuel in 2011, whereas the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 
had leaking fuel almost throughout the year. A 
fuel leak was detected at the plant unit immedi-
ately after the 2010 annual maintenance outage. 
The leak remained very small, and the leaking 
assembly was removed from the reactor during the 
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 4.71E+02 4.32E+02 5.01E+02 3.89E+02 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02 3.80+02 3.90E+02
 5.74E+02 3.22E+02 3.39E+02 2.91E+02 2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04 1.20+03 8.50E+02
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 5.70E+02 1.40E+02 4.80E+02 5.60E+04 6.70E+02
 4.40E+02 4.30E+02 6.40E+06 4.10E+02 1.40E+03
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 3.00E+03 2.30E+03 2.10E+03 2.20E+03 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03 4.97E+04 1.49E+03
9.30E+02 6.00E+02 5.80E+02 5.90E+02 5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85E+06 3.20E+03 6.64E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 2.2 MBq/l
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Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 2.90E+02 4.30E+02 1.90E+02 5.90E+01 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01 3.12E+04 1.40E+02
2.37E+03 9.10E+01 3.12E+03 6.52E+03 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02 2.01+04 4.84E+03
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.03E+04 0.00E+00
 3.70E+04 2.52E+02 0.00E+00 1.61E+05 3.93E+03
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2.00E+02 4.30E+02 8.20E+01 5.80E+01 2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01 2.45E+03 5.50E+01
1.50E+03 9.00E+01 1.49E+03 4.00E+03 4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01 1.87E+03 1.46E+03
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
In 2011, the reactor of Olkiluoto 1 had no leaking 
fuel. A leaking fuel assembly was removed from 
the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 during the annual main-
tenance outage. It had been leaking since 2010. Yet 
another fuel leak was detected at Olkiluoto 2 in 
August. The leaking fuel assembly will be removed 
from the reactor in the 2012 annual maintenance 
at the latest.
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
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Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
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 LO2
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
2011 annual maintenance outage. A new fuel leak 
was detected at Olkiluoto 2 on 5 August 2011. The 
leak has remained small throughout the reported 
period. The leaking fuel assembly will be removed 
from the reactor during the 2012 annual mainte-
nance outage at the latest. The maximum I-131 ac-
tivity content during shutdown at Olkiluoto 2 was 
measured in a situation where the plant unit was 
shut down for a generator maintenance outage. At 
Olkiluoto 1, the shutdown did not affect the I-131 
activity content.
In 2011, fuel integrity was good at Olkiluoto 1. 
The fuel integrity of Olkiluoto 2 was weakened by 
minor fuel leaks.
Several fuel leaks have occurred in the 2000s at 
the Olkiluoto plant units, particularly at Olkiluoto 
2. The main reason for the leaks has been small 
loose objects, such as metal chippings, entering the 
reactor during maintenance operations, which can 
get caught in the fuel assembly structures. The 
coolant flow may make the loose objects vibrate 
and break the fuel cladding. In addition to enhanc-
ing administrative procedures, technical solutions 
are also being sought to eliminate the problem. 
Among other things, foreign object sieves of a new 
type have been designed for the fuel assemblies. 
Fuel assemblies fitted with these are to be intro-
duced in 2012.
A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2011, neither plant unit reactor at Loviisa had 
any leaking fuel.
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A.III.2 Primary circuit integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
As the indicators, the water chemistry conditions 
for each plant unit are followed.
The water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
licensees, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
PWRs and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The 
chemical conditions in the secondary circuit of a 
pressurized water reactor affect the integrity of 
the interface between the primary and second-
ary circuits. The indicator for Loviisa is a new 
index developed at the plant to be used together 
with the international index. The new index 
describes the water chemistry conditions in the 
secondary circuit at Loviisa with a higher de-
gree of sensitivity than the corresponding inter-
national index for VVER plants. The indicator 
for Olkiluoto is the international index used by 
the plant. This index observes corrosive factors 
and the concentrations of corrosion products in 
the steam generator blowdown and the feedwa-
ter. For steam generator blowdown, the calcula-
tion includes the chloride, sulphate and sodium 
concentrations and acid conductivity. For feed-
water, it includes the iron, copper and oxygen 
concentrations. The chemistry index of the Olki-
luoto plant consists of the chloride and sulphate 
concentrations of the reactor water and the iron 
concentration in the feedwater. The indices for 
both plants only cover the aforementioned pa-
rameter values during power operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown at the Loviisa plant 
units and the reactor water at the Olkiluoto 
plant units during operation compared with 
the OLC limit in the monitoring period. At the 
Olkiluoto plant, the maximum sulphate content 
of reactor water on even, steady-state operation 
is also followed.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor circuit and the secondary circuit 
into the coolant. For the Loviisa plant, the iron 
concentration of the primary coolant and the 
secondary circuit feedwater (maximum values 
for the monitoring period) are followed. For 
the Olkiluoto plant, the iron concentration of 
feedwater (maximum value for the monitoring 
period) is followed. In addition, the maximum 
Co-60 activity concentration in the reactor cool-
ant while bringing the plant to a cold shutdown 
or after a reactor trip is followed for both plants.
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The concentration levels of corrosive 
substances and corrosion products can also be ob-
tained from quarterly reports submitted by the 
licensees.
Purpose of the indicator
The water chemistry indicators are used to moni-
tor and control primary and secondary circuit in-
tegrity. The monitoring is done by indices depicting 
water chemistry control and by following selected 
corrosive impurities and corrosion products. The 
water chemistry indices combine a number of wa-
ter chemistry parameters and thus give a good 
overview of the water chemistry conditions. STUK 
indicators are also used to monitor the fluctua-
tion of certain parameters in more detail. The cor-
rosive substances monitored include chloride and 
sulphate. The corrosive products followed are iron 
and radioactive Co-60. The activity concentration 
of Co-60 isotope while bringing the plant to cold 
shutdown is used to describe the access of cobalt-
containing structural materials into the reactor 
circuit, the success of the water chemistry con-
trol, and the shutdown procedures. In addition to 
the parameters described here, the license holders 
use several other parameters to monitor the plant 
units’ water chemistry conditions.
Responsible units/persons
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA)  
Kirsti Tossavainen
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Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2011, the impurity and corrosion product lev-
els in primary and secondary circuits, followed in 
STUK’s indicator scheme, were in keeping with 
the guide values set by the license holder at both 
plant units. The chemistry index of both Loviisa 
plant units has remained in recent years at almost 
the best possible value. The exceptional value of 
the index for Loviisa 2 in 2004 was caused by a 
seawater leak in the condenser, which had caused 
the chloride concentration of the steam generator 
blowdown, affecting the index, to become great-
er than normal. The condenser leak was repaired 
in the annual maintenance outage in 2004, after 
which the chloride concentration also decreased. 
The maximum Co-60 activity levels associated 
with shutdowns were measured during shutdowns 
for annual maintenance outages. In 2011, the con-
centrations did not deviate from previous years’ 
values. 
The indicator shows that primary circuit in-
tegrity has been good at the Loviisa plant units in 
2011.
0
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3
4
5
Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1.19 1.18 1.11 1.08 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02
 1.76 3.93 1.05 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator blow-down 
(µg/kg) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1.43E+01 3.64E+01 2.90E+01 7.80E+00 1.93E+01
 3.19E+01 2.10E+02 1.14E+01 9.10E+00 1.10E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
OLC limit after the annual maintenance outages 2008 100 µg/kg; 
before them 500 µg/kg.
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l) 
(RL30 / RL70) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 13.6 11.4 15.1 17.0 8.1
 11.4 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.4
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fe-tot µg/l) 
in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 8.9 11.0 19.4 6.5 9.1
 18.7 13.6 16.1 7.5 15.7
0
5
10
15
20
25
Integrity of primary circuit: 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1.09E+04 1.29E+04 1.03E+04 8.21E+03 5.26E+03
 2.30E+04 2.40E+04 1.71E+04 8.60E+03 9.88E+03
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The impurity and corrosion product levels in reac-
tor water and feedwater, followed in STUK’s in-
dicator scheme, were in keeping with the guide 
values set by the license holder at both plant units 
almost throughout the year. Olkiluoto 1 had in-
dividual cases of exceeding the target values for 
reactor water iron content and sulphate content. 
The iron content of Olkiluoto 1 feedwater has been 
increasing. However, the iron content was in keep-
ing with the licensee’s guide value apart from one 
sampling. Usually, the installation of new compo-
nents causes an increase of iron content but, in 
this case, no obvious causal link to component re-
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placements exists. The iron content of feedwater is 
affected by corrosion and the filter material used in 
the ion exchangers of the condensate purification 
system. The licensee is investigating the reason for 
the increase in iron content.
Olkiluoto 2 had cases of exceeding the tar-
get values for reactor water chloride content and 
sulphate content. The higher-than-usual chloride 
content was caused by a seawater leak in the con-
denser. The leak was repaired within two weeks of 
detecting it, after which the chloride content has 
been in line with the guide value. Exceeding the 
target values for sulphate content is associated 
with the use of the ion exchange filters of the con-
densate purification system, and the situation will 
be rectified by changing the exchanger resin, which 
is done from time to time in the course of normal 
operations.
At Olkiluoto 1, the deviations from target val-
ues were so small that they did not affect the 
chemistry index, which was at its optimum value. 
At Olkiluoto 2, the chemistry index was slightly 
higher than the optimum value due to the excep-
tional exceeding of the target value for chloride 
content.
At both plant units, the shutdown-related maxi-
mum value of Co-60 activity content occurred dur-
ing shutdowns for annual maintenance outages. 
The Co-60 activity content values did not signifi-
cantly change from previous years. 
A change in the OLCs regarding chemistry was 
introduced at both Olkiluoto plant units before the 
annual maintenance outages. The changes affect-
ing the followed in STUK’s indicator scheme were 
the addition of a limit value for reactor water sul-
phate content in the OLCs and the introduction of 
a stricter value for reactor water chloride content.
The indicator shows that reactor circuit integ-
rity has been good at the Olkiluoto plant units in 
2011.
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Integrity of primary circuit: Chemistry index, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 1.00 1.09 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum sulphate concentration in primary coolant (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 7.0 2.2 3.2 7.0 4.9 
 4.9 2.1 5.6 4.6 4.8
0
10
100
OLC limit 20 µg/kg (since II/2011)
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in reactor feed water (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 1.60 1.10 0.68 1.15 1.10
 1.20 0.90 0.67 0.49 0.70
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0.4
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0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
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1.8
 
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 7.08E+04 8.34E+04 7.83E+04 8.59E+04 1.10E+05
 1.46E+05 7.01E+04 7.54E+04 1.01E+05 2.66E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration in primary coolant (µg/kg) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.5 0.5 2.1 3.0 0.7
 1.2 0.6 2.0 2.1 7.8
0.0
0.1
1.0
10.0
100.0
below detection limit
OLC limit 20 µg/kg (since II/2011)
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A.III.2b Primary circuit leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
The indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified primary circuit leakages at the 
Olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3) of identified (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the con-
trolled floor drainage system, 345 T33) contain-
ment internal leakages during the operating 
cycle.
•	 Highest	 daily	 containment	 internal	 leakage	
volume during the operating cycle in relation to 
the allowed leakage volume in the OLCs (out-
flow water volume of water condensing in the 
air coolers of the containment cooling system 
725/OLCs limit).
Source of data
The licensee submits data on primary circuit leak-
ages at the Olkiluoto power plant to the respon-
sible person at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describing primary circuit leakages 
are used to follow and monitor the leak rate of the 
primary circuit within the containment.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), Jarmo Konsi
Interpretation of the indicator, 
operating cycle 2010–2011
One of the purposes of controlled leakage 352 is 
to collect seal box leakages from valves, pumps 
and other such components. The drains from the 
seal boxes of the valves within the containment 
are equipped with temperature sensors to locate 
any leaks. Temperature sensors installed on the 
drains above the main lines will detect any leak-
age in the specific line. Other methods must then 
be used to locate the actual leaking object. The 
containment leakages identified at OL1 during the 
four last operating cycles have increased a little. At 
OL2, the identified leakages have remained almost 
constant. The leakage volumes do not include the 
drainage of process systems during annual main-
tenance outages and other outages. The identified 
leakages include sampling flows of approximately 
1,000–1,500 m³ from the reactor building.
At the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit T33, which collects the 
drain water from the containment drywell floor 
drains and any leakage from the control rod actua-
tor seals. The volumes of unidentified primary cir-
cuit leakages during the operating cycle 2010–2011 
decreased at both plant units.
One of the purposes of containment gas cool-
ing system 725 is to remove moisture from the 
containment atmosphere. Moisture may originate 
from steam leaking from the primary circuit. In 
the operating cycle of 2010–2011, the contain-
ment’s largest internal daily leak volume’s ratio 
to the maximum allowable volume, as specified in 
the Operational Limits and Conditions, was low for 
both plant units.
The primary circuit has been relatively leak-
proof in the 2010–2011 operating cycle.
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Identified leakages of primary circuit (352T1, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 4281 3716 3300 3004 4058 3805 4697 6448 7496
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Unidentified leakages of primary circuit (345T33, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 196.00 9.20 1.14 2.52 1.56 2.16 15.48 32.28 4.74
 14.00 18.60 53.00 3.84 1.26 2.04 16.5 43.08 5.10 
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The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the OLC limit, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 9.40 0.70 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.21 1.27 2.20 0.35
 0.60 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.09 0.16 1.97 2.08 0.35 
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A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As the indicators, the parameters below are fol-
lowed: the total as-found leakage of outer isolation 
valves following the first integrity tests, compared 
with the highest allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves; the percentage of isolation 
valves tested during the year in question at each 
plant unit that passed the leakage test on the 
first attempt (i.e. as-found leakage smaller than 
the acceptance criteria of a valve and no exceed-
ing of the so-called attention criteria of a valve 
without repair in consecutive years) and the com-
bined as-found leakage rate of containment pen-
etrations and airlocks in relation to their highest 
allowed total leakage. The combined leakage rate 
at Olkiluoto includes leakages from personnel air-
locks, the maintenance dome and the containment 
dome. At Loviisa, the combined leakage rate is 
comprised of the leakage test results from person-
nel airlocks, the material airlock, the cable pen-
etrations of inspection equipment, the containment 
maintenance ventilation systems (TL23), the main 
steam piping (RA) and the feedwater system (RL) 
penetrations; the seals of blind-flanged penetra-
tions of ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is extracted from the utilities’ leak-tightness 
test reports submitted by the licensee to STUK for 
information within three months of the comple-
tion of annual maintenance. STUK calculates the 
total as-found leakages, since the reports give total 
leakages as they are at the end of the annual main-
tenance outage (i.e. after the completion of repairs 
and re-testing).
Purpose of the indicator
This indicator is used to follow the integrity of 
the containment isolation valves, penetrations and 
airlocks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA)
Päivi Salo
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The overall as-found leakages of outer containment 
isolation valves have decreased at both plant units.
The percentage of isolation valves which passed 
the leakage test at the first attempt has remained 
high.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which at Loviisa includes the leakage 
test results for the personnel airlock, the emer-
gency personnel airlock, the material airlock, the 
reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable penetrations 
and bellow seals (RA, RL, TL23), was small at both 
plant units.
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The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.39 0.71 1.10 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.54 0.47 1.37 0.76
 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.36 0.11 0.20 0.45 0.74 0.87 0.71
92%
94%
96%
98%
100%
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 99.0 99.0 95.0 97.0 96.0 99.0 95.5 99.5 97.0 98.1
 97.0 99.0 97.0 99.5 98.6 99.5 98.6 97.7 95.4 98.5
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
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Olkiluoto
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit was extremely 
small, clearly below the limit set in OLCs.
At the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit, the as-found leak-
age of the outer isolation valves was below the 
limit set in the OLCs and has remained approxi-
mately the same as before. 
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak tightness test at first attempt has re-
mained high for both plant units.
The total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, has re-
mained small for both plant units.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Olkiluoto NPP 
 OL1
 OL2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
 0.58 0.50 0.80 0.47 0.38 0.41 1.02 1.29 0.10 0.14
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.74 1.69 1.26 0.45 1.27 1.10 0.45 1.12 0.55 0.53
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
 98.00 98.00 95.00 96.10 98.60 97.50 98.00 99.40 99.50 97.60
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 99.00 98.00 97.00 97.00 97.40 97.70 98.30 95.80 97.60 98.50
APPENDIX 2 Occupational radiation dose distribution 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 2011
According to the Radiation Decree, the annual ef-
fective dose from radiation work for a worker must 
not exceed 50 mSv while the average over any pe-
riod of five years must remain below 20 mSv.
The highest individual dose incurred at Finnish 
nuclear power plants was 9.9 mSv. This dose was 
accumulated from work at the Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant. The highest individual dose for a Finnish 
nuclear power plant worker in the five-year period 
from 2007 to 2011 was 55.9 mSv. The dose was ac-
cumulated at Swedish nuclear power plants.
dose range 
(mSv)
number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,1 736 1424 2066
0.1–0.49 177 732 872
0.5–0.99 111 235 336
1.00–1.99 111 188 292
2.00–2.99 42 64 115
3.00–3.99 35 26 58
4.00–4.99 20 10 42
5.00–5.99 8 9 19
6.00–6.99 9 4 17
7.00–7.99 2 2 6
8.00–8.99 0 0 3
9.00–9.99 0 1 3
10.00–10.99 0 0 0
11.00–11.99 0 0 1
12.00–14.99 0 0 0
15.00–20 0 0 0
> 20 0 0 0
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have 
received doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same 
person may have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants 
and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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Loviisa NPP
Replacement of EDG bearings 
due to suspected fault
On 14 January 2011, the Loviisa power plant 
learned through unofficial channels that the emer-
gency diesels used in France had suffered serious 
bearing failures. On the basis of this information 
and negotiations with the equipment manufactur-
er, the Loviisa power plant established that one 
emergency diesel at Loviisa 1 uses the same bear-
ing type. This connection rod bearing had been in-
stalled in 2009 in connection with a complete over-
haul. The power plant took immediate action and 
replaced the bearing during the following week. 
In order to carry out the replacement work, an 
external power connection was made to replace 
the emergency diesel generator isolated for the 
replacement work. No defect could be found in the 
removed bearing in preliminary inspections, al-
though there were some signs of excess wear.
Outage at Loviisa 1 for repair of a leaky 
flange seal in the steam generator
A steam leak was detected inside the contain-
ment of Loviisa 1 during the evening of Friday 18 
February. The steam leak was a minor one, and 
the steam contained no radioactivity as it came 
from the secondary circuit containing pure water. 
The leak did not put the safety of people or the 
surrounding environment at risk. The location of 
the leak was such that in order to repair it, the 
plant had to be shut down and cooled down. After 
repairs, the start-up of the plant unit began on 
Sunday, 20 February, and the unit resumed elec-
tricity production during Monday, 21 February.
Irregularities regarding the cooling capacity 
of emergency cooling pump rooms
The circulation air cooling system of emergency 
cooling pump rooms in Loviisa is intended for re-
moving from the room the heat load caused by the 
pumps and their motors. The system has originally 
had two circulation air cooling units for each room. 
At a later stage, two circulation air cooling units 
with larger capacities were installed in each room 
because the design temperature of cooling water 
was increased. The blowers have diesel back-up, 
and the coolers are cooled using pure intermediate 
circuit water.
The system is on standby during normal operat-
ing conditions at the plant. If the temperature in-
creases, the room thermostats automatically start 
the cooling process. In that instance, the cooling 
system valves are opened and the blowers are 
started. At Loviisa 1, the power supply and cooling 
water connection have been implemented so that 
two small-capacity circulation air cooling units (2 x 
30%) and two large-capacity circulation air cooling 
units (2 x 70%) are connected in series. The connec-
tion is such that the cooling power may fall short 
of the design value. The room temperatures have 
been analysed in cases like this, and the analysis 
results indicate that the temperatures are higher 
than in earlier analyses. Comparison of the results 
with the design temperatures of components locat-
ed in the rooms shows that the temperatures may 
become too high for the components when seawater 
is warm.
In the same connection, the situation of the 
Loviisa 2 cooling system was also analysed; it has 
one low-capacity and one large-capacity cooling 
unit in series, giving 100% cooling power. The tem-
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peratures in the rooms were lower than at Loviisa 
1, but the rooms contained components more sensi-
tive to temperature.
As an immediate corrective action, the cooling 
water circulation valves at Loviisa 1 will be locked 
open in the summer to ensure sufficient cooling. 
The power company will draw up a plan regarding 
other actions required.
Spare part problems regarding 
the pump motors of the high-
pressure safety injection system
During condition monitoring measurements at 
Loviisa 2 on 8 June 2011, fluctuations and an in-
crease in vibration level were observed in the pump 
motor of the high-pressure safety injection system. 
The motor was found to be operable in spite of the 
higher vibration levels. Nevertheless, Fortum de-
cided to send the motor to the supplier for inspec-
tion and maintenance because it wanted to make 
sure of the motor’s operability and reliability. The 
power company also decided to verify the condition 
of the other pump motors of the safety injection 
system. The condition monitoring measurements 
carried out did not reveal any deviations in the 
other motors.
The motor overhauled by the supplier was 
installed back in its position, and assessment of 
its operability continued. However, the vibration 
readings measured during test operation exceeded 
the approval limits, which is why the power plant 
found the motor inoperable.
The three-day repair time allowed in the OLC 
was not sufficient to diagnose the motor, which is 
why the power company applied for an extension of 
nine days for the repair time.
The motor was sent back to the supplier where 
it was opened. A spare part rotor was installed in 
the motor, and its bearings were replaced. After 
successful test operation at the supplier’s test field, 
the motor was delivered back to the Loviisa power 
plant. On the basis of the test run in the motor’s 
ordinary place of operation, the power company 
found the motor to be operable, and the operation 
restriction of the plant unit was lifted.
This pump and its motor are part of the reac-
tor’s high-pressure safety injection system that 
pumps boron-containing water in the primary cir-
cuit in the initial stage of a possible accident situa-
tion. The system has two independent subsystems, 
each with two pumps in parallel. During normal 
operation, the pumps are on standby, and they 
are only used when the system is being tested. On 
those occasions, they are kept running for about 
two hours.
A fault was also detected during the 2010 
maintenance outage in the motor stator of a safety 
injection pump at the Loviisa power plant. The 
faulty motor was replaced with a spare one and 
sent to the supplier for inspection. The examina-
tion revealed that the motor stator had permanent 
deformations, which is why it was decided to scrap 
the motor. The replacement motor installed in the 
component location was the last spare motor in 
store for the safety injection system at the Loviisa 
power plant. This is why the power plant initiated 
procurement of several new motors with the inten-
tion of having the motors available at the plant for 
the 2011 annual maintenance outage.
Because the procurement of new motors did not 
progress as planned, Fortum initiated a process 
to find out the possibilities for procuring the mo-
tors from other European NPPs. Consequently, 
the power company succeeded in procuring four 
used motors from Slovakia. They were of the same 
type and make as the motors in use at the Loviisa 
power plant. The plan is to use two of them as 
spare motors. This requires, in addition to inspect-
ing and test running the motors, re-winding them 
to achieve better heat resistance.
STUK requires power companies to have spare 
part procurement systems in place for ensuring 
that there are enough spare parts available for 
installation at the plant. Since the assessment 
performed indicated that the procurement system-
compliant actions of the Loviisa power plant for 
procuring new motors had been insufficient, STUK 
required Fortum to clarify the matter. In the same 
context, the power plant was required to assess, by 
the end of 2011, the comprehensiveness of the pe-
riodic inspection, preventive maintenance and re-
placement programmes concerning structures and 
components important to safety in order to ensure 
the operability of these structures and components.
According to the clarification, the procurement 
of new motors had to be suspended because ambi-
guities were observed in the procurement specifi-
cations of the motors. Replacing the motors with 
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the alternative offered by the manufacturer would 
have required modifications to the motor base and 
also, depending on the location of the motor, to the 
system pipelines because the new motors offered 
had outside dimensions considerably larger than 
the old ones.
Following the faults that have occurred in the 
pump motors of the high-pressure safety injec-
tion system, STUK has assessed that the original 
motors, made in the Soviet Union, are approach-
ing the end of their life span. STUK has required 
Fortum to prepare a plan and time schedule re-
garding the replacement of the motors.
Initiation of annual maintenance 
operations on the DC systems of an 
emergency diesel generator at Loviisa 2 
while in power operation, in breach of 
the Operating Limits and Conditions
Both Loviisa plant units have four emergency die-
sel generators that start and supply power, when 
required, to systems and components important to 
safety, such as the pumps cooling the reactor. For 
example, the diesel generators are required in a 
situation where connection to the Finnish national 
grid is lost.
During the 2011 annual maintenance outage of 
Loviisa 2, one of the diesel generators underwent a 
complete overhaul where the entire diesel engine 
was replaced with a completely overhauled engine. 
Fortum initiated, as planned, the replacement 
work before the annual maintenance outage dur-
ing power operation of the plant, and therefore, the 
Operating Limits and Conditions dictated that the 
subject diesel generator had to be replaced with 
a power supply connection between the Loviisa 
power plant and the nearby Ahvenkoski hydro-
power plant.
In connection with the diesel generator main-
tenance operation, a temporary power supply was 
connected to the DC control switchgear of the 
diesel generator’s control system from the DC 
switchgear of another diesel generator. In this con-
nection, the battery array and rectifier backing up 
the control system of the diesel being overhauled 
was also disconnected, in breach of the Operating 
Limits and Conditions, for maintenance operations. 
According to OLC, the control voltage-supplying 
DC switchgears of all diesel generators in the plant 
unit must be operable during power operation be-
cause the switchgears also supply control power for 
the Ahvenkoski power supply connection. However, 
disconnection of one emergency diesel generator 
for maintenance is permissible if the diesel genera-
tor being maintained is replaced with a power sup-
ply connection from the Ahvenkoski hydropower 
plant.
As a result of the isolation and connection 
actions carried out, the supply of control volt-
age to one Loviisa  2 diesel generator and to the 
Ahvenkoski supply connection replacing the other 
diesel generator relied on one DC switchgear only. 
Had the switchgear then failed in a situation 
where it was needed, this would have prevented 
the deployment of the Ahvenkoski connection and 
the start-up of one diesel generator, which means 
that two of the four emergency switchgears of 
Loviisa 2 would have been unavailable.
The event caused no danger to the environment 
or the personnel, but it weakened the operabil-
ity of the emergency switchgear in case of loss of 
offsite power. The event demonstrated that there 
were deficiencies at the Loviisa power plant in the 
planning and implementation of maintenance op-
erations important to safety. Following the event, 
Fortum draw up a special report and root cause 
analysis.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 0.
Omission of primary coolant hydrogen 
concentration measurements
A measurement of the hydrogen concentration 
of primary coolant, prescribed in the OLC, was 
omitted at the Loviisa NPP on 2 October 2011. 
The hydrogen concentration affects the integrity 
of the primary circuit and fuel cladding. Hydrogen 
concentration is a so-called monitoring parame-
ter, and its limits are set in the Operating Limits 
and Conditions. The purpose of setting a minimum 
limit hydrogen concentration is to ensure that the 
reducing conditions, necessary for minimising cor-
rosion, are maintained. If the hydrogen concentra-
tion is too high, it may cause, among other things, 
embrittlement of the fuel cladding, which is why 
an upper limit has also been set for the hydrogen 
concentration.
At the Loviisa plant unit, hydrogen is produced 
by feeding ammonia into the primary coolant. The 
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neutron radiation in the reactor decomposes the 
ammonia, releasing hydrogen. The hydrogen elimi-
nates the corrosion-inducing oxygen, generated in 
the primary coolant by the radiolysis of water and 
also fed into the coolant in make-up water.
At the Loviisa power plant, the hydrogen con-
centration of primary coolant is usually mea-
sured using two continuously operating analysers. 
However, one of the two analysers is inoperable, 
and there are no spare parts available for it. The 
measurement result obtained from the analyser in 
operation indicated that the hydrogen concentra-
tion was increasing on Thursday, 29 September 
2011. Another measurement was taken using a 
portable hydrogen analyser in order to solve the 
situation. The continuously operating hydrogen 
analyser was found to be faulty, so it was repaired.
However, the measured value of hydrogen con-
centration started to rise again on Saturday, 1 
October, and repairs on the hydrogen analyser 
were initiated. According to the OLC, a hydrogen 
analysis must be performed every 24 hours us-
ing a portable hydrogen analyser if the continu-
ous measurement function is inoperable. However, 
the hydrogen concentration was only determined 
on Sunday, 2 October, using a portable hydrogen 
analyser, and the 24-hour time limit was exceeded. 
The integrity of the primary circuit or fuel cladding 
was not at risk, because the other parameters mea-
sured at the plant allow the assumption that the 
hydrogen concentration had been normal.
The event is classified as 0 on the INES scale, 
i.e. it has no significance for radiation or nuclear 
safety.
Error in determining radioactive releases
The Loviisa power plant introduced a new gamma 
activity measurement system on 11 June 2010, 
which is used, among other things, for determin-
ing the aerosols and iodine isotopes in the emis-
sions released into the atmosphere. At the same 
time, the method for calculating the air volume 
of emissions was also amended. Had it functioned 
correctly, the new method for calculating the air 
volume would have been more accurate than the 
old one, but the measurement system did not apply 
the correct measurement data of sample flow, but 
instead a value set for the instrument. However, 
the true air flow in the sampling channel was close 
to the set value. Due to the error in the air volume 
of the sampling flow, the figures reported to STUK 
for gamma-active emissions into the atmosphere 
had been incorrect during the period 11 June 2010 
to 2 September 2011. Having discovered the er-
ror, the plant reported the matter to STUK on 2 
September 2011. 
STUK required the Loviisa power plant to sup-
ply new, corrected figures for the incorrectly report-
ed emissions. The error concerned the atmospheric 
releases of particulate aerosols and iodine isotopes 
that only represent a small part of all the radioac-
tive releases from the power plant. Due to the er-
ror, the atmospheric release values that the Loviisa 
power plant had reported to STUK had been about 
3 MBq smaller than the actual values in 2010 and 
about 10 MBq larger than the actual values in 
2011. These deviations correspond to 2% and 9% 
of the atmospheric releases of particulate aerosols 
and iodine isotopes of those years, respectively.
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Olkiluoto NPP
Incorrect operation of the emergency 
diesel generator at Olkiluoto 1
The generator switch of the diesel generator opened 
when the switch-over and re-switching automation 
of the 660 V emergency power supply was tested. 
The opening was caused by overvoltage resulting 
from the incorrect operation of the generator ex-
citer. Because of the fault, the generator would not 
have operated according to specifications in a real 
situation where it would have been required.
The reason for the incorrect operation was 
found to be a faulty thyristor in the rotary exciter 
inside the generator. As a precaution, the exciter 
was repaired by replacing all three thyristors and 
one rectifier diode. After the repair, the generator 
was tested and found to be in order.
The fault that now occurred cannot be detected 
in tests other than those of the re-switching auto-
mation or in preventive maintenance operations, 
because the load does not fluctuate enough in those 
situations. When testing the re-switching automa-
tion, the generator is loaded by starting the electri-
cal motors.
The power company will find out the possi-
bilities for improving the comprehensiveness of the 
operational tests of diesel generators performed in 
connection with preventive maintenance and after 
generator replacement.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 0.
Defects in the internal parts of blowdown 
system valves at Olkiluoto 2 and repair 
outage at Olkiluoto 1 on 26–28 June 2011
TVO discovered in the inspections performed dur-
ing the annual maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2 
that there were cracks in the valve pistons of the 
system required for overpressure protection of and 
residual heat removal from the primary circuit. 
The inspections revealed other damage as well; for 
example, the hard chrome plating of the pilot cyl-
inder had been damaged. However, the cracks and 
other damage had not affected the operation of the 
valves; they had operated correctly in regular tests.
TVO replaced the parts of the worst damaged 
valves during the annual maintenance. Not all 
damaged parts could be replaced due to an in-
sufficient inventory of spare parts. On the basis 
of results from tests carried out during the pre-
ceding operating cycles, the valve manufactur-
er’s assessment and analyses performed by VTT, 
TVO assessed that these valves were operable as 
well. Immediate replacement of the parts was not 
deemed necessary. Nevertheless, STUK found, on 
the basis of the reports produced by TVO regarding 
the faults discovered, that the original pistons and 
pilot cylinders of the valves were approaching the 
end of their life span. It was nevertheless not likely 
that the valves would quickly become inoperable, 
which is why STUK gave, on 6 June, permission 
to start up Olkiluoto 2 after the annual main-
tenance outage. STUK required that new spare 
parts should be changed to the valves immediately 
when a sufficient number of new spares has been 
received from the manufacturer. The requirement 
was to carry out the replacement by 15 September.
Olkiluoto 1 is using similar valves, which is why 
STUK required that TVO must also inspect them. 
During the repair outage of 26–29 June 2011, dam-
age was observed in the pistons of four valves and 
in the pilot cylinders of 11 valves. TVO replaced 
them with flawless spare parts.
The faulty valves were part of a system in-
tended for protecting the nuclear reactor against 
overpressure and for removing its residual heat in 
a situation where the steam generated in the reac-
tor cannot enter the turbine plant. The necessary 
number of valves is opened, and the steam generat-
ed in the reactor is led along the system’s pipelines 
to a condensation pool in the reactor containment 
building. From the condensation pool, the heat is 
transferred to the sea by other systems.
On the seven-step International Nuclear Event 
Scale (INES), the event is rated as class 1, i.e. it 
is classified as an anomaly, an incident affecting 
safety.
Short between core windings discovered 
in the maintenance of a diesel generator
The tests carried out during the annual mainte-
nance outage of Olkiluoto 1 in May 2011 revealed 
that one emergency diesel generator was operating 
incorrectly due to a faulty thyristor in the exciter. 
The fault was repaired, and the generator was 
sent for basic overhaul after the plant’s annual 
maintenance. The measurements on the rotor core 
winding performed in the basic overhaul of the 
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generator in August 2011 revealed a short between 
windings. A short between core windings means a 
short circuit between two or more insulated wind-
ings. On the basis of further measurements on the 
faulty rotor, the fault was diagnosed as an earth 
fault occurring at a certain voltage level. A short 
between core windings was discovered in another 
EDG of Olkiluoto  1 in connection with a repair 
and basic overhaul operation in August 2010. The 
operability of other generators at Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 was tested for shorts between windings 
in August 2011. The tests revealed indications of a 
short between windings in two generators, which is 
why the power company will replace these genera-
tors with overhauled units.
The short between core windings discovered in 
2010 was repaired by replacing the core winding 
insulators. The other core windings will be similar-
ly insulated as an immediate corrective action for 
the fault now discovered. Following the observation 
made in 2010, the generator maintenance instruc-
tions have been supplemented with a test to be 
carried out at the workshop, intended for detecting 
any shorts between windings and for testing the 
condition of the insulation during maintenance. 
The power company has decided to carry out main-
tenance on the generators more frequently.
A short between the core windings of a gen-
erator may remain latent if the windings are not 
tested with special measurements. A latent short 
between windings can occur without affecting the 
operability of the generator for a long time, but 
it can also rapidly escalate and damage the core 
winding and cause a risk of fire. 
Both Olkiluoto plant units have four emergency 
diesel generators that start and supply power, 
when required, to systems and components impor-
tant to safety, such as the pumps cooling the reac-
tor. Such situations include disturbances resulting 
in a loss of the connection to the national grid. 
According to the Operating Limits and Conditions, 
unrestricted use of the reactor is allowed for thirty 
days when only one of the diesel generators is 
unavailable. In an operational transient of the 
plant, at least two of the four diesel generators are 
required to secure the safety functions in all situa-
tions where they are needed.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 0.
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APPENDIX 4 Licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2011
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 6/G42214/2010,	 12	 January	 2011,	 OL3.	 Im-
port of spent fuel transfer machine and fuel 
handling tools from Germany; amendment to 
licence	3/G42214/2010.	Last	date	of	validity	31	
December 2013. The licence supersedes licence 
3/G42214/2010,	granted	on	28	October	2010.
•	 14/C42214/2010,	 12	 January	 2011,	 OL1/OL2.	
Import of fission chambers from Germany, 
France and the United States. Last date of va-
lidity 31 December 2020. 
•	 5/G42214/2010,	12	February	2011,	OL3.	Amend-
ment	to	import	licence	1/G42214/2010	for	reac-
tivity measurement and analysis equipment. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2013.
•	 1/G42214/2011,	 12	 July	 2011,	OL3.	Possession	
of a spent nuclear fuel transfer machine at 
Olkiluoto Harbour. Last date of validity 29 Feb-
ruary 2012.
•	 2/G42214/2011,	 14	 July	 2011,	OL3.	Possession	
of components for a spent nuclear fuel transfer 
machine at Olkiluoto Harbour. Last date of va-
lidity 31 March 2012.
•	 4/G42214/2011,	 2	 September	 2011,	 OL3.	 Pos-
session of components for spent nuclear fuel 
handling equipment at Olkiluoto Harbour. Last 
date of validity 31 March 2012.
•	 9/C42214/2011,	2	September	2011.	Import	of	a	
rod made of zirconium alloy from Sweden. Last 
date of validity 31 March 2012.
•	 7/C42214/2011,	24	October	2011.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “C”, 
from Sweden (OL2 E32, part of the batch). Last 
date of validity 31 December 2012.
•	 8/C42214/2011,	24	October	2011.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “P”, 
from Sweden (part of batch OL2 e32). Last date 
of validity 31 December 2012.
•	 6/C42214/2011,	24	October	2011.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “C”, 
from Sweden (OL1 e34). Last date of validity 31 
December 2012.
•	 5/G42214/2011,	 14	 November	 2011,	 OL3.	
Amendment	 to	 import	 licence	 4/G42214/2010	
for dual-use items required in the construction 
and operation of an NPP. Last date of validity 
31 December 2013.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 1/A42214/2011,	24	February	2011,	Loviisa	1	and	
2; Import of a protective assembly from Russia. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2011.
•	 2/A42214/2011,	24	February	2011,	Loviisa	1	and	
2; Import of intermediate range neutron flux 
detectors from Russia. Last date of validity 31 
December 2011.
•	 4/A42214/2011,	 8	 June	 2011,	 Loviisa	 1	 and	 2;	
Import of power range neutron flux detectors 
from Russia. Last date of validity 31 December 
2015.
VTT
•	 2/F42214/2010,	 24	 February	 2011,	 import	 of	
a control rod mechanism for the FiR 1 reac-
tor from the USA. Extension of validity of the 
licence	F214/16	granted	on	22	September	2006	
until 31 December 2012.
•	 1/F42214/2011,	 11	March	 2011,	 import	 of	 plu-
tonium standards from Austria. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2011.
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Others
•	 3/A42214/2011,	11	May	2011,	Loviisa	1	and	2.	
Import, possession and assignment of docu-
mentary material for the design of sampling 
autoclaves. Last date of validity 31 December 
2021.	The	licence	supersedes	licence	Y214/170,	
granted on 9 January 2008 for possession of 
documentary material.
•	 23/A42214/2011,	 19	 December	 2011,	 assign-
ment of documentary material for the design 
of sampling autoclaves. Last date of validity 31 
December 2021.
•	 2/A42214/2011,	 24	May	 2011,	 Celer	 Oy.	 Crea-
tion, possession and assignment of documen-
tary material for the design of sampling auto-
claves. Last date of validity 31 December 2013.
•	 4/A42214/2011,	 20	 May	 2011,	 Siimet	 Oy.	 Pos-
session of documentary material for the design 
of sampling autoclaves. Last date of validity 31 
December 2021.
•	 5/A42214/2011,	24	May	2011,	Lujax	tmi.	Posses-
sion and assignment of documentary material 
for the design of sampling autoclaves. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 6/A42214/2011,	24	May	2011,	Pemco	Oy.	Posses-
sion and assignment of documentary material 
for the design of sampling autoclaves. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 7/A42214/2011,	 20	 May	 2011,	 Nasto	 Welding	
Pipe Oy. Possession of documentary material for 
the design of sampling autoclaves. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2021.
•	 8/A42214/2011,	 20	May	 2011,	 Rejlers	Oy.	 Pos-
session and assignment of documentary mate-
rial for the design of sampling autoclaves. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 10/A42214/2011,	20	May	2011,	Esys	Oy.	Posses-
sion and assignment of documentary material 
for the design of sampling autoclaves. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 11/A42214/2011,	 20	 May	 2011,	 Simsotec	 Oy.	
Possession of documentary material for the de-
sign of sampling autoclaves. Last date of valid-
ity 31 December 2021.
•	 13/A42214/2011,	 25	 May	 2011,	 Instrumentti	
Mattila Oy. Possession of documentary material 
for the design of sampling autoclaves. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2021. Superseded li-
cence	13/Y42214/2011	granted	on	20	May	2011.
•	 16/A42214/2011,	24	May	2011,	Holming	Works.	
Possession and assignment of documentary ma-
terial for the design of sampling autoclaves. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2017.
•	 17/A42214/2011,	 24	 May	 2011,	 KTS-Mekano	
Oy. Possession of documentary material for the 
design of sampling autoclaves. Last date of va-
lidity 31 December 2021.
•	 18/A42214/2011,	 20	May	 2011,	 Smartweld	Oy.	
Possession of documentary material for the de-
sign of sampling autoclaves. Last date of valid-
ity 31 December 2021.
•	 19/A42214/2011,	 24	 May	 2011,	 IS	 Works	 Oy.	
Possession and assignment of documentary ma-
terial for the design of sampling autoclaves. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 22/A42214/2011,	 21	 November	 2011,	 Suomen	
Teknohaus Oy. Possession of documentary ma-
terial for the design of sampling autoclaves. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 25/A42214/2011,	 19	 December	 2011,	 Planray	
Oy. Possession of documentary material for the 
design of sampling autoclaves. Last date of va-
lidity 31 December 2021.
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Inspections contained in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the technical 
acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, operations, maintenance 
and protection activities (radiation protection, fire protection and security) with the 
requirements of nuclear safety regulations are verified by the inspections. The annual 
inspection programme is brought to the attention of the licensee at the beginning of 
each year, and inspection dates are agreed upon with the licensee’s representatives.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2011, Loviisa
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 25 August 2011
In August, STUK conducted an inspection of the 
management and safety culture at the Loviisa 
plant, focussing on the planning and monitoring 
of activities, the handling of matters important to 
safety in management as well as the management 
of modification projects and procurement opera-
tions. The power company has appropriate proce-
dures in place for planning and monitoring the 
activities. The example discussed during the in-
spection indicates that the management is quickly 
informed of any matters important to safety and 
follows the progress of measures taken to clarify 
the issue. Following the inspection, STUK imposed 
three requirements. One requirement concerned 
the development of operations in order to ensure 
that matters important to safety are put in order 
within the set deadline. Two requirements con-
cerned procurement: the licensee must see to it 
that the organisation has sufficient competence 
and that procedures are compliant with the re-
quirements for implementing and monitoring nu-
clear procurement operations. STUK has repeat-
edly prompted the licensee to put matters impor-
tant to safety in order within the set deadline and 
to take the nuclear industry-specific requirements 
into account in its procurement operations.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 7–8 June 2011
The inspection of human resources and competence 
at the Loviisa power plant, carried out by STUK in 
June, assessed the personnel planning, training 
and personnel management at the Loviisa power 
plant. The inspection found that these functions 
are guided by Fortum’s corporate-level documents 
that have not been clearly included in the power 
plant’s management system. It was further found 
that the resources required for the development 
of the plant and its operations are not sufficiently 
taken into account in personnel planning. STUK 
required that these issues should be rectified.
A3 Functionality of the management 
system, 7 and 9 March 2011 
The inspection of management and safety culture 
concerned the functionality of the management 
system at the Loviisa power plant from the per-
spective of nuclear and radiation safety, and the 
progress made in developing procurement was also 
inspected. In February 2011, the power plant es-
tablished a working group to plan the development 
of the management system into a process-like sys-
tem and tasked a member of the management with 
the responsibility for improving and developing 
the management system. The Loviisa power plant 
has made improvements in its procurement pro-
cess and taken into account the requirements im-
posed by STUK in earlier inspections. Following 
the inspection, STUK required the Loviisa power 
plant to specify further the procedures for self-
assessment by a more systematic description and 
to supplement the description of assessment pro-
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cedures of safety culture. Furthermore, as a result 
of the inspection, the power plant was required to 
ensure that a quality-related vocabulary compli-
ant with ISO 9000: 2005 is systematically used in 
Loviisa’s management system documentation and 
communications..
A3 Functionality of the management 
system, 13 June 2011
STUK had discovered deficiencies in the way the 
licensee processed management-related documents 
at the Loviisa power plant and therefore carried 
out an additional inspection concerning the func-
tionality of the power plant’s management system 
and its continual improvement. Following the in-
spection, STUK required the Loviisa power plant 
to create a procedure for assessing the possible 
impacts of the amendments made to the licensee’s 
management system on the power plant’s manage-
ment system and operations. Furthermore, STUK 
required the Loviisa power plant to assess the com-
petence and expertise of the organisation regard-
ing the safety culture as well as its assessment and 
continual promotion.
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement 
of safety, 18–19 April 2011
STUK carried out an inspection regarding assess-
ment and improvement of safety in April, and it 
concerned the procedures guiding plant modifi-
cations management at the Loviisa power plant. 
The functionality of the procedures was assessed 
through two plant modification projects in prog-
ress. The power plant introduced a new project 
management model in 2010. It is now also ob-
served for the management of some old modifica-
tion projects. Following the inspection, STUK im-
posed requirements regarding further specification 
and development of the procedures.
B2 Plant safety functions, 28 February 2011
The inspection of the plant’s safety functions 
concerned the software suites applied for design-
ing and monitoring the reactor core as well as 
their use, maintenance and quality management. 
The inspection was conducted at the Nuclear 
Safety Department of Fortum Power and Heat’s 
Power Division’s Technical Support that provides 
the Loviisa power plant with analysis services. 
Following the inspection, STUK required Fortum 
to supplement the procedures related to core de-
sign and monitoring so that the input files for 
outsourced work can also be verified and the infor-
mation therein traced. In addition, Fortum must 
develop its procedures, including those related to 
testing the computer software used for planning 
the reactor refuelling operations after modifica-
tions made to the production version.
B3 PRA and safety management, 
2 November 2011
The main subjects of the inspection concerning the 
use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) in safety 
management were the resources, up-to-dateness 
of the procedures, monitoring of the fault frequen-
cies and repair times of critical faults in emergency 
generators, as well as the criticality classification 
of certain ventilation systems on the basis of their 
importance measures. The number of persons par-
ticipating in PRA work at Fortum has increased, 
and the procedures have been updated appropri-
ately. Fortum has further specified the classifi-
cation of critical faults, and monitoring of their 
fault frequencies and repair times is continued. A 
marked increase in the fault frequency of EDG re-
lays was detected in 2009, after which many or the 
relays were replaced, bringing the fault frequency 
down to the earlier level. The significance of ven-
tilation systems to the safe operation of the plant 
was assessed using the PRA importance measure, 
and a significant deviation was discovered regard-
ing the maintenance classification and prelimi-
nary importance measures of two circulation water 
pumps. Fortum will continue the assessment of 
maintenance classification in 2012.
B4 International operating experience 
feedback, 9 November 2011
The inspection of international operating experi-
ence feedback focussed on the processes of inter-
national operating experience feedback and their 
associated procedures and instructions, as well as 
on the utilisation of international operating experi-
ence feedback. The inspection also briefly touched 
the analysis of own operating experience feed-
back and the materialisation of corrective actions. 
Procedures were verified in the inspection, and 
their functionality was assessed using example 
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cases. STUK found that there was scope for im-
provement in the follow-up of corrective actions 
decided on the basis of operational events at the 
plant as well as in the assessment of implementa-
tion of corrective actions and their effectiveness.
Operational safety
C1 Operation, 9 March 2011
The focus areas of inspecting the operation were 
the planning and assessment of the operating 
unit’s operations as well as the maintenance and 
review procedures regarding operation-related doc-
uments. Following the observations made during 
the inspection, STUK required the Loviisa power 
plant to assess the up-to-dateness of documenta-
tion in the main control room and to delete or 
update any outdated documents. It was also found 
that there was scope for improvement in the sign-
ing off practices of training information sheets in-
cluded in the control room documentation.
C1 Operation, 10 August and 
21 September 2011
The inspection of operation consisted of oversight 
and inspections by STUK in connection with the 
annual maintenance outages of Loviisa plant units 
in September and October, focussing on the activi-
ties of the power plant’s operating and maintenance 
organisations and its quality assurance unit. The 
oversight included assessment of the maintenance 
of operating procedures, work permit practices, 
shutdown and start-up of the plant units, imple-
mentation of modifications, general tidiness and 
housekeeping as well as testing activities. Following 
the observations made in the course of oversight 
and inspections, STUK required the Loviisa pow-
er plant to develop further the flow of information 
between Fingrid, the company responsible for the 
monitoring and maintenance of the national grid, 
and the Loviisa power plant, as well as the pro-
cessing of information provided by Fingrid in the 
different organisational units of the power plant. 
It was further noted that the power plant must 
complete the procedures for kick-off meetings and 
implement the related induction training. STUK 
also imposed the requirement of further developing 
the assessment and follow-up procedures regarding 
the success of corrective actions taken on the basis 
of internal follow-up inspections.
C2 Plant maintenance, 17 August 2011
In the inspection it conducted in August STUK as-
sessed ageing management at the Loviisa power 
plant as well as its development following the ex-
tensions to the plant’s operating life and the organ-
isational changes carried out. Particular attention 
was paid to the control measures that the respon-
sible units use to identify the actions required by 
the ageing of components, such as basic overhauls 
or improvements to the maintenance, inspection 
and testing programmes. The chosen practical ex-
amples of mechanical or electrical engineering and 
I&C components were the internal parts of the 
reactor pressure vessel, the spare parts for and 
repair capabilities of relays and plant protection 
system PC cards, as well the spare parts for the 
main steam line radiation measurement. In ageing 
management based on the plant’s procedures, the 
extent of actions is decided at the Loviisa plant on 
the basis of the operating life and availability of 
components, systems and structures. In the future, 
it must be verified whether the plant is also in 
control of physical and technological ageing in such 
parts of the plant required for important safety 
functions which, according to the procedures, are 
not included within the scope of the ageing man-
agement programme. Furthermore, the Loviisa 
power plant must assess whether the system re-
sponsibilities regarding ageing management have 
been defined in such a manner that the parts of 
the plant important for safety are covered and that 
sufficient human resources have been allocated to 
system responsibility duties.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems, 
1–2 November 2011
The electrical subjects inspected in the inspection 
of electrical and I&C systems were electrical de-
sign, acceptance inspections, oil leaks in the main 
circulation pump motors, vibration measurements 
on EDGs, relay protection and the monitoring of 
electrical equipment ageing. Following the inspec-
tions, STUK required Fortum to supplement and 
further specify the maintenance procedures for the 
inspected subjects. Furthermore, STUK required 
Fortum to submit an account of the oil leaks oc-
curring in the main circulation pump motors and 
the related corrective actions. The I&C subjects 
included component repair procedures, manage-
ment of ageing and qualifications, organisation and 
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competence of the maintenance personnel deal-
ing with new programmable technology, as well 
as the organisation, competence and design pro-
cess development of the plant’s I&C design activi-
ties. Following the inspection, STUK required the 
power company to draw up inspection and testing 
plans for component repairs, to describe the pro-
cedures in the competence development process of 
the plant’s I&C design and installation personnel 
and to submit to STUK the interim results of com-
petence development and rectify the deficiencies in 
the I&C design process.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
15 November 2011
The subjects of mechanical engineering inspection 
were primary circuit load measurements, pressure 
and temperature transients as well as the ageing 
management of pressure-bearing components. The 
Loviisa power plant has not recorded the inter-
rupted heat-ups of the primary circuit from cold 
shutdown state to operating state as primary cir-
cuit loading situations. STUK required the power 
company to assess if the interrupted heat-ups can 
have caused significant additional strains on the 
primary circuit. When assessing the replacement 
of pressurizer spraying lines at the Loviisa power 
plant, STUK paid attention to the possibility of 
strains induced by fluctuations in the flow condi-
tions. STUK required the power company to sub-
mit an account of the strain measurements to be 
carried out in conjunction with replacing the pipe-
lines. Measurements of loads inducing fatigue to 
pipe material have been carried out at the Loviisa 
power plant in the system designed for blowing out 
secondary circuit impurities accumulating in the 
steam generator. STUK required the power com-
pany to verify further these observations by non-
destructive tests on the subject pipeline sections. 
Furthermore, STUK required the power company 
to produce an account of the current level and ac-
ceptability of the auxiliary feed water system pipe-
line vibrations observed at the Loviisa power plant 
after the latest power uprates.
C5 Structures and buildings, 27 October 2011
In the inspection of structures and buildings at the 
Loviisa power plant, the maintenance procedures 
of structures, buildings as well as seawater chan-
nels and tunnels were assessed. In addition, the 
results of inspections carried out by the power com-
pany and the modifications made were discussed. 
The scope of inspections included the organisation 
of the power company, inspection procedures is-
sued by the power company, in-service inspections 
by the power company, maintenance, repairs and 
modifications of seawater tunnels and channels, 
supplementary construction works at the plant 
area, operational experience feedback activities 
and other inspections within the sphere of respon-
sibility. No requirements were imposed following 
the inspections.
C6 Information management and 
security, 1–2 February 2011
The focal areas selected for the inspection of in-
formation security practices at the Loviisa power 
plant were the procedures issued for information 
security-related activities and maintenance of 
these procedures, as well as analysis of informa-
tion security-related operational experience and 
taking it into account when developing operations. 
During the inspection, STUK found scope for im-
provement in certain areas.
C7 Chemistry, 22–23 February 2011
The subjects of the inspections on chemistry were 
the chemical conditions of the primary and second-
ary circuits compared to guide values, reporting of 
chemical and radiochemical results to STUK, spare 
parts management and functionality of the modi-
fication process as well as certain areas of qual-
ity management. The reporting of chemical and 
radiochemical deviations to STUK has been made 
less ambiguous, although there is still scope for 
improvement. In radiochemistry, the uncertainty 
regarding activity measurements has only been 
based on statistical uncertainty, which is why the 
requirement of producing a budget of overall un-
certainty was imposed during the inspection. The 
requirement was imposed so that the procedures 
would have to be supplemented with descriptions 
of certain current practices and that the decontam-
ination instructions would have to be completed 
before the 2011 annual maintenance. The plant 
has established a working group to find a solution 
to the procurement of spare parts for the continu-
ous chemical process measurements. Some contin-
uous measurements have been inoperable or have 
malfunctioned due to the lack of spare parts, and 
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measurements have had to be replaced with labo-
ratory measurements. Following the inspection, it 
was required that the examinations  in progress 
are completed without delay and that the responsi-
bilities and necessary procedures for ensuring the 
availability of spare parts are defined.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 
10–11 November 2011
The particular subject of the inspection of radi-
ation protection at the Loviisa power plant was 
the measurement of radiation. The subject of the 
inspection included the environmental radiation 
monitoring programme as well as the portable and 
fixed radiation measurement instruments in use at 
the plant. In addition, the faults and disturbances 
observed in measurements were discussed, and the 
spare parts inventory of instruments and the pro-
cedures for monitoring the ageing of instruments 
were inspected. Following the inspection, STUK re-
quired the power company to assess whether more 
accurate environmental dosimetry measurement 
results can be obtained by utilising the recom-
mendations of the new standard. Furthermore, the 
equipment used for collecting atmospheric samples 
from the environment must be included within the 
scope of the periodic maintenance programme. The 
new equipment procured by the power company 
has improved the standard of radiation monitoring 
at and around the Loviisa power plant. In addition, 
the plant is in the process of further modernis-
ing the existing range of radiation measurement 
equipment.
D2 Fire protection, 8 March 2011
The subjects of the fire protection inspection in-
cluded improvements and modifications, training 
and fire brigade equipment, procedures as well 
as fire detection and extinguishing systems. Fire 
alarms in the turbine hall were raised by the ex-
tinguishing systems. It was established in the in-
spection that the Loviisa power plant will find out 
and follow up, among other things, new solutions 
and equipment for fire alarm systems. The pur-
pose of this is to find a fire alarm system solution 
that would allow room-specific surveillance of the 
turbine hall. Following the inspection, the power 
company was required to produce an account of 
the methods allowing the use of wooden scaffolding 
planks to be reduced, thus reducing the fire load 
they cause.
D3 Emergency response, 4 
and 18–19 October 2011
STUK inspected the emergency response arrange-
ments of the Loviisa power plant, and the emergen-
cy response arrangements of Fortum’s Technical 
Support in Keilaniemi was included within the 
scope of the inspection for the first time. Following 
the inspection, STUK imposed five requirements, 
one of which concerned the emergency response 
arrangements of Fortum’s Technical Support. The 
equipment used by Fortum for emergency response 
have been modernised, and their development con-
tinues.
D4 Security, 2 November 2011
STUK inspected the security arrangements at the 
Loviisa power plant; they are deemed to include 
structural, technical, operational and organisa-
tional arrangements for detecting, delaying and 
preventing illegal activities in the nuclear power 
plant. No significant deviations were detected in 
the inspection. The measures resulting from re-
marks made in the course of STUK’s earlier in-
spections were also considered to be appropriately 
implemented.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Reactor waste, 9–10 June 2011
The focal points of the inspection of nuclear waste 
management at the Loviisa power plant were the 
arrangements for low- and intermediate-level 
waste management as well as the new treatment 
facilities at the Loviisa power plant, the sufficiency 
of personnel and up-to-dateness of the procedures. 
Following the inspection observations, STUK re-
quired the Loviisa power plant to assess the rust-
ing and corrosion mechanism of low-level waste 
barrels placed in the VLJ repository, as well as the 
impacts that the deteriorating condition of the bar-
rels will have on nuclear waste management and 
its safety.
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E2 Final disposal facilities, 
13–14 October 2011
When inspecting the final disposal facilities at the 
Loviisa power plant, STUK assessed the mainte-
nance procedures at the plant site, the repairs and 
modifications carried out as well as the results of 
the power company’s inspections. No requirements 
were imposed following the inspections.
Special items
F1 LARA
On the basis of its inspection of the requirements 
management, change management, configuration 
management and supervision of the project suppli-
er in the I&C modernisation project of the Loviisa 
NPP (the LARA project), STUK required the pro-
cedures for the project to be further developed, 
particularly with respect to configuration manage-
ment. In addition, STUK required the supervision 
work to be more precisely instructed and planned 
so that Fortum can ensure that the I&C design 
work progresses in compliance with the safety re-
quirements.
F2 Spare parts management, 22–23 
November 2011 and 11 January 2012
STUK inspected the responsibilities and proce-
dures regarding the management of spare parts 
for systems and equipment important to safety at 
the Loviisa power plant, as well as the determina-
tion of spare parts requirements, the sufficiency 
of spare parts in stock and their storage. A com-
prehensive task to find out the exact situation of 
and future requirements for spare parts is in prog-
ress at the Loviisa power plant. In addition, STUK 
required the power plant to develop the alloca-
tion of responsibilities and the procedures related 
to spare parts management as a whole so that 
spare parts compliant with the requirements will 
be available for systems and equipment important 
to safety. For the purpose of developing the spare 
parts management procedures, STUK required the 
Loviisa power plant to produce a documented plan 
for 2012–2016.
Periodic inspection programme 
2011, Olkiluoto
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 29–30 August 2011
The inspection of management and safety culture 
focussed on the planning and monitoring of opera-
tions, the management of modifications and proj-
ects as well as development of the management 
system from the perspective of the power com-
pany’s top management. In the inspection, TVO’s 
management and STUK’s inspection team also 
paid a joint inspection visit to Goods Inwards and 
stores. Following the inspection, STUK required 
that the procedures for TVO’s management re-
views must be updated to comply with the require-
ments of YVL Guide 1.4.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 7 and 9 September 2011
The inspection of personnel resources and com-
petence dealt with personnel planning, alloca-
tion of resources and assessment of their suffi-
ciency. The inspection focussed in particular on 
the planning and management of TVO’s personnel 
resources between project and line organisation 
work. Following the inspection, STUK noted that 
TVO has different practices in different parts of 
its organisation regarding the allocation of human 
resources and the monitoring of their sufficiency. 
According to TVO, the procedures have sufficiently 
met the company’s requirements, but the practic-
es and the associated procedures do not, however, 
fully comply with the requirements of YVL Guide 
1.4. Following the inspection, STUK required TVO 
to develop its HR planning and its associated pro-
cedures, observing the requirements of YVL Guide 
1.4 and the risks associated with the ageing of the 
plant. In addition, the inspection also concerned 
the actions for training development and the train-
ing register to which STUK found no objections.
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A3 Functionality of the management 
system, 14–15 November 2011
The inspection of functionality of the management 
system focussed on the quality management of 
modifications, as well as on the management of 
procurement operations and control of the supply 
chain that are its essential parts. Following the 
inspection, STUK required TVO to develop further 
its quality management procedures and practices 
regarding modifications so that they are clear and 
unambiguous to their users and guide the qual-
ity management to comply with the requirements 
of the YVL Guides. Furthermore, STUK required 
TVO to develop the training for modification-relat-
ed quality management.
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement 
of safety, 11–12 October 2011
STUK inspected the assessment and improvement 
of safety at TVO by evaluating the procedures 
guiding the plant modifications for Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 as well as the functionality of the pro-
cedures through two plant modification projects 
that were in progress. During 2011, TVO has com-
piled a Project Manual to guide project activities; 
it contains procedural instructions and also best 
practices. Following the inspection, STUK imposed 
the requirement that benchmarks should be de-
veloped to measure the operation of modification 
projects.
B2 Plant safety functions, 2 November 2011
The inspection of plant safety functions focused 
on the software suites applied for designing and 
monitoring the reactor core as well as their use, 
maintenance and quality management. The devel-
opment of software and related analyses are the 
responsibility of TVO’s Reactor Physics Office in 
Helsinki, while the use and maintenance of the 
operation monitoring program is the responsibil-
ity of the Reactor Monitoring Office in Olkiluoto. 
Following the inspection, it was found that the 
organisational units have sufficient personnel re-
sources and competence. The interface procedures 
and uniform working methods, necessary for good 
cooperation, are also well established, and version 
management is in place. There are also sufficiently 
detailed procedures available for the operations. 
STUK required that the procedure update, re-
quired as a corrective action regarding the tilting 
of a fuel rack during the 2011 annual maintenance, 
must be completed before the 2012 annual main-
tenance and sent to STUK for information. The 
action and its deadline had already been entered 
in TVO’s database of corrective actions, but STUK 
had not been officially informed of the deadline.
B3 PRA and safety management, 
8 September 2011
In September, STUK carried out an inspection 
regarding the use of PRA (Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment) in safety management. The inspection 
covered the organisation, resources, procedures, 
training, the situation regarding PRA updates and 
the delivery schedule, as well as the use of PRA 
for “Fukushima analyses” and diversity analyses. 
Further subjects included the risk-informed in-ser-
vice inspection programme (RI-ISI) for pipelines, 
the use of PRA in decision-making and event anal-
ysis, as well as the use of PRA in ageing manage-
ment. Following the inspection, STUK found that 
the state of the inspected PRA functions complies 
with the requirements of YVL Guide 2.8. Following 
the inspection, it was required that the updated 
schedule of the risk-informed in-service inspection 
programme for pipelines be submitted to STUK.
B4 International operating experience 
feedback, 1–2 November 2011
The inspection of international operating experi-
ence feedback focussed on the processes of inter-
national operating experience feedback and their 
associated procedures and instructions, as well as 
on the utilisation of international operating expe-
rience feedback. The inspection covered both the 
plant units in operation (Olkiluoto 1 and 2) and the 
unit under construction (Olkiluoto 3). The inspec-
tion also briefly touched on the analysis of own 
operating experience feedback and the implemen-
tation of corrective actions. Procedures were veri-
fied in the inspection, and their functionality was 
assessed using example cases. No requirements 
were imposed by STUK following the inspections.
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Operational safety
C1 Operation, 30–31 March 2011
The inspection of operation focussed on the 
Operating Limits and Conditions (OLC), main 
control room documentation and periodic tests 
for which Operation is responsible. In addition, 
the planning of operation and operational safety 
functions at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 were in-
spected, together with their results. Following the 
inspection, STUK imposed requirements related 
to keeping the control room documentation up to 
date, to supplementing the procedures and to prac-
tices related to amending the OLC.
C1 Operation R211, 10 May–3 June 2011 
The purpose of the second inspection of operation 
during the year was to verify the safety of an-
nual maintenance, and the inspection was car-
ried out during the annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2. The inspection focussed on the actions 
of the operators in the control room, on events 
related to fuel handling, as well as on operations 
most important regarding the outage-related risk. 
Following the inspection, STUK required TVO to 
assess the situation and availability of the fuel 
transfer machine, the safety significance of fire 
doors wedged ajar and the sufficiency of correc-
tive actions regarding events where operators have 
responded to alarms during the outage only after 
some delay. The corrective actions required must 
be determined on the basis of the assessments.
C2 Plant maintenance, 17 October 2011
The inspection of plant maintenance concentrated 
on analysing the situation with regard to the re-
quirements imposed in the previous inspections 
and on the exhaust pipe damage observed in the 
EDGs. Following the inspection, STUK found that 
there are deficiencies in the way the ageing mecha-
nisms of components and parts most important to 
safety are identified in the related maintenance 
planning and analysis. STUK required TVO to es-
tablish whether the ageing mechanisms and the 
actions they require could be defined for the com-
ponents and parts in closer detail.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems / 
electricity, 16–17 March 2011
The electricity-related part of the inspection of elec-
trical and I&C systems assessed the power compa-
ny’s procedures for ensuring the reliable operation 
of the plant units’ electrical systems and equip-
ment. The particular subjects included monitoring 
the ageing of electrical equipment and cables, the 
electrical maintenance of diesel generators, the gas 
turbine power plant and installation inspections. 
No significant deficiencies were detected in the 
inspection.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
/ I&C, 30–31 March 2011
The focus of the I&C part of the inspection of elec-
trical and I&C systems was on the maintenance 
of measuring accuracy, the I&C design and imple-
mentation process, the qualification monitoring 
programme, ageing and inventory management. 
Scope for further development was observed in 
particular in the design and implementation pro-
cess for I&C modifications and in the management 
of measurement accuracy coverage.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
1–2 November 2011
The inspection of mechanical engineering con-
cerned the ageing management of pressure-bear-
ing equipment, the results of and projects related 
to load monitoring, the topical projects of vibration 
monitoring and the situation of mechanical engi-
neering studies aimed at extending the operating 
life. Following the inspection, STUK required the 
power company to present a summary of the cur-
rent status of measurements carried out for iden-
tifying the pipework points where temperature 
stratification takes place.
C5 Structures and buildings
The inspection of structures and buildings includ-
ed an inspection of the maintenance procedures of 
structures, buildings as well as seawater channels 
and tunnels. In addition, the results of inspections 
carried out by the power company and the modi-
fications made were discussed. No requirements 
were imposed following the inspections. 
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C6 Information management and security
An inspection of information security was carried 
out at the Olkiluoto NPP on 17–18 November 2011.
C7 Chemistry, 13–14 September 2011
The inspection of chemistry focussed on the re-
sources of the organisational unit responsible for 
chemistry-related functions, alternative analysis 
methods for the parameters most important to 
safety, management of spare parts inventory for 
chemical and radiochemical instruments, function-
ality of the plant’s modification process from the 
perspective of chemistry and radiochemistry, the 
up-to-dateness of chemistry-related procedures as 
well as certain areas of the laboratory’s quality 
management and emergency response. The valida-
tion of activity measurements and determination 
of overall uncertainty are areas of quality manage-
ment that were already inspected in the previous 
year’s inspection. The licensee had left the deter-
mination of overall uncertainty to be done in con-
nection with validating the new analysis method, 
which is why the requirement was repeated during 
the inspection. It was required that the timing of 
closing the ventilation system of the laboratory in 
an emergency should be revised. The requirement 
was imposed due to the fact that in an emergency, 
the radioactive contamination carried in the venti-
lation system may cause an increase in background 
activity in the laboratory with the result that the 
activity measurement results of analysed samples 
are not reliable. The contamination level affecting 
the activity measurements is considerably lower 
than the level relevant to employees’ radiation 
safety. Following the inspection, the requirement 
was also imposed that emergency situations must 
be taken into account in the liquid nitrogen supply 
of the gamma spectrometers used in activity mea-
surements. The nitrogen required for the gamma 
spectrometers is kept in liquid nitrogen tanks lo-
cated outdoors, which means that in an emergency 
situation, the outdoor radiation conditions may re-
strict the transfer of the tanks indoors.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 15–17 March 2011
The radiation protection inspection focussed on ra-
diation measurements. The subjects covered in the 
inspection included the situation regarding por-
table and fixed radiation measurement systems, 
the environmental monitoring programme, the 
spare parts situation as well as the faults and dis-
turbances observed in the radiation measurement 
systems. Following the inspection, STUK required 
TVO to assess the shortcomings in the spare parts 
inventory for radiation meters and to determine 
the corrective actions. Furthermore, TVO must as-
sess the effect that the carrying cases of dosimeters 
used for environmental radiation measurements 
and the ambient conditions have on the results and 
further specify the procedures regarding the func-
tional tests on radiation monitoring equipment 
and the calibration protocol of portable radiation 
measurement instruments.
D2 Fire protection, 31 August 2011
In the inspection of fire protection, the efficiency 
of the NPP’s fire protection arrangements and the 
power company’s operations was assessed and the 
amendment plans for fire protection arrangements 
were analysed. The round made at the plant in 
connection with the inspection revealed excess fire 
load in the relay rooms next to the control rooms – 
for example, packing crates and furniture made of 
combustible materials. STUK required the excess 
fire load to be removed. A non-compliant electrical 
penetration was observed on the wall of a cable 
room. STUK required all penetrations in that room 
and in similar rooms to be inspected and rectified.
D3 Emergency response, 6–7 June 2011
The subjects of the inspection of emergency re-
sponse included emergency response training and 
exercises, the facilities, equipment, emergency-
related documents and the emergency response 
organisation. Following the inspection, STUK re-
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quired TVO to repair the external radiation mea-
surement station in the vicinity of the plant. The 
station had been out of order for almost a year. 
The situation regarding revision of the information 
transfer connection between the plant units was 
discussed during the inspection. STUK required 
TVO to submit a technical specification and assess-
ment regarding the availability of certain spare 
parts. In an emergency response situation, TVO 
would use the subject system for sending to STUK 
the measurement data most important to plant 
safety.
D4 Security, 16 November 2011
STUK inspected the security arrangements at the 
Olkiluoto power plant; they are deemed to include 
structural, technical, operational and organisa-
tional arrangements for detecting, delaying and 
preventing illegal activities in the nuclear power 
plant. In addition, the actions taken on the basis of 
an extensive assessment of security arrangements 
were inspected. No significant deviations were de-
tected in the inspection. All the actions regarding 
the remarks and requests made in STUK’s earlier 
inspections had not yet been fully implemented.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Reactor waste, 1–2 November 2011 
STUK conducted an inspection of nuclear waste 
management, focussing on waste accounting and 
the foreseen waste management facilities of the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction. STUK 
required TVO to update the mass limit set for the 
amount of waste cleared from control and received 
at its own landfill site. The waste volumes have 
increased as the plant has aged, and, in the future, 
the operation of Olkiluoto 3 will further increase 
the amount of waste. However, the activity limits 
important for radiation safety have been appropri-
ate, and the activity values of waste cleared from 
control are well below the set limits.
E2 Final disposal facilities
Not inspected in 2011.
Special items
F1 Spare parts management, 20–21 April 2011
STUK carried out an additional inspection re-
garding spare parts management. The inspec-
tion identified areas for development, related to, 
among other things, the goods reception area and 
the goods reception practices, the determination of 
spare parts requirements of systems and compo-
nents important to safety as well as to the size and 
monitoring of the inventory. Following the inspec-
tion, STUK required TVO to produce a report on 
spare parts maintenance regarding systems and 
components important to safety and submit it to 
STUK by the end of November 2011. The report 
must indicate the responsibilities and procedures 
as well as the implemented and planned develop-
ment actions.
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Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Main functions
Project quality management 21 January 2011
Commissioning processes and procedures 9–10 March 2011
Project management and the management of safety 28–29 April 2011
Quality management – functionality of the management system 21 December 2011
Work processes
Radiation safety 18–19 January 2011
Information security 23 March 2011
Quality control – electrical and automation engineering 4 May 2011
OL3 – readiness for commissioning, turbine island 7 June 2011, 14–16 June 2011
Delivery supevision, receiving inspections and erection supervision  
(mechanical engineering)
15 June 2011
Preparation of operating license application 22–23 September 2011
Information security of electrical systems 6 October 2011
Equipment installation steering process (electrical engineering) 3–4 November 2011
Utilisation of PRA 8 December 2011
Quality management – review and evaluation of safety implications of  
documents and time extension requests 
15–16 December 2011
APPENDIX 6 Periodic inspection 
programme during construction
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction-time 
inspection programme is to verify that the oper-
ations required by the construction of the plant 
ensure a high quality implementation according 
to the approved plans and compliant with official 
regulations, without endangering the plant units 
operational within the plant site. The inspection 
programme assesses and oversees the licensee’s 
operations in building the plant unit, implemen-
tation procedures in various technical areas, the 
licensee’s expertise and use of that expertise, the 
handling of safety issues and the quality manage-
ment and control. STUK prepares an inspection 
plan for Olkiluoto 3 every six months.
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Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Management system
ONP-A1 Management system 15 March 2011
Planning and management
ONP-B1 Project management and control Not in 2011
ONP-B2 Safety management 5–6 May 2011
ONP-B3 Project quality management 19–20 May 2011
ONP-B4 Planning and management of the research and monitoring programme Not in 2011
ONP-B5 Design of Onkalo Not in 2011
Implementation
ONP-C1 Site inspection and monitoring procedures 28–29 September 2011
ONP-C2 Drilling and modelling Not in 2011
ONP-C3 Foreign substances 15–16 December 2011
ONP-C4 Excavation and EDZ 20–21 December 2011
ONP-C5 Onkalo in-flows 10–11 November 2011
ONP-C6 Monitoring and research methods Not in 2011
APPENDIX 7 Inspection programme 
during the construction phase of Onkalo
The objective of the construction-time inspection 
programme is to verify that high-quality imple-
mentation of approved plans is ensured in the con-
struction of the underground research facility, with 
compliance with official regulations and without 
jeopardizing safe final disposal. The inspection pro-
gramme includes assessment and monitoring of 
Posiva’s operations in building Onkalo, the pro-
cedures applied to various parts of the construc-
tion work, the management of Onkalo research 
and monitoring, the management of safety and the 
quality assurance of the implementation. STUK 
prepares annual plans for Onkalo inspections.
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APPENDIX 8 Assignments funded by STUK in 2011
Safety of NPPs
The subjects of assignments presented in the 
2011 plan for technical support assignments were 
mainly inspection and assessment tasks regarding 
the regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto 3 as part of 
STUK’s decision-making. Due to the delays in the 
Olkiluoto 3 construction project, part of the assign-
ments proposed for 2011 were postponed to 2012.
Of the assignment proposals for 2011, 34 were 
related to the project of overseeing the construc-
tion	of	Olkiluoto	3	(FIN5/OL3),	five	to	the	Olkiluoto	
plant units already in operation, nine to Loviisa 
plant units and three to new NPP projects. The 
most significant framework agreements related to 
overseeing the construction of Olkiluoto 3 in 2011 
were: 
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Oversight	 and	 inspection	 of	 the	
manufacture of pipeline prefabricates of Safety 
Classes 1 and 2 (Quality Factory Oy, EUR 
260,700)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Inspection	 of	 mechanical	 compo-
nents for pipelines of Safety Classes 1 and 2 
(Lamprotek Oy, EUR 120,100)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Inspection	 of	 stress	 and	 strength	
analyses of components for pipelines of Safety 
Classes 1 and 2 (VTT, EUR 81,900)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Strength	 analyses	 of	 nuclear	 pres-
sure vessels (VTT, EUR 18,200)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Strength	 analyses	 of	 structural	
plans (Inspecta Nuclear AB, EUR 91,300)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	Buildings	and	structures:	inspection	
of detailed structural plans (Pontek Oy, EUR 
64,800)
Safety of nuclear waste disposal
The volume of the technical support programme 
for the oversight of nuclear waste management 
was about EUR 412,000 in 2011. The programme 
included assignments related to both overseeing 
the construction of the underground research facil-
ity and to the preliminary inspection of the con-
struction licence for the final disposal facility. They 
included:
•	Overseeing	the	construction	of	the	underground	
research facility
• External specialist work related to the con-
struction of ONKALO (EUR 35,000)
•	 Overseeing	 the	 research,	 development	 and	
planning/design	work	for	the	disposal	facility
• Safety Case documentation
• EBS Design Report, Structural Design of 
Disposal Canister (EUR 21,150)
• Detailed design report for the buffer (EUR 
5,000)
• Replaceability of bentonite (EUR 21,600)
• THC modelling possibilities (EUR 15,000)
• Increase of fuel burn-up (EUR 47,000)
• Improvement of biosphere assessment capa-
bilities (EUR 8,000)
• Comparison of the disposal locations of Fors-
mark and Olkiluoto (EUR 15,250)
• Safety analysis training (EUR 20,000)
• SAS-SAFARI consultancy (EUR 60,000)
• Assessment of Posiva’s FEP documentation 
2011–2012 (EUR 77,000)
• Posiva’s climate scenario report (EUR 
16,000)
• Development of independent safety analysis 
(EUR 17,000)
• Creation and assessment of scenarios (EUR 
36,000)
• Assessment of Posiva’s final EDZ report 
(EUR 10,000)
• Possibilities for site-scale hydrogeological 
modelling (EUR 7,650)
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APPENDIX 9 International co-operation in 2011
IAEA
IAEA working groups
•	 CSS,	Commission	of	Safety	Standards	–	a	body	
steering the preparatory work for IAEA’s safety 
standards, Lasse Reiman, Vienna 1–2 Nov 2011
•	 Regulatory	 Co-operation	 Forum	 Meeting,	 Pet-
teri Tiippana, Vienna 14–15 April 2011
•	 NUSSC,	Nuclear	Safety	Standards	Committee,	
Marja-Leena Järvinen, Vienna 3–6 July 2011, 
2011, 17–20 Oct 2011
•	 NUSSC,	Nuclear	Safety	Standards	Committee,	
Keijo Valtonen, Vienna, 4–5 July 2011
•	WASSC,	 Waste	 Safety	 Standards	 Committee,	
Kaisa-Leena Hutri, 27–30 June, 12–15 Dec 
2011
•	 TRANSSC,	 Transport	 Safety	 Standards	 Com-
mittee, Anna Lahkola 24–27 Oct 2011
•	 IAEA	Steering	Committee	Meeting	for	Regula-
tory Training, Kaisa Koskinen, Vienna 22–24 
Feb 2011, 27 Nov – 2 Dec 2011
•	 GEOSAF,	International	Project	on	Demonstrat-
ing the Safety of Geological Disposal, Jussi 
Heinonen 10–17 Apr, 16–20 May 2011
•	 CEG,	 Contact	 Expert	 Group	 for	 International	
Radwaste Projects in the Russian Federation, 
Henri Niittymäki 17–20 May, 6–7 Oct 2011; 
Esko Ruokola 16–17 Feb 2011
•	 ASTOR,	Application	of	Safeguards	to	Geological	
Repositories, Elina Martikka, , 31 Mar – 1 Apr, , 
24–25 Oct 2011; Tapani Honkamaa 31 Mar – 1 
Apr, 23–26 Oct 2011
IAEA’s expert duties
•	 IRRS,	International	Regulatory	Review	Service,	
IAEA expert group to assess national nuclear 
safety regulation
• Review of the Korean regulatory framework, 
Kaisa Koskinen, 8–23 July 2011
• Review of the German regulatory frame-
work, Marja-Leena Järvinen, 4–10 Sep 2011
• Review of the Swiss regulatory framework, 
Petteri Tiippana, 20 Nov – 2 Dec 2011
•	 IAEA,	IPPAS	mission	to	Sweden,	Ronnie	Olan-
der, Stockholm 16–27 May 2011
IAEA’s expert meetings
•	 CNS,	International	Nuclear	Safety	Convention,	
meeting and presentation of the country report 
of Finland, Petteri Tiippana, Vienna 6–7 Apr 
201, Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Pekka Salminen, 3–8 Apr 
2011, 10–14 Apr 2011
•	 IAEA	Technical	Meeting	on	Safety	Goals,	Lasse	
Reiman, Vienna 11–15 Apr 2011
•	 IAEA/ISSC,	 International	Seismic	Safety	Cen-
tre
• Extra-budgetary donors’ meeting, Pekka Vä-
likangas, Vienna 18–21 Jan 2011
• Working area 7 meeting and meeting with 
construction and fire protection specialists 
of CNSC, Pekka Välikangas, Ottawa, 27–31 
Mar 2011 
•	 IAEA/ISSC	 -EBP,	 1st	 Meeting	 of	 Working	
Group 8.1, Ulla Vuorio, Madrid 26–29 Sep 
2011
• Consultancy meetings on design safety mar-
gin evaluation (DSME), Vienna, Pekka Vä-
likangas, Vienna 2–5 Aug 2011
• Method development for DSME guide-
lines,, Pekka Välikangas, Vienna 23–25 
Aug 2011
• Drafting of  DSME guide, Pekka Välikan-
gas, Liverpool, Bootle 6–9 Sep 2011
• DSME guide development, Pekka Vä-
likangas, Vienna 20–23 Sep 2011
•	 IAEA,	Consultancy meetings on design safety 
margin evaluation (DSME), Tomi Routamo, Vi-
enna 2–4 Aug 2011
•	 IAEA	Ministerial	Conference	on	Nuclear	Safety,	
Risto Sairanen, Vienna 20–23 June 2011
•	 IAEA	TM	on	Safety	Culture	Oversight	and	As-
sessment, Anna Aspelund, Vienna 14–18 Feb 
2011
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•	 IAEA	 INES-workshop,	Tomi	Koskiniemi,	Han-
na Kuivalainen, Vienna 10–15 Oct 2011
•	 IAEA,Consultancy	 Meeting	 to	 agree	 the	 way	
forward for Draft Safety Guide, Keijo Valtonen, 
Vienna 14–18 Nov 2011
•	 IAEA	Meeting	of	the	Security	Information	Por-
tal (NUSEC) Liaison Officers , Paula Karhu, 
Vienna 8–9 Nov 2011
•	 IAEA	 TM	 Guide	 on	 Nuclear	 Security	 Infra-
structure, Paula Karhu, Vienna 12–16 Dec 2011
•	 IAEA,	International	Meeting	on	Application	of	
the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research 
Reactors, Pöllänen Lauri, Vienna 15–20 May 
2011
•	 IAEA	 European	 Regional	 Workshop,	 Janne	
Nevalainen, Budapest 15–20 May 2011
•	 IAEA	 Follow	 up	 to	 3–7	 May	 Consultancy	 on	
Regulatory Oversight, Janne Nevalainen, Vi-
enna 2–7 Oct 2011
•	 IAEA	23rd	TWG-NPPIC-meeting,	Harri	Heim-
bürger, Vienna 23–27 May 2011
•	 IAEA	 Consultancy	 Meeting	 on	 GNSSN,	 Erja	
Kainulainen, Vienna 13–16 Nov 2011
•	 IAEA	Workshop	 on	 National	 Nuclear	 Regula-
tory Portals, Erja Kainulainen, Bonn 3–6 July 
2011
•	 IAEA/NEA	 Joint	 Technical	 meeting	 to	 Ex-
change Experience on Recent Events in Nuclear 
Power Plants and the Technical Committees 
Meeting of the IRS National Coordinators, Erja 
Kainulainen, Paris 25–29 Sep 2011
•	 IAEA	Workshop	 on	 the	Lessons	Learned	 from	
the IAEA IRRS Missions, Kaisa Koskinen, 
Washington 25–29 Oct 2011
•	 IAEA	 Technical	 Meeting/	 Environmental	 Im-
pact assessment of nuclear facilities, Olli Vilka-
mo, Vienna 27–30 Nov 2011
•	 IAEA	DBT-workshop,	Paula	Karhu,	Stockholm	
13–16 Feb 2011
•	 IAEA	Safety	Assessment	Workshop,	PSA	Level	
1 and Level 2, Janne Laitonen, Trieste 2–15 Oct 
2011
•	 Safeguards	Bilateral	Meeting,	Risto	Paltemaa,	
Elina Martikka, Marko Hämäläinen 22 Sep 
2011
•	 IAEA/SSM	 International	 Workshop	 on	 High	
Level Radioactive Waste, Risto Paltemaa, Jussi 
Heinonen, Kai Hämäläinen, Kaisa-Leena Hutri 
29 Nov –1 Dec 2011
•	 Better	use	of	Joint	Convention,	Risto	Paltemaa	
3–4 Nov 2011
•	 Joint	 Convention	 Organization	 Meeting,	 Kai	
Hämäläinen, Kaisa-Leena Hutri 10–12 May 
2011
•	 Consultants	 Meeting;	 Guidance	 on	 the	 use	 of	
nuclear material accountancy and control for 
nuclear security at facilities, Elina Martikka 
12–13 May, 26–30 Sep 2011
•	 Technical	Meeting	on	the	Accountancy	and	Con-
trol of Nuclear Material for Nuclear Security at 
Facilities, Elina Martikka 9–11 Feb, 26–28 Apr 
2011
•	 Trilateral	Meeting	IAEA-EURATOM-STUK	on	
safeguards issues related to the Finnish facili-
ties for final disposal, Elina Martikka, Marko 
Hämäläinen 13 Apr 2011
•	 Seminar	 on	 Optimizing	 the	 IAEA	 safeguards	
system, Elina Martikka 14–15 Apr 2011
CTBTO
•	 CTBT	 WGB	 and	 Radionuclide	 Expert	 Group	
(RNEG), Mikael Moring 23 Feb –4 Mar, 31 Aug 
–2 Sep, 6–9 Sep 2011
OECD/NEA
•	 CNRA,	 Committee	 on	Nuclear	 Regulatory	Ac-
tivities, Petteri Tiippana, Paris 4–7 Dec 2011
•	 OECD/NEA,	Working	 group	LTO	Green	Book-
let, Martti Vilpas, Paris 21–24 Feb 2011 ja 
26–28 Sep 2011
•	 CNRA/WGRNR	meeting,	Tapani	Virolainen,	Pa-
ris 5–9 June 2011, 18.–21 Sep 2011
•	 CNRA	Fukushima	Senior	Task	Force	meeting,	
Petteri Tiippana, Paris 4–6 May 2011
•	 CNRA	meeting	and	Fukushima	 forum,	Petteri	
Tiippana, Lasse Reiman, Paris 8 June 2011
•	 CNRA	Fukushima	Task	Force	meeting,	Petteri	
Tiippana, Paris 20–23 Sep 2011
•	 OECD/NEA/WGOE	meeting,	Seija	Suksi,	Paris	
25–30 Sep 2011
•	WGIP,	Working	Group	on	 Inspection	Practices	
Workshop, Jukka Kupila, Paris 10–14 Oct 2011
•	 NEA	 Technical	 Experts	 Meeting	 on	 national	
Fukushima assessment, Risto Sairanen, Tokyo 
7–10 Nov 2011
•	 OECD	FIRE	meeting	and	PSA2011	conference,	
Matti Lehto, Washington 8–17 Mar 2011
•	 OECD	FIRE	and	HEAF	working	group	working	
meetings, Matti Lehto, Paris 7–10 Sep 2011
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•	 OECD/NEA	Workshop	on	PSA	for	New	and	Ad-
vance, Reino Virolainen, Paris 19–25 June 2011
•	 OECD/NEA	 CSNI/DIDELSYS	 meeting,	 Kim	
Wahlström, Paris 9–11 May 2011
•	 OECD	 PKL-2	 project	 PRG	 and	MB	meetings,	
Eero Virtanen, Erlangen 7–10 Nov 2011
•	 OECD	PKL-2	Management	board	of	the	OECD	
PKL2 Project, Risto Sairanen, Eero Virtanen, 
Budapest 13–15 Apr 2011
•	 OECD/NEA	 Working	 Group	 on	 Fuel	 Safety,	
Risto Sairanen, Paris 21–22 Sep 2011
•	WG	 WGHOF	 seminar	 and	 NEA/IAEA	 Work-
shop, Milka Holopainen, Kirsi Levä, Chester 
25–29 Sep 2011
•	WG	 CNRA	 Regulatory	 Oversight	 of	 NCFSI,	
first meeting, Kirsi Levä, Paris 18–21 Oct 2011
•	 CNRA	Meeting,	Kirsi	Levä,	Paris	4–7	Dec	2011
•	 Expert	Group	on	the	Implications	of	ICRP	Rec-
ommendations, Arto Isolankila 3–4 Oct 2011
CSNI 
•	 CSNI	Meeting,	Petteri	Tiippana,	Lasse	Reiman,	
Paris 9.6.2011
•	 CSNI/WGRisk	 Annual	 Group	 Meeting,	 Reino	
Virolainen, Paris 27.3.–1.4.2011 
•	 CSNI/IAGE	 Working	 Group	 on	 Integrity	 and	
Ageing of Components and Structures, “Sub 
group on the integrity of metal components 
and structures”, 16th Metal Subgroup Meeting, 
Rauli Keskinen, Paris 4–8 Apr 2011
•	 CSNI	 COMPSIS	 SG-Meeting,	 Heimo	 Takala,	
Paris, 19–21 Sep 2011
•	 CSNI/CAPRI	Management	Board	meeting,	Kei-
jo Valtonen, Paris, 7–8 Feb 2011, 8–10 June 
2011, 5–9 Dec 2011
•	WGAMA	Programme	Project	Meeting,	
• SETH2-Project seminar and Hymeres-pro-
ject meeting, Eero Virtanen, Paris 11–14 Sep 
2011
• Management Board of the OECD-NEA-RO-
SA-2 Project, Eero Virtanen, Paris 18–20 Oct 
2011
•	 CSNI	HALDEN	Board	Meeting	Keijo	Valtonen,	
Washington 20–24 June 2011 ja 5–9 Dec 2011 
Paris
•	 HALDEN	Enlarged	Halden	Programme	Group	
Meeting 2011, Advisory Groups and Nordic 
TC45 Meeting, Harri Heimbürger, Sandefjord 
2–7 Oct 2011 
•	 HALDEN	Enlarged	Halden	Programme	Group	
Meeting 2011, Lena-Hansson Lyyra, Sandefjord 
2–7 Oct 2011
•	 HALDEN	Workshop	 on	 VVER	 Fuel	 behavior,	
Risto Sairanen, Budapest 10–11 May 2011
•	 OECD,	 Post-Tensioning	 Group	Workshop,	 Jari	
Louhivirta, Lyon 19–22 Apr 2011
CRPPH 
•	 NEA	 CRRPH	 Annual	 Meeting,	 Olli	 Vilkamo,	
Paris 16–18 May 2011
RWMC, Radioactive Waste Management 
Committee
•	 Radioactive	 Waste	 Management	 Committee,	
Regulators’	Forum	 (RWMC/RF),	Esko	Ruokola	
22–24 Mar, 31 May –1 June 2011
•	 Radioactive	Waste	Management	Committee,	In-
tegration	for	the	Safety	Case	(RWMC/IGSC-13),	
Petri Jussila 19–21 Oct 2011
EU
•	 Ad	Hoc	Group	Nuclear	Security,	Lasse	Reiman,	
21 Sep 2011, 21 Oct 2011, 18 Nov 2011
•	 Ad	Hoc	Group	Nuclear	Security,	Tapani	Hack,	
Brussels 26–27 July 2011, 20–21 Sep 2011, 4–5 
Nov 2011
•	 ENSREG,	European	Nuclear	Safety	Regulator’s	
Group, Petteri Tiippana 27–29 June 2011
• WG2, Risto Paltemaa 21 Jan, 1 Feb, 1 Mar, 
29 Apr, 12–13 May, 11–13 Sep, 11–12 Oct, 
4–6 Dec 2011
•	 EC	A37,	Penly	npp	General	Data,	Olli	Vilkamo,	
Luxembourg 27–29 Sep 2011
•	 EC	 A31	 meeting,	 Olli	 Vilkamo,	 Luxembourg	
21–24 Nov 2011
•	 A37	 Expert	 Group	 Meeting,	 Lauri	 Pöllänen,	
Luxembourg 7–10 Nov 2011 
•	 EU	Extra	ordinary	meeting	–	Response	 to	Ja-
pan events, Jorma Sandberg, Brussels 15–16 
Mar 2011
•	 Annual	Meetings	 (TB	&	 SC)	 of	 EC	 CH,	 Seija	
Suksi, Petten 25–27 Jan 2011
•	 EU	 Stress	 Tests	 –	 Peer	 Review	 Task	 Force	 –
meeting, Tomi Routamo, Paris 19–20 Sep 2011
•	 Pilot	Topical	 Peer	 Review	 in	 EU	 Stress	Tests,	
Riku Mattila, Tomi Routamo, Ulla Vuorio, Risto 
Sairanen, Luxembourg 7–8 Dec 2011
•	 EU	Clearinghouse	Technical	Board	and	Steer-
ing Committee, Mika Kaijanen, Petten 25–27 
Jan 2011
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•	 Regional	 Joint	 IAEA/EC-JRC	 Workshop	 Ulla	
Vuorio, Petten 22–26 Aug 2011 
•	 ENSRA-European	 Nuclear	 Security	 Regula-
tors Association, Tapani Hack, Ronnie Olander, 
Bonn 28 Nov – 1 Dec 2011
•	 SARNET2	–	Advisory	Committee	Meeting,	Tomi	
Routamo, Paris 14–15 Feb 2011
•	 Joint	Research	Centre	(JRC)	Decommissioning	
and Waste Management Expert Group, Risto 
Paltemaa 18–19 Apr, 21–22 Nov 2011
•	Working	 Party	 on	 Atomic	 Questions,	 Safety	
case/safety	 assessment	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
waste management directive, Risto Paltemaa 23 
Feb 2011
•	 Crystalline	Rock	Retention	Processes	(CROCK)	
-project, Ari Luukkonen 9–12 Feb 2011
•	Monitoring	 Developments	 for	 Safe	 Repository	
Operation and Staged Clorue (MoDeRn), Expert 
stakeholders workshop, Rainer Laaksonen 4–6 
May 2011
•	 Advisory	 Committee	 for	 implementation	 of	
Council	Directive	2006/117/Euratom,	Arja	Tan-
ninen 4 April, 8 Dec 2011
•	 ESARDA,	European	Safeguards	Research	 and	
Development Association, Steering Committee, 
Elina Martikka 16–19 May 2011
•	 ESARDA,	 Executive	 and	WG,	 Elina	Martikka	
18–20 Jan 2011
•	 ESARDA	Novel	Approaches/Novel	Technologies	
working group, Tapani Honkamaa 19–20 May 
2011
•	 ESARDA	symposium,	Anna	Lahkola,	Timo	An-
saranta 17–21 May 2011
•	 ESARDA,	Verification	Technologies	 and	Meth-
odologies Working Group, Olli Okko 16–19 May, 
3–5 Oct 2011
•	Meeting	 with	 the	 Commission	 on	 safeguards	
implementation in Finland, Elina Martikka, 12 
Oct 2011
Nordic cooperation
•	 NSFS	conference,	Nordic	Society	for	Radiation	
Protection,board meeting (board member 2005–
2011), Olli Vilkamo, Reykjavik 21–25 Aug 2011
•	 Swedish	 Radiation	 Safety	 Authority	 (SSM),	
Comparison of nuclear waste safety regulation 
and licensing procedures, Risto Paltemaa, Jussi 
Heinonen, Kai Hämäläinen, Janne Viertävä, 
Jaakko Leino, Esko Ruokola 27 Jan 2011
•	 Inspection	to	a	repository	for	operational	waste	
in Forsmark, Sweden (SFR). Katriina Labbas 
(observer), 22–23 Nov 2011.
•	 Visit	 to	 SKB’s	 Canister	 Laboratory	 and	 Äspö 
Hard Rock Laboratory in Oskarshamn, Swe-
den, Rainer Laaksonen, Jarmo Lehikoinen, Ari 
Luukkonen 28–29 Apr 2011
•	 Visit	 to	 interim	 storage	 facility	 (CLAB)	 and	
hard rock laboratory (Oscarshamn) Janne Vi-
ertävä, Kai Hämäläinen, Jaakko Leino 26 Jan 
2011
•	 Participation	in	hearing	of	international	review	
(NEA) of Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Man-
agement Company (SKB) , Jarmo Lehikoinen, 
Kai Hämäläinen 12–13 Dec 2011
•	 Presentation	 of	 the	 use	 of	 Digital	 Cherenkov	
Viewing Device (DCVD) in the Swedish interim 
spent fuel storage (CLAB), Antero Kuusi 17–18 
Feb 2011
Other multinational working groups
WENRA
•	Western	 European	 Nuclear	 Regulator’s	 Asso-
ciation, Lasse Reiman, Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Berliini 
15–16 Nov 2011
•	WENRA	Inspection	Working	Group,	Lasse	Rei-
man, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Mirka Schildt, Liv-
erpool 7–10 Feb 2011
•	WENRA/RHWG,	Reactor	Harmonization	Work-
ing Group, Lasse Reiman, Paris 5–6 Apr 2011
•	WENRA/RHWG,	Reactor	Harmonization	Work-
ing Group, Lasse Reiman, Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Pra-
ha 23–28 May 2011
•	WENRA	Inspection	Working	Group,	Lasse	Re-
iman, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Mirka Schildt, 
Stockholm 31 May –1 June 2011
•	WENRA	RHWG	Reactor	Harmonization	Work-
ing Group, Lasse Reiman, Kirsi Alm, Portoroz 
26 Sep – 1 Oct 2011
•	WENRA	RHWG	Reactor	Harmonization	Work-
ing Group, Lasse Reiman, Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Brus-
sels 9–10 Nov 2011
•	WENRA	multiple	 failure	working	group	meet-
ing, Keijo Valtonen, Köln 17–19 Aug 2011, 30 
Nov – 2 Dec 2011
•	WENRA	 Practical	 Elimination,	 meeting	 Keijo	
Valtonen, Ljubljana 17–19 Jan, 18–21 Apr 2011
•	WGWD,	Working	Group	for	Waste	and	Decom-
missioning, Esko Ruokola 10–11 Feb 2011
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MDEP
•	Multinational	 Design	 Evaluation	 Programme	
– Cooperation project of 10 countries aimed at 
achieving global harmonization in the construc-
tion of new nuclear power plants
• MDEP STC meetings 18–20 Jan 2011 ja 
26–29 Apr 2011 and 11–16 Sep 2011, STC 
meeting and MDEP conference, Petteri Tiip-
pana, Paris
•	MDEP/EPRWG,	Multinational	Design	Eval-
uation Programme, Petteri Tiippana, Kim 
Wahlström, Paris 16–18 May 2011
•	MDEP/EPRWG	 Internal	 hazards	 ad-hoc	
meeting, Ari Julin, Vesa Meuronen, Paris 
5–6 Sep 2011
•	MDEP/EPR	Working	Group	and	PRA	Meet-
ing, Ilkka Niemelä, Paris 16–19 May 2011
•	MDEP/EPR	Technical	Expert	Subgroup,	Ris-
to Sairanen, Riku Mattila, Paris 15–19 May 
2011 
•	 OECD/MDEP	Meeting,	Tomi	Routamo,	Paris	
15–18 May 2011
•	 OECD/NEA-MDEP	meeting,	Keijo	Valtonen,	
Paris 16–18 Apr 2011
•	MDEP/DI	 &	 C	 Working	 Group	 Meeting,	
Mika Johansson, Paris 7–9 Feb 2011, 27–28 
June 2011
•	MDEP/CSWG	 Codes	 and	 Standards	Work-
ing Group, Yrjö Hytönen, Paris 4–7 Dec 2011
• MDEP CSWG meeting, Rauli Keskinen, Par-
is 18–20 Apr 2011
• Observation of NRC Inspection at Westing-
house Sweden, Riku Mattila, Västerås 10 
Sep 2011
•	MDEP/VICWG	 NRC	 audit	 (Westinghouse),	
Jenny Laine, Västerås 13–16 Sep 2011
•	MDEP/VICWG	 meeting,	 Jouko	 Mononen,	
Paris 10–13 May 2011
•	MDEP/VICWG	kokous,	Martti	Vilpas,	Paris	
6–9 Dec 2011
• Task force on safety critical software meet-
ing, Mika Johansson, Liverpool 4–7 Apr 2011
VVER-Forum 
•	 VVER-forum	PSA	WG,	Reino	Virolainen,	Janne	
Laitonen, Sofia 27 June –1 July 2011
•	 VVER	forum	PSA	working	group	meeting,	Jan-
ne Laitonen, Reino Virolainen, Bratislava 1–4 
Feb 2011
•	 VVER	working	group	meeting,	Ann-Mari	Suna-
backa-Starck, Milka Holopainen, Köln 21–24 
Feb 2011
•	 VVER-forum,	 Jouko	 Mononen,	 Bratislava	 6–8	
July 2011
Participation in international meetings 
in the capacity of a lecturer, panel 
member or session chairpersons
•	 SMIRT	21	pre-conference	–	Fire	Safety,	Pekka	
Välikangas München 12–16 Sep 2011
•	 EUROSAFE	2011	seminar,	Marja-Leena	Järvi-
nen, Ulla Vuorio, Tommi Renvall, Paris 6–9 Nov 
2011 
•	 Participation	 in	 symposium	 Current	 and	 Fu-
ture Challenges, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Brygg 
18–21 Jan 2011
•	 PSAM11&ESREL2012	 presentation	 of	 the	
progress meeting of ESREL2011, Reino Viro-
lainen, Troyes 18–23 Sep 2011 
•	 VATESI	 20	 years:	 NP	 Regulation	 conference,	
Paula Karhu, Vilna 9–11 Nov 2011
•	 Conference	 of	 the	 Nordic	 Society	 for	 Rdiation	
Protection, Veli Riihiluoma, Reykjavik 21–25 
Aug 2011
•	 AtomEco-2011	Forum,	Risto	Paltemaa	31	Oct	–	
2 Nov 2011
•	 Institute	 of	 Nuclear	 Materials	 Management	
(INMM) annual meeting, Elina Martikka, Ta-
pani Honkamaa, Antero Kuusi 16–23 July 2011
•	 ESARDA-INMM	 (Institute	 of	 Nuclear	Materi-
als Management) Workshop, Elina Martikka 
17–21 Oct 2011
•	 International	 Conference	 on	 the	 Safe	 and	 Se-
cure Transport of Radioactive Materials: The 
Next Fifty Years – Creating a Safe, Secure and 
Sustainable Framework, Anna Lahkola 17–21 
Oct 2011
Standardisation working groups
•	 Kick-off	meeting	of	 the	CEN-CENELEC	Focus	
Group on Nuclear, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Brus-
sels 15–17 Nov 2011
•	 Fifth	 Meeting	 of	 CLC/TC45AX,	 Marja-Leena	
Järvinen, Brussels 6–8 Dec 2011 
•	 ISO/IEC	JTC1	SC7	meeting,	Mika	 Johansson,	
Paris 25–24 May 2011
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Participation in foreign committees
•	 Advisory	 committee	 on	 nuclear	 safety	 to	 sup-
port the Swedish nuclear authority (SSM, Strål-
säkerhetsmyndigheten), Lasse Reiman, Stock-
holm 9 Mar 2011, 15 June 2011, 14 Dec 2011, 24 
Nov 2011
•	 SSM,	Swedish	Radiation	Safety	Authority,	Av-
fallsnämnden, Risto Paltemaa 23 Aug 2011
Bilateral cooperation between authorities
•	Meeting	 with	 SSM	 MTO,	 Milka	 Holopainen,	
Hanna Kuivalainen, Ann-Mari Sunabacka-
Starck, Stockholm 27–28 Jan 2011
•	 Beredskapsövning,	 SAMÖ	 (Hubbard/Eksborg),	
Olli Vilkamo, Oskarshamn 2 Feb 2011
•	 SSM	 Cooperation	 meeting	 on	 nuclear	 safety	
research issues, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Stock-
holm, 31 Aug – 1 Sep 2011
•	 Authority	 meeting	 with	 SSM	 Nuclear	 Safety	
Department, Petteri Tiippana, Marja-Leena 
Järvinen, Kaisa Koskinen, Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Kei-
jo Valtonen, Stockholm 12–13 Dec 2011
•	 SSM-YTO/KÄY	 meeting,	 Hanna	 Kuivalainen,	
Stockholm 16–17 Nov 2011
Others
•	 NERS,	Network	of	Regulators	of	Countries	with	
small Nuclear Programmes, Petteri Tiippana, 
Capetown 12–17 Feb 2011
•	Meeting	 with	 NRC	 and	 participation	 in	 RIC	
(Regulatory Information Conference), Petteri 
Tiippana, Bethesda, Maryland 6–11 Mar 2011
•	 Participation	 in	 ICG-EAC:n	 annual	 meeting,	
Yrjö Hytönen, Dresden 8–15 May 2011
•	 FAK	(German	expert	Group)	+	TUEF	PSA	Sym-
posium, Reino Virolainen, Mannheim-Heidel-
berg 24–27 May 2011
•	 Security	workshop,	Timo	Wiander,	London	5–8	
Sep 2011
•	Workshop	on	PSA	for	New	and	Advanced	Reac-
tors, Janne Laitonen, Paris 19–22 June 2011
•	 Participation	 in	 Nordic	 PSA	 conference,	 Ulla	
Vuorio, Johannesbergs Slott, Gottröra 4–6 Sep 
2011
•	 SMiRT	21	Pre-conference	seminar	–	fire	safety,	
Matti Lehto, München 12–16 Sep 2011
•	 Serpent	 conference,	 Jukka	 Mettälä,	 Dresden-
Rossendorf 14–17 Sep 2011
•	 PLIM	&	PLEX	2011,	 conference	 participation,	
Charlotte, Petri Vuorio, Charlotte 28 Sep – 2 
Oct 2011 
•	 Nureth-14	 conference,	 Eero	 Virtanen,	 Toronto	
25 Sep – 1 Oct 2011
•	 Seismic	Engineering	Knowledge	Transfer	Semi-
nar, Yrjö Hytönen, Rez 20–25 Nov 2011
•	 14th	Technical	Meeting	 on	Risk-based	Precur-
sor Analysis, Janne Laitonen, Brussels 20–23 
Nov 2011
•	 Northnet	RM3	meeting,	Eero	Virtanen,	Västerås	
2 Dec 2011
•	 Interpol	Global	RN	Terrorism	Prevention	Con-
ference, Paula Karhu, Lyon 17–19 May 2011
•	 Excursion	to	Canada	to	become	acquainted	with	
the regulatory control of uranium mining and 
milling activities, Arja Tanninen, Tuulikki Sil-
lanpää 11–17 Sep 2011
•	 Visit	in	uranium	mine	and	milling	facilities	in	
Czech Republic, Antero Kuusi 21–24 June 2011
•	 Visit	 in	Grimsel	 hard	 rock	 laboratory,	Kai	 Ja-
kobs son 19 July 2011
•	 Uranium	mining	and	hydrogeology	-konferenssi	
(Freiberg), Ari Luukkonen 19–22 Sep 2011
•	 SSM/STUK/ASN-IRSN	 meeting,	 Ari	 Luuk-
konen, Rainer Laaksonen 15–17 Nov 2011
•	 European	Nuclear	Society	 (ENS),	Nuclear	En-
gineering Science and Technology, Nestet 2011, 
Tapani Honkamaa 15–18 May 2011
•	 Implementation	of	the	Integrated	Safeguards	in	
Ukraine,	exchange	on	the	national	experiences/
practices between Ukraine, Finland and Swe-
den, Elina Martikka, Marko Hämäläinen 8–9 
Nov 2011
•	 Global	Initiative	to	Combat	Nuclear	Terrorism	
(GICNT), Implementation and Assessment, De-
tection subgroup, Tapani Honkamaa, 27 Feb – 4 
Mar 2011
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APPENDIX 10 Glossary and abbreviations
ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)
radiation protection optimisation principle, ac-
cording to which exposure must be limited to 
being as low as reasonably achievable
BWR
boiling water reactor
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear)
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear 
weapons or hazards, for example: ”protective 
measures taken against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”
Euratom
for nuclear material safeguards, Euratom refers 
to the European Commission units responsible 
for nuclear material safeguards: Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport, Directorates 
H and I
FSAR
Final Safety Analysis Report
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSAG
International Nuclear Safety Group; organisa-
tion called by the Director General of IAEA
IRS
Incident Reporting System; nuclear power plant 
operating experience reporting system main-
tained by the IAEA and NEA
ITDB
Illicit Trafficking Data Base, an IAEA database 
to which member states deliver data on de-
viations observed as regards nuclear substances 
and radiation sources.
KYT
Finnish nuclear waste management research 
programme
LARA
I&C renewal project at the Loviisa power plant
MDEP
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme; 
a multinational cooperation programme evalu-
ating the practices and requirements of au-
thorities related to the licensing of new nuclear 
power plants
NKS (Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning)
Nordic safety research programme
OECD/NEA
OECD Nuclear Energy Association
OLC
Operational Limits and Conditions (previously 
Technical Specifications)
Onkalo
underground research facility for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel
PRA
Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
PWR
pressurised water reactor
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SAFIR
Safety of nuclear power plants; Finnish publicly 
funded national nuclear power plant research 
programme
SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation; an international team of nu-
clear material safeguard experts called by the 
Director General of the IAEA
STUK-YVL Guides
Working title for the new restructured regula-
tory guides on nuclear safety during the renew-
ing process in 2006–2009
WANO
World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association
VVER (Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky 
Reactor)
Russian pressurised water reactor; Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 are VVER-440 reactors
nuclear material 
special fissionable material suitable for the 
creation of nuclear energy, such as uranium, 
thorium or plutonium
nuclear commodity (or: nuclear material)
nuclear material referred to above or another 
material referred to in Section 2, Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (deu-
terium or graphite), device, system and infor-
mation (Section 1, paragraph 8 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree). 
nuclear material accounting and control 
manual
manual to be used by an organisation in pos-
session of nuclear commodities, describing the 
nuclear commodity safeguards and accounting 
system
nuclear non-proliferation manual
manual to be used by a future possessor of nu-
clear commodities, describing the measures to 
secure the requirements of nuclear safeguards
regulatory control of nuclear non-
proliferation
monitoring operations to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons; operations consist of 
nuclear safeguards and the monitoring of the 
nuclear test ban
EIA procedure
Enviromental Safety Assessment
YVL Guides
STUK guides containing detailed requirements 
set for the safety of nuclear power plants. 
There’s a large restructuring project going on, 
the new YVL Guides should replace old ones by 
the end of 2012. The last old style YVL Guides 
with number-only id’s were issued in 2008.
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